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This dissertation examines how contemporary state power is constructed and restricted 
through social media platforms by focusing on China’s rising role in global communication. 
Previous research on China’s approach to communication has focused mainly on censorship and 
activism at home while disregarding the fact that the Party-state is increasingly intervening in 
global information landscapes by curating information flows on Western platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter. This project draws on novel datasets and computational methods; and it 
integrates theoretical insights from global communication, comparative political communication, 
and international relations to develop a theory of how a rising non-Western and non-democratic 
power wields Western platforms for expanding its propaganda efforts. The theoretical framework 
is tested and supported by three empirical studies. In the first study, I reveal that Chinese state 
media actively leverage Western platforms to provide alternative news and craft national images, 
and global audiences engage with propagandized content. In the second study, I further 
demonstrate that the Chinese state media strategically shape international news by reporting 
different stories to foreign countries. Economic factors drive the structure of international news 
flows. In the third study, I test how Western platforms regulate and restrict this new practice of 
globalizing propaganda through strategic flagging of state media accounts. Collectively, these 
findings provide a composite framework to explore the stakeholders of globalizing propaganda, 
explain the components behind China’s subversive penetration in global communication, and 
advance the scholarly understanding of state-sponsored international propaganda in the social 








“Across the Great Wall we can reach every corner of the world” 
    – The first email sent from China, September 14, 1987 
 
In February 2021, China Global Television Network (CGTN), a Chinese state-run multi-
language media channel, lost its broadcast license in the UK because the communication 
regulator Ofcom concluded that the news network was fully owned by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). At the same time, politicians and regulators in Germany and France discussed the 
challenge of preserving CGTN to stay on the air in Europe. However, this effort to ban CGTN 
does not necessarily mean that it cannot deliver news for European and/or global audiences 
today. On the contrary, CGTN had obtained more than 100 million followers on Facebook in 
2020, making it the most popular media outlet on the largest platform in the world1. Along with 
other Chinese state media like Xinhua (89 million followers) and People’s Daily (89 million 
followers), CGTN seeks to use Facebook and other platforms to dish up propaganda and 
simultaneously compete with Western mainstream media outlets at the international level.
 
1 Although there have questions about the number of followers that CGTN and other Chinese state media obtained 
on Western social media platforms, Facebook claimed that less than 0.001% of the total followers of Chinese state 




To be sure, Western social media platforms have provided China an accessible bullhorn. 
In recent years, Chinese state media are increasingly flooding into Facebook and Twitter to offer 
multilanguage news for global audiences (Huang & Wang, 2019; Nip & Sun, 2018; Timmons & 
Horwitz, 2016). Among the top 10 news outlets with the most followers on Facebook, six are 
Chinese state media, including CGTN, CCTV (China Central Television), Xinhua, People’s 
Daily, China Daily, and Global Times2. The main purpose of these media organizations, 
according to Chinese President Xi Jinping, is to “tell China’s story well, spread China’s voice 
well, let the world know a three-dimensional, colorful China, and showcase China’s role as a 
builder of world peace” (AP, 2016).  
However, the global expansion of Chinese state media presents a paradox. At home, the 
Chinese government has technically blocked Western platforms including Facebook and Twitter. 
As such, Chinese citizens cannot access these platforms unless they bypass the Great Firewall. 
Ironically, Chinese state media are substantially adopting these domestically-banned platforms to 
disseminate propaganda and shape online information. Then, to what extent and in what ways are 
Chinese state media leveraging Western platforms that are blocked in China for propaganda 
operations? How does this shift challenge our understanding of the current global 
communication order and international information landscape? What might this convey in 
renewing a scholarly examination of disrupted state-power (Owen, 2015) – a period purportedly 
testing the relevance and permanence of the state in the social media age? 
In this dissertation, I argue that China’s prominence on Western social media platforms 
has resulted in a profound shift in the order of global communication and a rising non-Western 
and non-democratic nation is increasingly displaying and exercising communication power 
 




throughout the world. The ongoing shift will determine who can influence the flows of 
international information online, as well as how such influences will be solidified in the social 
media age. Indeed, it has been argued that power can be constructed and maintained through the 
management and control of communication processes (Castells, 2013). Castells (2013, p. 10) 
defines power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically 
the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, and 
values.” He further considers communication as “the sharing of meaning through the exchange 
of information” (Castells, 2013, p. 54). Beyond Castells’ agnosticism in clarifying precisely how 
contemporary communication power may entangle, compete, or cohere with our established 
scholarly understandings of state power, certainly, the rise of social media has provided a 
significant communication revolution that changes how power relations are constructed and 
practiced in our society (Castells, 2007; Owen, 2015).  
The fact that Chinese state media can distribute information globally via Western 
platforms constitutes an enormous transformation that a rising power has the potential to 
influence the attitudes and perceptions of audiences through communication. That is, China has 
the potential to globalize its propaganda practice via Western platforms. To understand the 
transformation more precisely, this dissertation proposes a framework of globalizing propaganda 
to theoretically investigate the rise of China on Western platforms. In this dissertation, I consider 
propaganda as the production and dissemination of information, including facts, rumors, and 
misleading messages, to purposefully influence and distribute public opinions. Globalizing 
propaganda, therefore, refers to the expansion of such practices into global communication 
sphere, aiming to affect people of foreign countries. While recent literature suggests that 




propaganda is mainly conducted by state-sponsored actors like Chinese state media CGTN for 
deliberately displaying China’s power and meantime influencing others’ attitudes and 
perceptions.   
Scholars in several disciplines have analyzed the relationships between power and 
communication. First, communication and media researchers have extensively examined the 
political implications of new communication technologies (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; 
Howard, 2006; Howard & Hussain, 2013; Papacharissi, 2015). The scholarship of championing 
the democratic potential of distributed media and networked communication proposes that there 
has been a positive association between digital media use and democratic transformation, 
suggesting that new communication technologies can challenge the legitimacy and stability of 
centralized authoritarian regimes (Bailard, 2012; Esarey & Xiao, 2011; G. Yang, 2009). For 
example, some suggest that social media platforms enable democratic development by lowering 
transaction costs, providing alternative information, and facilitating collective actions 
(Valenzuela, 2013; G. Yang, 2009). Ubiquitous Internet access has been expected to bring 
political changes to non-democracies (Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014). By contrast, the competing 
perspective cognizant of state repression suggests that the widespread growth of new 
communication technologies can, instead, empower authoritarian stakeholders to bolster regime 
interests and capabilities (Morozov, 2011; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). These scholars claim that 
social media cannot simply undermine authoritarian regimes because state actors often have the 
reigning capabilities to control new technologies’ infrastructural, cultural, economic, and 
operational prerogatives (Svensson, 2014; Youmans & York, 2012). 
Political scientists also invest in articulating how state power can be strengthened and 




Hindman, 2008; Prior, 2007; Roberts, 2018). Compared to communication researchers who 
focus primarily on media, sometimes too endogenously, political scientists are more attentive to 
the roles that political actors and institutions play in the process of power distribution via 
communication, as well as various strategies adopted by state actors for repression (Farrell, 
2012). Disciplinarily, political science often examines how centralized state power can increase 
the odds against the democratic affordances of social media platforms (B. Miller, 2018; Roberts, 
2018). For instance, some argue that while new communication technologies can enhance 
political participation and civic engagement, such technologies also enable state power to 
improve social control and repression (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Xu, 2021). According to 
these studies, state actors can manipulate the spread of information on social media, thus 
restricting citizens from accessing certain types of information and sources (King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013; MacKinnon, 2008; B. Miller, 2018). Others have also identified that authoritarian 
regimes adapt multiple, nuanced, and layered strategies to manage the spread of online 
information, rather than simply gradations of censorship at large (Han, 2018; Hassid, 2012; 
Lorentzen, 2014; Roberts, 2018). 
Between the risks of juggling disciplinary foci, we should be careful to avoid the pitfalls 
of disciplinary determinism. For example, communication and media researchers concentrate 
closely on media content and media use while disregarding the large political and social contexts 
often changing underneath. As Howard and Hussain (2013) have found in their study of the Arab 
Spring uprisings of 2010-2012, some countries had deeper social and historical roots of rebellion 
long before the introduction of Facebook and Twitter. State-society relations also vary and 




small reflection of these larger conditions. Hence, it is often unclear whether and how state 
power can be displayed through the production of online news and information globally. 
Moreover, many studies of communication and political science still suggest simply that 
authoritarian regimes are mainly interested in manipulating and controlling information flows 
within their borders while overlooking the observable fact that state actors themselves have 
unprecedentedly turned their focus outward to display and exercise power in global 
communication (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Thussu, De Burgh, & Shi, 2017). In other words, while 
academic interests across communication and political science imagine that state powers are 
cautious and careful in handling social media in order to control and manage it at home, on the 
other hand the trends on the ground suggest that state powers are increasingly innovating, 
creating, and investing ambitiously in advancing state power, not limiting civic agency. The 
rapid growth of Chinese state media on Western platforms illustrates both this significant shift in 
state power through global communication and academic near-sightedness in being agnostic to it. 
That is, a major non-Western and non-democratic state power contending with the United States’ 
role as a global superpower is steadily challenging and reshaping international information flows 
dominated by Western nations, and is doing so in part by wielding democratic platforms to 
further its non-Western interests.  
Thus, the case of China’s rise on Western platforms presents a notable challenge to 
established scholarly understandings of global and comparative political communication. In 
contrast to the prevailing literature, I argue that we need to move attention away from the 
democratic effects of social media in authoritarianism to the investigation of how state power can 
globalize its influences through communication, as exemplified in the case of global-digital 




legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, we should also ask to what extent authoritarian interests 
could reshape, disrupt, and challenge the order of global communication landscapes so far 
dominated by Western states’ interests. This also means that we need to avoid the prima facie 
focus of studying social media’s impacts in political communication in such a way that a) does 
not take for granted that the impacts are only domestic, and thus b) moves beyond agnosticism of 
state-power, and importantly the differences within and across states altogether in a digitally 
interconnected world-system fundamentally dependence on global communication flows. 
To do so, in this dissertation, I contend that China is actively and purposefully 
intervening in global communication for the purposes of framing national images, offering 
counter-flows of international information, and attracting foreign audiences. I reveal that China 
has implemented an additive approach to expand its propaganda beyond its territory in order to 
reach and affect audiences around the globe, not generally but rather very specifically with 
differentiated and nuanced audience engagement strategies. The additive and layered approach 
enables China to show and enhance its power in the global information landscape, suggesting 
that it has the potential to become a leading actor in global communication through scale and 
sophistication. 
It is necessary to reimagine how social media could be harnessed by state actors to 
facilitate international propaganda3. Yet, there are three obstacles to drawing this goal into a 
scholarly engagement. First, although there are many theories that explain China’s approach to 
communication at home or domestically (Jiang & Fu, 2018; Plantin & de Seta, 2019; Roberts, 
2018; G. Yang, 2009), we still lack an understanding of how China’s approach is implemented in 
 
3 International propaganda (i.e., the operation of propaganda abroad) is also called “external propaganda” or 




the global context, to foreign audiences. If the Party-state cannot censor sensitive content on 
Facebook and Twitter beyond its borders, how then do state media tell the stories of China for 
global audiences? Second, previous literature on China’s foreign propaganda is limited to 
examining the role of international broadcasting in Africa (Bailard, 2016; Wasserman & Madrid-
morales, 2018; Wu, 2016), but it fails to investigate its operation on Western platforms. China’s 
rise on Western platforms represents a qualitative and theoretically nuanced shift in wielding 
power via communication. Third, recent theoretical advancement in articulating this type of 
qualitative shift in international propaganda exists, but is limited to understanding Russia and 
mis-/disinformation campaigns (Elswah & Howard, 2020; Golovchenko et al., 2020; Lukito, 
2020). Although these studies provide empirical evidence to understand the mechanism of 
foreign propaganda on social media, China’s practices are different and hence require specific 
exploration and authentication. 
Therefore, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to provide a theoretical perspective 
to understand the trends that characterize the practice and regulation of China’s rise in global 
communication. Across three empirical studies, I reveal that China is proactively globalizing its 
propaganda apparatus to amplify its presence by offering China’s stories and perspectives 
abroad, though its effectiveness is still in question. In particular, I unveil that the globalization of 
propaganda allows China to present itself as a culture and society rather than a polity and 
military power (Study 1). Then, I show that Chinese state media tend to highlight China’s 
international economic connections when covering other foreign countries on Western platforms 
(Study 2). Finally, I find that corporate stakeholders of Western platforms have taken note and 
advanced their own efforts to regulate and curb the exercise of China’s propaganda. This 




investments depends upon the governance dynamics surrounding Western social media platforms 
(Study 3). 
 
Literature Review  
 To advance this study, I draw on three domains of literature. First, I examine existing 
studies from global and comparative political communication to determine how scholars theorize 
the transformation of global communication order (I). Second, I synthesize scholarship from 
propaganda studies to understand how state-sponsored propaganda has reemerged as an 
important topic in the field of communication research, and what is still missing in this recently 
exhumed Cold War literature (II). Finally, I draw on studies that specifically focus on China’s 
propaganda and its expansion in global communication to assess how researchers have theorized 
China’s approach to international propaganda (III).  
 
I. The Transformation of Global Communication  
 Global communication was originally formed during the mid-nineteenth century when 
telegraph and submarine cables were deployed for fostering the exchange of economic and 
informational products between Europe and North America (Headrick & Griset, 2001; Hills, 
2002). The transatlantic cables between Britain and Canada and the submarine cables in the 
Mediterranean not only helped the British government conduct long-distance control but also 
created the first international communication networks (Schiller, 2011). As a result, global media 
organizations like Reuters in the UK and Havas in France arose and fundamentally affected the 
flows of international news (Winseck & Pike, 2007, 2009). More importantly, the growth of 




distribution (Hills, 2002). This illustrates the power of global communication in shaping and 
reconstructing political and economic power, as well as information distribution in the world. 
The US, France, and Germany used to be major players in global communication in the 
early twentieth century (Headrick & Griset, 2001). The introduction of telephone and shortwave 
radio networks in the early twentieth century allowed the US to challenge the British monopoly 
in global communication order (Hills, 2007; Schiller, 2011). The use of coaxial cables further 
strengthened the US dominance in international communication networks after World War II 
(Starosielski, 2015), and thus “Media are American” (Tunstall, 1977). Since the 1990s, the rise 
of the Internet, mobile communication, and social media platforms have significantly enhanced 
the dominance of the US in the global communication order (Parks & Starosielski, 2015; 
Schiller, 2011; Youmans & Powers, 2012). Consequently, they have also solidified the 
coherence of American power, by making other nations, media markets, and cultural affinities 
more accessible as well – exemplified in the rise of K-POP music, Bollywood cinema, and 
Turkish daytime television, for example (Jin, 2013). 
Two important transformations have emerged during the past decade. The first is the shift 
from comparing media systems to hybrid media systems in which multiple stakeholders steadily 
interact with and interdepend upon each other in a complex system (Chadwick, 2017). The 
second transformation is the rise of non-Western media organizations with the purpose of 
offering the counter-flows of international information and reshaping global communication 
(Thussu, 2018; Youmans & Powers, 2012). In this dissertation, I underscore that these two 





First, during the heyday of American global power after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
scholars argued that a country’s media system was determined by sub-national structural factors 
such as the type of media market, political system, and journalism culture (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004). The advancement of social media platforms, however, challenged traditional models of 
media systems initially proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Rather than considering a 
country’s media as an isolated system mainly determined by country-level factors, researchers 
soon claimed that current media systems are increasingly experiencing transformation and 
convergence (Mattoni & Ceccobelli, 2018; Nechushtai, 2018). As a result, media systems have 
become hybrid so that the production and dissemination of information are simultaneous 
integration and fragmentation (Chadwick, 2017). Multiple stakeholders, including old and new 
media, political actors, audiences, are integrated in the hybrid media systems for the purposes of 
shaping the information flows. This hybridity also foregrounds the complexity and transition of 
media and politics, meaning that we need to develop a new type of mode for thinking about and 
analyzing global communication. That is, we need to separate it from the presuppositions 
established during the Cold War, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union – both of which 
preceded the global digital transformation shaping today’s world-system.  
Second, while the current global communication order is largely owned and dominated 
by major Western countries and Western media, it is undergoing a significant transformation and 
evolution triggered by the growth of non-Western countries including China, India, Russia, and 
Qatar (Elswah & Howard, 2020; Thussu, 2018; Youmans & Powers, 2012). Echoing related 
shifts have been referred to by international relations scholars as, “the rise of the rest,” “the re-
centering of global power,” “the Sino century,” the Sino-Indian century,” “the Asian Century,” 




from the West to the Other has been challenged and modified. More recently, as the widespread 
use of social media has made communication and media systems more global, connected, and 
hybrid than ever before (Castells, 2011; Chadwick, 2017; van Dijck, Poell, & de Waal, 2018), 
non-Western media agencies like Russia Today and Al Jazeera have increasingly reshaped and 
reconstructed international information flows (Diamond, Plattner, & Walker, 2016; Thussu, 
2018). These layered transformations, while still ongoing, indicate the possibility that media 
organizations in non-Western countries are essentially destabilizing Western media dominance. 
As such, we need to systematically examine how countries like China are intervening in 
international information landscapes and what roles this may play in the transformation of the 
global communication order.  
 
II. The Resurgence of Propaganda Research 
Propaganda is conventionally defined as “a deliberate, systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014, p.7). It is one of the major means 
for persuading and manipulating the public (Ellu, 1973; Lasswell, 1938). State-sponsored 
propaganda had provoked a great deal of scholarly interest during the first half of the twentieth 
century (Simpson, 2015). For example, Lasswell (1938) considered propaganda as the control 
and management of opinions and claimed that it served to mobilize hatred against the enemy. In 
addition, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) argued that the news media played a key role in 
disseminating propaganda and maintaining capitalist hegemony. While the early literature 




efforts are essential for consent-engineering in contemporary democratic societies (Carey, 1995; 
Herman & Chomsky, 2008).   
It is noteworthy that propaganda operations do not always emphasize domestic audiences. 
Instead, foreign propaganda has been widely used to affect foreign publics and international 
politics. Nazi Germany, for instance, strategically employed radio broadcasts to disseminate war 
information before and during World War II (Adena, Enikolopov, Petrova, Santarosa, & 
Zhuravskaya, 2015). Similarly, BBC in the UK and Voice of America (VOA) in the US also 
actively broadcasted propaganda content abroad during wartime (Rawnsley, 1997). During the 
late twentieth century, broadcast networks have become the main arena for the practice of 
foreign propaganda (Gilboa, 2005; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Many countries continue to use 
government-funded media outlets, such as the BBC World Service (UK), VOA (US), Radio 
France Internationale (France), and Russia Today (Russia), to report international news from the 
perspective of the host country (Tsan Kuo Chang & Lin, 2014; Wright, Scott, & Bunce, 2020). 
These efforts to renew and develop a deeper understanding of news-based strategies have led to a 
more focused program of inquiry on propaganda and public diplomacy, which explores the ways 
by which foreign governments work to influence foreign public opinion through their 
broadcasting networks (Entman, 2008; Miladi, 2006).  
As I noted early in this chapter, propaganda is the production and dissemination of 
information by state actors to purposefully influence and distribute public opinions. This 
definition is consistent with previous propaganda studies in three aspects. First, my idea echoes 
the classic definition proposed by Jowett and O’Donnell (2014), focusing on the deliberate and 
purposeful practice for manipulation and influence. Second, I consider states, particularly state-




previous studies focusing on VOA and other state media practices in democratic countries 
(Gilboa, 2005; Rawnsley, 1997). Third, I also recognize the expansion of propaganda around the 
world. Although my definition of propaganda is related to prior literature, this dissertation shifts 
our attention to the understanding of globalizing propaganda through Western platforms. As I 
will discuss in detail in this chapter, the shift suggests a new way of thinking and analyzing 
propaganda in the social media age. 
The term propaganda was considered as a negative connotation, thus its altered version – 
public diplomacy – has been widely used by researchers to explore how nation-states connect 
with the public of foreign countries (Tsan Kuo Chang & Lin, 2014; Simpson, 2015). Public 
diplomacy refers to state-sponsored communication strategies aiming at persuading the public of 
other countries (Malone, 1985). The main purpose is to cultivate “favorability toward the 
practicing country” among foreign audiences (Entman, 2008, p.88). The closely-related concept 
of soft power indicates a nation’s ability to affect foreign publics and governments through 
cultural attraction and resonance rather than hard power (e.g., military might or economic 
coercion) (Nye, 2004). Soft power works through its ability to attract rather than enforce, and fits 
within the larger strategies of public diplomacy as an important means to improve a country’s 
international image (Nye, 2008).  
Furthermore, the proliferation of social media platforms enabling multi-directional 
communication and interaction requires us to explore new forms of propaganda that have 
emerged in the new media environment (Castells, 2013). Researchers claim that foreign 
propaganda today works by directly engaging foreign citizens in conversations and emphasizing 
interaction, engagement, and relationship building in a flexible and decentralized media 




country facilitates nation-branding activities and reputation management through direct 
interaction with foreign publics (Aronczyk, 2013).  
The recent growth of foreign propaganda and mis-/disinformation campaigns has brought 
propaganda back into communication research (Col Jarred Prier, 2017; Golovchenko et al., 2020; 
Woolley & Howard, 2018). More recently, political actors around the world are increasingly 
weaponizing social media for political purposes (Farkas, Schou, & Neumayer, 2018; King et al., 
2017; Xia et al., 2019) and this has raised growing concerns regarding information manipulation 
across the world (Bimber & Gil de Zúñiga, 2020; M. L. Miller & Vaccari, 2020). For example, 
studies have examined how Russia can apply Western platforms such as Twitter and YouTube to 
spread disinformation and asymmetrically impact social media users, arguing that authoritarian 
regimes can enhance their influences in the social media age (e.g., Freelon et al., 2020; 
Golovchenko, Buntain, Eady, Brown, & Tucker, 2020; Lukito, 2020). Such “information 
disorder” (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) and “computational propaganda” (Woolley & Howard, 
2018) have significantly challenged the role of communication in political life and global affairs.  
Foreign propaganda today comprehensively leverages social media and automation 
techniques, aiming to integrate political agenda into the online information environment. Various 
tactics are adopted, ranging from state-sponsored trolling and mis-/disinformation campaigns 
aiming to mislead people and disrupt public opinion (i.e., black propaganda) to public diplomacy 
carried out by state-funded media focusing on soft power (i.e., white propaganda) (Elswah & 
Howard, 2020; Lukito, 2020; Xia et al., 2019). While the former has raised alarms since the 2016 
US presidential election, the latter has received less attention probably because it is not overtly 
fake. Nevertheless, it is a common and effective way for foreign countries to instill in the public 




 However, existing research on propaganda and social media focuses mainly on Russia’s 
efforts (Elswah & Howard, 2020; Golovchenko et al., 2020; Lukito et al., 2020), whereas little 
attention has been paid to understand how China adopts social media platforms for propaganda 
operation and information manipulation. In fact, Chinese state media are vociferously producing 
news content on Western platforms, equaling and oftentimes outnumbering the online followers 
of the incumbent news agencies (Timmons & Horwitz, 2016). As China’s news agencies surge 
on platforms that Chinese citizens are banned from accessing, we need to investigate how this 
might reshape the understanding of international propaganda on social media platforms. In 
addition, there is considerable research on the subject of black propaganda including mis-
/disinformation campaigns and social bots (Woolley & Howard, 2018; Xia et al., 2019), yet 
hardly any work has addressed how state actors produce news stories and how audiences engage 
with the practice of white propaganda on large platforms like Facebook. Therefore, this 
dissertation interrogates how the intervention of state power reshapes and reconstructs news 
production on social media platforms.   
 
III. China’s Propaganda and Its Expansion in Global Communication 
China began to embrace information and communication technologies in the 1980s 
(Harwit, 2008; Zhao, 2010). The Party-state not only adopts emerging technologies for the 
purpose of economic growth and technological innovation (Hong, 2017), but also adaptively 
engages with information control and propaganda operations (Creemers, 2017; Han, 2018). The 
political and social implications of information and communication technologies in China have 
been long and widely discussed by communication scholars (Jiang & Fu, 2018; G. Yang, 2009) 




broader control systems led by the Party-state, aiming to persuade citizens and manufacture 
consent (Shambaugh, 2007). The Publicity Department of the CCP is the backbone of China’s 
propaganda system (Brady, 2009). Traditional propaganda techniques include media control, 
indoctrinations, ideological education and exams, and mass mobilization (Brady, 2009; 
Shambaugh, 2007). Previous research has claimed that China has strategically updated its 
propaganda systems since 1989 (Brady, 2009). The rise of social media offers new opportunities 
for improving propaganda in the era of Xi Jinping (Creemers, 2017). 
Domestically, China has launched multiple online campaigns including the use of popular 
culture and automation to modernize propaganda on platforms (Bolsover & Howard, 2019; Han, 
2018). For instance, the Party-state has promoted digital persuasion by actively adopting social 
media and fostering patriotic users (Chen, Kaye, & Zeng, 2021; Han, 2018). Meanwhile, these 
initiatives emphasize Chinese President Xi Jinping and portray him as a political idol (Repnikova 
& Fang, 2018). In addition, automation and state-sponsored commenters (i.e., 50-cent party) are 
widely used by the Party-state to disseminate pro-regime content and distract online opinions on 
social media (Bolsover & Howard, 2019; King et al., 2017). These efforts purport to persuade 
people using popular culture and digital platforms, indicating that China is extraordinarily adept 
in leveraging new technologies for propaganda works (Creemers, 2017; Han, 2018). 
At the same time, the Chinese government launched media “going-out” policy in the 
early 2000s, seeking to reshape its national image and affecting both overseas Chinese and 
foreigners (Brady, 2015). Researchers argue that the Chinese government has in fact become a 
skilled player – arguably leading the way in the most cutting-edge advancements of foreign 
propaganda (Kurlantzick, 2007; Min & Luqiu, 2020; Scott, 2015; Wang, 2011). China’s 




BBC in Africa, and have been increasingly engaged by China’s leadership to serve the state’s 
public diplomacy goals (Gorfinkel, Joffe, Van Staden, & Wu, 2014). In addition, state-owned 
media like Xinhua and People’s Daily strategically employ Twitter and Facebook to compete 
with Western mainstream media and frame China’s policies in a favorable light (Huang & Wang, 
2020; Liang, 2019; Nip & Sun, 2018).  
Notably, China has devoted significant resources to improve foreign propaganda after Xi 
Jinping came to power in 2012 (Tsai, 2017). For example, the government rebranded CCTV’s 
international broadcasting under the name CGTN in 2016. Xi further announced that Chinese 
media should “tell China’s story well, spread China’s voice well” (AP, 2016). This shows 
China’s attempt to influence and control the global information landscape by generating news 
stories for global audiences.  
Nevertheless, previous studies on China’s foreign propaganda focus predominantly on 
China’s international broadcasting in Africa (Bailard, 2016; Wasserman & Madrid-morales, 
2018; Wu, 2016), much less work has been done on investigating how Chinese media employ 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter to disseminate propaganda and attract foreign publics. 
Moreover, others have explored the institutional structure and process of propaganda in China 
(Brady, 2015; Creemers, 2017), but few have attempted to examine the content structure of 
globalizing propaganda. If the official aspiration is to “tell China’s story” and “spread China’s 
voice”, then how do state media achieve this goal by producing news content? How do global 
audiences engage with these stories? And how could social media platforms regulate the 





A Framework of Globalizing Propaganda 
In this dissertation, I propose a theoretical framework that identifies and contextualizes 
the relevant stakeholders, components, and information flows of globalizing propaganda. The 
framework lays out some of the important trajectories of globalizing propaganda and is based on 
three domains of literature I reviewed. In particular, studies on global and comparative political 
communication recognize the shift toward a hybrid system and the rise of non-Western nations 
(Chadwick, 2017; Thussu et al., 2017). Propaganda research suggests that researchers need to 
investigate how foreign countries and international news have been reshaped and reconstructed 
by propaganda efforts (Ellu, 1973; Zollmann, 2019). Recent literature on computational 
propaganda further indicates the importance of social media platforms in the practice of 
international propaganda (Woolley & Howard, 2018). Finally, prior studies on China’s 
propaganda hold that Chinese state media are purposefully framing China in favorable ways and 
offering China’s perspectives for international affairs (Huang & Wang, 2019; Nip & Sun, 2018).  
Building upon these scholarships, I argue that there are four stakeholders in the operation 
of globalizing propaganda: the host country (i.e., China), global audiences, guest countries, and 
social media platforms. Further, there are two components that link these stakeholders: practice 
and regulation. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of globalizing propaganda requires 
researchers to examine the relationship among these stakeholders. First, the practice of 
globalizing propaganda refers to the production and consumption of propaganda content on 
social media platforms. In other words, it explores what content has been provided by the media 
of the host country, as well as how global audiences engage with propaganda content on social 
media platforms. I further distinguish the practice into two aspects. The first is related to the 




national image and reputation of the host country in order to affect global audiences. The second 
aspect involves the coverage of foreign nations (i.e., guest countries). This shows how 
international news has been shaped and how other countries have been reported by the host 
country. Hence, the practice component explains how the host country adopts social media 
platforms to cover its own stories as well as the stories of the other countries. This component 
hence helps us understand how propaganda has been globalized and how global audiences react 
to such practice.  
Second, in a hybrid media system, the production and consumption of news should be 
considered as interactions between multiple stakeholders including news media, state actors, 
audiences, and social media platforms. Therefore, my framework also takes into account the role 
of platforms in globalizing propaganda. In particular, the connection between the host country 
and the platforms examines the regulation of globalizing propaganda, as social media platforms 
have the capacity to moderate and control information produced by propaganda sources. Here I 
define regulation as a system of rules, norms, and policies managing and governing users and 
content of an online community. The use of Western platforms for international propaganda 
means that the host country has to depend upon these platforms for achieving its political goals. 
As a result, Western platforms can govern and manage information flows offered by the host 
country, and the regulation could restrict the dissemination of globalizing propaganda. This 
component thus helps entail an expansion of previous studies focusing mainly on news media 
and audiences by recognizing the role of platform regulation.  
Overall, the proposed framework provides an overarching view for exploring and 




as an integrated system that has different stakeholders and components. Thus, my framework 




Challenges in Studying Globalizing Propaganda 
The most common challenge in studying globalizing propaganda lies in avoiding the 
tendency of disciplinary determinism and methodology determinism. Disciplinary determinism 
occurs when a researcher relies exclusively on her or his own field, thereby omitting the corpus 
of knowledge offered by other disciplines. Consequently, such determinism will limit the scope 
and boundaries of academic research. As I have discussed in this chapter, communication and 
media researchers have paid particular attention to the democratic potential and constraint of 
digital technologies in authoritarian regimes. Although this focus has produced a significant 
body of literature about state power and social media, it fails to recognize the fact that state 
power can expand and globalize its presence and influence through communication. To 
overcome disciplinary determinism, I focus on interdisciplinarity to develop this dissertation 
project. Rather than debating whether social media can democratize authoritarian regimes, I 
argue that we need to think differently about how authoritarian regimes can leverage social 
media for political goals. The shift of thinking requires us to synthesize knowledge from 
traditional disciplines, discover gaps in our knowledge that lie between traditional disciplines, 
and make knowledge more relevant to society. In this regard, interdisciplinarity signals the 




Methodology determinism occurs when a researcher depends merely on one or two 
specific research methods while overlooking the possibility of other methods and analytic 
techniques. This type of challenge will restrict the way by which theories are developed and 
tested, and consequently, restrain the exploration of new phenomena. Indeed, traditional 
quantitative methods in social sciences were designed to produce inferences about social actions 
(King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). In the field of communication, researchers are often interested 
in the antecedents and consequences of media use, and they achieve the goal by analyzing the 
attitudes, perceptions, motivations, and behaviors of people. Methodologically speaking, the 
media effect approach is concerned almost exclusively with self-reported data and linear models. 
While this approach does help researchers investigate the implications of media in Western 
democratic countries, I argue for a different analytical frame that treats communication as 
political and social practices that have multiple actors including institutions, governments, users, 
and platforms. This is particularly important in global communication and comparative political 
communication because researchers usually lack detailed and reliable individual-level data to test 
their theories, and more importantly, the individual-level concentration may ignore the cultural 
and social contexts. In this dissertation, I start with the assumption that a communication process 
contains multiple actors such as media outlets and foreign countries. The multiplicity suggests 
that we need to investigate not only individual-level factors but also the role of other actors in the 
process.  
In recent years, computational social science has exploded in prominence to study how 
power is exercised through communication. Compared with traditional approaches used in 
communication and political science, this new scholarly group tends to develop computational 




has provided more alternatives to address methodological challenges and generate patterns and 
inferences from massive datasets (Molina & Garip, 2019; Shah, Cappella Ramesh, & Neuman, 
2015). Of course, computational social science also has its own challenges. It is possibly the best 
time for communication research not only because researchers can access large amounts of data 
and powerful computational tools, but also because almost every aspect of politics, culture, and 
economy has been enabled via communication. On the other hand, it is the worst of times due to 
the difficulty of evaluating the data-generating process, the rapid change of platforms’ policies, 
as well as the influence of tech companies on academic inquiry.  
 
Research Methods 
To address the methodology determinism, I adopt three research methods to analyze 
China’s globalizing propaganda. This section offers a brief introduction about these methods and 
more details will be offered in Chapters 2 – 4. First, automated content analysis is used to 
analyze news content offered by Chinese state media on Western platforms. The big data and 
computation revolutions have offered remarkable tools and massive textual data (Evans & 
Aceves, 2016). Rather than human coding a sample of data, researchers now can leverage 
automated content analysis to categorize and explore large amounts of textual data. This 
approach has been widely employed to examine various topics in social sciences, including 
political discourse (Stewart & Zhukov, 2009), comparative politics (Lucas et al., 2015), 
newspaper coverage (DiMaggio, Nag, & Blei, 2013), and social media (Barberá, 2015). In this 
dissertation, I employ dictionary-based approach and supervised learning method to classify 
textual data into a variety of categories, such as news topics and news sentiment (Study1, Study 




both dictionary-based and supervised learning methods allow me to examine large amounts of 
data. I will discuss the detailed methods in the next chapter. 
Second, I argue that we must look beyond traditional analytics that do not vary at more 
than one level. While researchers have discussed the benefit of multilevel modeling techniques 
modeling (also known as linear mixed-effect models, mixed models) in communication research 
(Pan & McLeod, 1991), it is until recently that empirical studies begin to utilize this method to 
understand various communication phenomena (Hayes, 2006). Compared to statistical models 
focusing on one-level observations, multilevel modeling takes into account the fact that human 
behaviors are influenced by both individual factors like motivations and structural factors like 
media environment (Hayes, 2006; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Recently, communication studies 
have used multilevel modeling to study topics like media supply (Althaus, Cizmar, & Gimpel, 
2009), news exposure (Strauß, Huber, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2020), and civic engagement 
(Ceccobelli, Quaranta, & Valeriani, 2020). Multilevel approaches are particularly appropriate for 
my dissertation research, given the fact that my data are organized at more than one level. This 
also means that the units of analysis will not be the same in this dissertation. This approach 
enables me to examine China’s globalizing propaganda at the content-level, country-level, and 
daily-level (Study 2 and Study 3).  
Finally, I rely on time series analysis to understand the change of globalizing propaganda 
over time. Compared with cross-sectional data, time series analysis enables researchers to 
examine temporal dynamics and social processes over time (Box-Steffensmeier, Freeman, Hitt, 
& Pevehouse, 2014). Recent communication studies have adopted time series to investigate user 




massive amounts of data over time, time series approach will help me systematically explore the 
patterns and dynamics of my data (Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3). 
 
Data 
This dissertation project draws upon two sources of data. The first is a dataset consisting 
of news content created by Chinese state media on Facebook. The first phase of data collection 
was to determine appropriate Chinese media organizations on Facebook. Three standards were 
used to identify targeted media (i.e., Facebook Pages): 1) the Page must be operated by the CCP 
or Chinese government, 2) each media Page must have been verified by Facebook, and 3) each 
Page should post substantive English-language content. By doing so, I initially identified eleven 
Chinese state media on Facebook, and seven of them produced regular news content in English.  
These seven media outlets include televisions (CGTN, CGTN America, CGTN Africa), 
newspapers (People’s Daily, Global Times, and China Daily), and news agency (Xinhua). Thus, 
they cover the full range and diversity of China’s state-led news media operating on Facebook. 
In the second phase, I used Facebook’s Application Programming Interface (API) to collect the 
full population of news content and data about audience attentiveness. The final dataset was 
made organizing each media from the date of its creation (ranging from 11/5/2009 to 5/2/2013) 
to June 30, 20174. Overall, the dataset includes 266,772 posts and related data and is used to 
examine the practice of China’s globalizing propaganda. 
The second dataset is about Chinese media on Twitter. Following the same approach, I 
first compiled a list of Twitter accounts that are operated by Chinese media organizations and 
 





then selected those are: 1) verified by Twitter, and 2) actively producing English news. This 
yielded 30 media accounts. Next, I relied on Twitter’s API to collect data from these accounts. I 
gathered data in a consecutive 60-day period between July 17, 2020 and September 14, 2020. I 
chose this period because Twitter announced that it would add labels to “accounts that are 
controlled by certain official representatives of governments, state-affiliated media entities” in 
order to “provide additional context” on August 6 (Twitter, n.d.). The label appears on the profile 
pages of flagged accounts and on the tweets posted and shared by these accounts. Overall, this 
dataset consists of a total of 49,126 tweets and is used to explore the regulation of China’s 
globalizing propaganda.  
 
Roadmap  
In Chapter 2, I examine the practice of China’s globalizing propaganda. I first show that 
Chinese state media produce a curated selection of news stories by focusing on the cultural and 
social aspects of China and casting the host country in a positive light. Next, I examine 
predictors of audience engagement with Chinese media on Facebook. The results suggest that 
soft news and China-related content receive more likes but fewer shares from global audiences. 
The mixed results suggest that China’s globalizing propaganda has attracted audience 
engagement while the effectiveness of this practice may vary depending on the type of 
engagement metrics. These findings advance the understanding of how state media “tell China’s 
stories” for global audiences on Western social media platforms. 
In Chapter 3, I analyze the practice of international news coverage. In addition to telling 
China’s stories, another important goal of globalizing propaganda is to shape the images of 




perceive other countries. I first reveal the fact that Chinese state media generate systematically 
different news for foreign nations. I then test the hypothesis that the structure of international 
news is primarily driven by three factors: national traits, economic connections, and negative 
events. The findings of this study suggest that economic connections (e.g., import and export) are 
positively associated with the amount of and the sentiment of international news. I also find that 
Chinese state media highlight China’s connections with its countries involved in the Belt and 
Road Initiative5. This chapter provides empirical evidence to understand how China shapes 
international news coverage and what factors can explain this practice.  
Chapter 4 examines the regulation of China’s globalizing propaganda. Using a quasi-
experimental design, I test the hypothesis that labeling state media could reduce people’s actual 
sharing of propaganda information on social media platforms. By analyzing tweets posted by 
Chinese media accounts before and after Twitter’s practice of labeling state-affiliated accounts, I 
find that flagged media accounts lost around 4 to 60 percent of news sharing. I also find that the 
effect of flagging state media on audience engagement occurs immediately after these accounts 
are labeled, and it also leads to a long-term reduction, particularly for political content. This 
chapter reveals that social media platforms have the potential to regulate the operation of 
globalizing propaganda.   
Finally, in Chapter 5, I integrate the findings from three empirical studies and suggest 
that we need to move from the focus on domestic information control and mis-/disinformation 
campaigns into the exploration of globalizing propaganda. The findings presented in this 
dissertation suggest that China has proactively and purposefully leveraged Western platforms for 
 
5 Belt and Road Initiative is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 




improving its national images and promulgating its point of view. Moreover, while global 
audiences actively engage with the practice, these platforms can regulate and restrict the 





Chapter 2 National Image-Crafting: Telling China’s Stories (Study 1)6 
 
Introduction 
As I have noted, communication scholars and political scientists frequently claim that 
China’s approach to communication is to remove and/or restrict the production of information at 
home (King et al., 2013; G. Yang, 2009). However, this approach fails to recognize that China 
also provides content for the global information landscapes. In Chapter 1, I propose a framework 
that systematically examines four actors involved in the practice and regulation of globalizing 
propaganda. Based on the framework, Study 1 analyzes how Chinese state media produce news 
about China on Western platforms, and how audiences engage with the practice. I argue that this 
is the first step to understand globalizing propaganda as it focuses on the host countries and 
global audiences.  
In Study 1, I examine the practice of globalizing propaganda on Facebook. To be sure, 
Facebook has become a globally popular platform for news production and consumption and 
surpassed Google as the main traffic source for online news and information (Ingram, 2015). 
Western mainstream media, such as CNN, Fox News, and BBC, have adopted Facebook to 
distribute news content and attracted tens of millions of online audiences. Yet, these media 
 
6 An earlier version of this chapter received the Top Student Paper Award from Public Diplomacy Interest Group at 




outlets are not the most tuned-into sources of online news on Facebook. As I have mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Chinese state media are the leading actors on Facebook. 
In fact, Western platforms like Facebook are now rife with English-language posts and 
videos generated by Chinese state media for global audiences (Timmons & Horwitz, 2016). For 
example, CGTN has more Facebook followers than any other news media, and other news 
agencies like People’s Daily and Xinhua have attracted more than 80 million followers on 
Facebook7. It is thus fair to say that Chinese state media are the most popular sources for the 
supply of international news on Facebook – the most popular social media platform around the 
globe. Interestingly, this story is more complicated by the fact that Facebook is technically 
blocked in mainland China, meaning that Chinese audiences do not have access to these Chinese 
media on Facebook. Therefore, the targeted audience of these official media is global Facebook 
users instead of Chinese people. 
While Chinese state media have been present on Facebook rather briefly, they have been 
growing exponentially. What does this shift potentially indicate for scholars studying global and 
comparative political communication? On the one hand, the publicly stated goal of this media 
practice on Facebook is to support China’s public diplomacy imperative by “tell[ing] China’s 
story well, spread[ing] China’s voice well” (AP, 2016). On the other hand, addressing this 
practice requires adopting Facebook to spread news content expressly for global audiences. As 
Chinese state media are becoming the popular news sources on a platform that is blocked in 
China, it is hence important to understand the practice of this endeavor. 
 
7 A Facebook Page is a public profile specifically created by businesses, celebrities, politics or other organizations. 
Unlike personal profiles, Pages do not gain “friends” but “followers” or “fans”, which are people who choose to 




Study 1 addresses this puzzle from the theoretical standpoints of public diplomacy (Bjola 
& Holmes, 2015; Nye, 2008) and agenda-building theory (Lang & Lang, 1991). I also draw upon 
the associated corpus of knowledge stemming from studies of online news consumption 
(Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2013) and audience engagement (Zamith, 2018). First, previous 
studies have drawn attention to the use of news media to conduct international propaganda, 
arguing that state actors can work to influence foreign publics through international broadcasting 
(Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). In addition, a burgeoning literature on social media and news 
consumption has adopted audience metrics to explore how social media users engage with online 
news (Boczkowski & Peer, 2011; Bright, 2016; Napoli, 2011). As Chinese state media surge on 
Facebook serving global audiences, what are their strategies and activities? How do global 
audiences engage with Chinese state media? How might this reshape the understanding of how 
state actors globalize propaganda today?  
Empirically, Study 1 draws on original data from seven Chinese state media on 
Facebook: CGTN, CGTN America, CGTN Africa, People’s Daily, Global Times, China Daily, 
and Xinhua. By examining 266,772 posts and related data via computational methods, I find that 
Chinese state media build and deploy different agendas towards China and other countries. In 
particular, they reported China as a culture and society rather than a political system and also 
covered China-related stories in positive sentiment. I also find that global Facebook users do not 
always engage with China-related stories. Overall, these findings advance our understanding of 





Research Hypotheses and Questions 
 
Chinese State Media Go Global 
Today, China is progressively framing its national images as a peaceful and reliable actor 
in the international environment (Hartig, 2016; Wang, 2011). It has been noticed that Chinese 
state media have launched English-language channels and overseas newsrooms since the early 
2000s (Nyri, 2017). The “going-out” policy of Chinese media is championed by the CCP and 
governments, aiming to promote China’s global images and meantime compete with Western 
mainstream media (Lee, 2012; Thussu et al., 2017). In 2000, the Chinese government launched 
CCTV International for providing English news content abroad, and sequentially offering 
French, Spanish, Arabic channels. In 2009, China decided to implement media globalization 
strategy (i.e., going-out policy) to expand the influence of Chinese state media. As a result, 
Xinhua News Agency launched Xinhua News Network Cooperation in 2009, producing 
international news for global audiences. In addition, the press like People’s Daily and China 
Daily provided its English edition in more than 70 countries. CCTV International channel was 
rebranded as CGTN (China Global Television Network) in 2016. These media initiatives suggest 
that Chinese state media have greatly increased their investment in global communication.  
China’s broadcasting media are competing with other major global outlets like CNN and 
BBC in Africa, and have been increasingly engaged by China’s leadership to serve the state’s 
public diplomacy goals (Y. S. Wu, 2016). Scholars have found that these state media seek to 
engage with global issues through content production and direct investment in local media 




expansion of Chinese state media has produced more favorable public opinions toward China in 
African countries (Bailard, 2016). Other scholars add that the enhanced positive perceptions of 
China in African countries have been made possible by launching Africa-specific channels and 
news programs (Gorfinkel et al., 2014; Y. S. Wu, 2016).  
However, early “going-out” activities relied mainly on the deployment of newsrooms and 
multi-language channels. In recent years, Chinese state media have devoted massive resources to 
Western platforms for globalizing propaganda. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are now rife 
with news produced by Chinese media such as CGTN and People’s Daily (Huang & Wang, 
2019; Nip & Sun, 2018). Previous studies have found that Chinese state media strategically 
adopt soft news to promote China’s national images (Huang & Wang, 2020) and enhance 
China’s foreign policy (Liang, 2019). Therefore, the use of Western platforms may 
fundamentally change globalizing propaganda, because authoritarian media can leverage these 
platforms for diffusing content and reaching audiences. Moreover, this also reflects the impact of 
the hybrid media system on propaganda operations, suggesting that we cannot consider 
propaganda as an isolated practice operated by media systems. Instead, we need to take into 
account the interaction among multiple stakeholders: media agencies, state governments, social 
media platforms, foreign nations, and global audiences.  
 
News Production: An Agenda-Building Perspective 
As I have noted, Study 1 investigates the news production and consumption of 
globalizing propaganda. To advance the analysis of news production, I draw on agenda-building 




mediated public diplomacy and propaganda studies from the macro- and meso-level sites of 
observations of state policies and organizational interests to the micro-level site of observation 
where state interests may be expressed in the production and dissemination of information. 
Agenda-building refers to the process whereby news media or other actors make certain 
issues and events more salient than others (Cobb & Elder, 1971; Lang & Lang, 1991). A relative 
concept agenda-setting explores the effect of issue salience in the media on public opinion 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972). I adopt the theory of agenda building because this concept focuses 
on the construction process of issue prominence, so I can develop hypotheses about how state 
media tell China’s stories.  
Previous studies claim that political, cultural, ideological, and industrial factors have an 
impact on the process of salience formation (Nisbet, 2008; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). In addition, 
scholars also suggest that the choice made by news professionals to report some issues but 
neglect others has an impact on public perceptions (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Sheafer & Gabay, 
2009). For example, prior work on international news has found that the more media coverage a 
country received, the more likely foreign audiences are to think this nation is important to their 
own nation’s interests (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). Given the fact that the official goal of 
Chinese state media is to “tell China’s stories”, I expect that these media produce more China-
related news on Western platforms: 
H1: Chinese state media produce more China-related news than other nations’ news  
Moreover, state actors have also expressly urged news media to build and advance an 
agenda on Facebook to “showcase China’s role as a builder of world peace” (AP, 2016). To 




topics about China in contrast to other nations. Therefore, I expect that Chinese state media tend 
to make China’s national achievements salient (e.g., economic growth and international 
relations) and diminishing coverage of China’s national challenges (e.g., political system and 
civil rights): 
H2a: Chinese state media highlight China’s successes including economic growth, 
technological innovations, and international relations  
H2b: Chinese state media downplay China’s challenges including political issues, civil 
rights, and environmental issues  
In addition, scholars often employ the hard-soft distinction to identify news topics. Hard 
news refers to politics, public affairs, and economy, whilst soft news often indicates 
entertainment, arts, sports, and popular culture (Boczkowski & Peer, 2011). While some scholars 
have argued that the hard-soft distinction is perhaps elitist, others find it valuable to differentiate 
democratically and normatively more or less valuable content produced by news organizations. 
Previous research has found that hard news is a preferred genre of information pursued by state 
actors (Gilboa, 2005; Livingston, 1997) because this type of news coverage has the potential to 
influence people’s attitudes toward public policies and official relationships (Fahmy, Wanta, & 
Nisbet, 2012).  
The growing use of social media, however, has challenged this assumption. Recent work 
on social media and news consumption has uncovered a trend toward the softening of news, 
suggesting that audiences consistently read and like soft news such as culture, entertainment, and 
sports (Baum, 2003; Bennett, 2003; Boczkowski & Peer, 2011). Consequently, the focus in 




and observed that political actors and government-sponsored media are using social media to 
directly distribute nonpolitical news (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Huang & Wang, 2020). Hence, I 
expect that the practice of Chinese state media on Western platforms follows this shift:  
H3: Chinese state media produce more soft news than hard news  
Finally, while the first level agenda building explores the differential emphasis in 
coverage of certain topics by news media (i.e., what to think), the second level agenda building 
concentrates on the sentimental attributes used by journalists to frame certain issues (Kiousis, 
Mitrook, Wu, & Seltzer, 2006). In other words, the second-level agenda building focuses on the 
way by which news media impact how to think about a topic (Lancendorfer & Lee, 2010). An 
important indicator used by communication researchers to observe attributes salience is the 
sentiment of the coverage: journalists can frame an event by focusing on either positive aspects 
or negative aspects, and this difference may influence audience perception (Iyengar & Simon, 
1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Researchers have revealed that Chinese state media often 
reported the positive aspects of China’s topics instead of negative stories and also tend to cover 
negative aspects of foreign nations in greater depth (Stockmann, 2011). Further, the more 
negative news a nation received, the more likely foreign audiences considered this nation 
negatively (Wanta et al., 2004). Thus, I predict that Chinese state media enunciate the positive 
attributes of China-related stories: 







Audience Engagement and Content Features  
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, my framework involves four stakeholders including 
global audiences on Western platforms. The analysis of news production provides empirical 
evidence for exploring how media “tell China’s story”, whereas the exploration of audience 
engagement helps understand how people interact with international propaganda. Compared with 
other media like broadcast networks, social media provide quantified indicators to measure and 
capture audience engagement (Napoli, 2011). Engagement hence has been considered as a metric 
to measure the spread and success of social media information (Zamith, Belair-Gagnon, & 
Lewis, 2020). In this study, I adopt a reception-oriented perspective of news engagement 
(Nelson, 2019) to investigate how social media users interact with globalizing propaganda. 
Admittedly, new communication technologies have facilitated more precise methods to 
measure and quantify the behavior of audiences (Livingstone, 2019; Zamith, 2018). Metrics 
including “likes”, “retweets”, “shares”, and “most read,” for instance, have been used to measure 
how many people visit a Page, what they choose to read and share a story, and how long they 
spend reading it (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Consequently, news outlets can understand the 
popularity of their news content and focus on these data-driven audience metrics, and alter their 
news production choices (Bright & Nicholls, 2014; Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Napoli, 2011).  
Certainly, many factors can affect whether audiences interact with a news story or not on 
social media. The existing literature on news values and shareworthiness has found that people’s 
engagement decision is driven by a combination of interests and content features (Trilling, 
Tolochko, & Burscher, 2017). In Study 1, I focus on content factors to explore how audiences 




“tell the stories of China,” it is important for Chinese state media to not only produce certain 
types of content, but also produce it in a way that will attract audience engagement on Western 
platforms. Thus, it is important and interesting to study how audiences engage with China-
related news, since this is the main goal of globalizing propaganda. On the one hand, one could 
expect that social media users are more interested in China’s news on platforms, and thus are 
more likely to interact with the content. This is because these audiences hold favorable attitudes 
toward China and/or Chinese state media produce more positive stories for China. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that audiences are less interested in China-related stories, let alone liking 
or sharing these messages on social media. Thus, I ask the following question: 
RQ1: Does China-related news receive more audience engagement than other nations’ 
news? 
Second, recent research has found that social media users are more interested in soft news 
rather than hard news (Bright, 2016). Conceptually, soft news involves topics like sports, 
celebrities, entertainment, and culture, while hard news contains politics, international affairs, 
economy, and finance (Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2012). While journalists 
usually claim that politics and public affairs are more newsworthy than soft news, online 
audiences are increasingly consuming more soft topics like entertainment and sports 
(Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2013). Empirical research has found that social welfare and 
science and technology are frequently shared on social media by audiences, whilst political news 
does not attract comparable audiences’ interest (Bright, 2016). Additionally, bizarre and unusual 
stories are more likely to be shared by Internet users (Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2013). 




H5: Soft news receives more audience engagement than hard news 
Lastly, in addition to the topics, audience engagement is also driven by the sentiment of 
news content. In Study 1, I consider news sentiment as the overall positive or negative tone of 
the news content. In particular, sentiment can not only affect how people perceive and think 
about information, but also influence information-sharing behavior (Kraft, Krupnikov, Milita, 
Ryan, & Soroka, 2020; Trilling et al., 2017). Recent studies have revealed that news items that 
contain positive sentiment are more likely to be selected and shared by social media users 
(Berger & Milkman, 2012; Kraft et al., 2020; Soroka, Daku, Hiaeshutter-Rice, Guggenheim, & 
Pasek, 2018). The explanation is that audience engagement is also a social behavior that 
facilitates people’s expression and impression management (Berger & Milkman, 2012). People 
prefer to be perceived as positive by others (Berger, 2014). In turn, then, they are more likely to 
interact with positive content (Kraft et al., 2020). I expect this trend to be replicated here: 





Data for Study 1 were collected in two phases by organizing news content produced by 
seven Chinese state media on Facebook, as well as their associated audience-engagement meta-
data. The first phase of data collection was to determine appropriate Facebook Pages. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, I employed three standards to identify the targeted media: 1) they must 




verified by Facebook, and 3) each Page should post substantive English-language content rather 
than primarily Chinese-language news. In doing so, I initially identified eleven Facebook pages 
operated by Chinese state media organizations, and of these seven produced regular news content 
in English. These seven pages include broadcasting (CGTN, CGTN America, CGTN Africa), 
newspapers (People’s Daily, Global Times, and China Daily), and news agency (Xinhua). 
Overall, these seven pages cover the full range and diversity of China’s state news media 
operating on Facebook.  
In the second phase, I relied on Facebook’s API (Application Programming Interface) to 
collect the full population of news content and meta-data about user activities related to 
interacting with these pages’ contents. Specifically, a complete local structured archive was 
made organizing each post made by each page since the date of its creation (ranging between 
11/5/2009 to 5/2/2013), until a common end date of June 30, 2017. The meta-data for each post 
included: the original content of each post, the date of each post, created time, number of likes, 






Table 2-1. Descriptive Statistics of Media Accounts  
Facebook pages             Posts              Mean likes (SD)          Followers                Date created       
CGTN                         24,936 8,197 (15,497)          48,612,875             5/2/20138         
CGTN Africa          28,116 168 (520)           1,130,148                1/11/2012    
CGTN America            18,662 194 (1,886)         1,688,874       8/22/2012       
China Daily              35,510 793 (1,825)           36,636,166       5/25/2011    
Global Times          43,320 683 (3,294)          18,854,657         1/6/2012      
People’s Daily          42,757 5,687 (9,901)        13,154,798       11/5/2009      
Xinhua               73,421 425 (1,542)         11,436,605         4/6/2011      
Total                      266,772                                                                          
  Note: Data were collected by June/30/2017.  
 
Table 2-1 provides details about these accounts. It is clear that most of these accounts 
were created between 2011 and 2012, and they have obtained millions of followers on Facebook. 
In addition, the table also illustrates that there have variations in terms of news production and 
audience engagement among these seven state media accounts. For example, CGTN and Global 
Times generated large amounts of news on Facebook, but the former received more followers 
and likes than the latter. Moreover, Xinhua also actively provided news and information on 
Facebook, though it only attracted limited audience engagement. Overall, Table 2-1 suggests that 
Chinese state media have provided enormous content on the Western platform in order to 
 
8 CGTN initially used CCTV as the Facebook account name before 2016 when it was renamed by the Chinese 









With recent advancements in computational methods, large amounts of textual data are 
increasingly available for descriptive and causal inference (Evans & Aceves, 2016). Broadly 
speaking, three approaches are used to extract meaningful inferences from large-scale text 
collections: dictionary-based methods, supervised learning methods, and unsupervised learning 
methods (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). More specifically, dictionary-based method is a 
nonstatistical endeavor that adopts predefined dictionaries to categorize a large corpus of texts 
(Young & Soroka, 2012). Supervised and unsupervised learning approaches, in contrast, are both 
machine learning approaches. While supervised learning approach relies on known categories to 
train statistical models for classifying vast amounts of text-based data (i.e., text classification), 
unsupervised learning method can discover new or unknown categories (i.e., topic modeling) 
(O’Connor, Bamman, & Smith, 2011).  
In Study 1, I adopted dictionary-based and supervised learning approaches for large-scale 
textual analysis. Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the analytical process and procedures used 
in this chapter. To be specific, after acquiring the 266,772 posts, I first preprocessed data in order 
to reduce the complexity of textual data. The preprocess efforts included the following 
established data-mining steps: transforming text into the corpus, removing stopwords, 
punctuation, common words, uncommon words, and stemming (Lucas et al., 2015). For 




to assign news content into either China-related news or other countries’ news, and a News 
country dictionary was adopted to identify whether a post mentioned foreign countries.  
 







To illustrate, the China dictionary included keywords about China, such as Chinese cities 
(e.g., “Beijing”, “Shanghai”), Chinese politicians (e.g., “Xi Jinping”), Chinese institutions (e.g., 
“State Council”, “People’s Bank of China”), and Chinese companies (e.g., “Alibaba”, “Tencent”, 
“China National Petroleum Corporation”). The logic of the dictionary-based method is that if the 
post contains keywords associated with China, then the linguistic system would consider this 
post as China’s news. Otherwise, the post would be labeled as non-China-related news. It is 
possible, for instance, that some posts involve both China’s keywords and other countries’ 
names. In this case, I still regarded this post as China’s news. Moreover, I also used the existing 
Sentiment dictionary for analyzing news tones (Young & Soroka, 2012). This dictionary 
contained 3,430 positive sentiment words and 5,718 negative sentiment words, allowing 
researchers to analyze the sentiment of textual data. I used R package “quanteda” to get a 
sentiment score for each post.  
In addition, I adopted supervised methods to classify news topics. It is worthy to note that 
supervised methods rely on the assumption of “bag-of-words”. That is, the word order in a 
corpus is irrelevant for textual classification (Banks, Woznyj, Wesslen, & Ross, 2018). In other 
words, word positions will be dropped in the analysis and only the frequency and occurrence of 
words are used for classification. However, some information might be removed in the process 
since this approach simplifies text content and ignores the syntax of a sentence (Banks et al., 
2018). In Study 1, the main goal of using supervised methods is to classify news posts into 
various news topics, and previous research has found that word frequencies alone can provide 
sufficient information for content classification (Welbers, Van Atteveldt, & Benoit, 2017). 
Based on previous literature (Bright, 2016), I first identified fourteen news topics: 




international affairs, law and crime, health, science and technology, sports, education, 
environment and nature, society and family, culture and entertainment. Typically, the first seven 
topics are considered hard news items, while other topics are regarded as soft news. Supervised 
methods can assign each Facebook post to one of fourteen categories. Table Aa in the Appendix 
A offers examples of these news topics, and I also provide the concise version of the codebook 
used in the content analysis in Table A2 in the Appendix A.  
Briefly, this approach included three steps. First, I established a training set for machine 
learning. The training set was a random sample representing the corpus so that human coders can 
develop an interpretive logic system for algorithmic classification (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). I 
randomly selected 4,000 posts from the original dataset, and then I worked with a training coder 
to code these posts and tested intercoder reliability (Krippendorff’s α = .83). Second, these hand-
labeled samples were used as the training set to train the machine to learn a set of parameters and 
therefore assigned the remaining documents into the categories. 
I employed ensemble learning, which uses multiple learning algorithms to obtain better 
predictive performance, for classifying news topics (Aggarwal & Zhai, 2012). Four supervised 
learning algorithms were used in Study 1: Lasso and Elastic-Net Regularized Generalized Linear 
Models, Logistic Regression, Stabilized Linear Discriminant Analysis, and Random Forest. To 
evaluate the predictive performance, I randomly split the coded samples into an 85% training set 
and 15% test set, and then compared the machine coding with human coding for the test set. If 
three out of four algorithms achieve the agreement for classifying the post, then the result was 
considered correct. Otherwise, the classification was false. The ensemble learning approach 
received 75% average accuracy rate for the test set, which is reliable for further research. Finally, 






News Production: China as a Culture and Society rather than a Polity 
This section explores what news stories have been produced by Chinese state media on 
Facebook. Figure 2-2 illustrates the time series change by news topics. The Y-axis is the number 
of weekly posts, and the X-axis is the month. Several patterns can be found in this figure. First, it 
is obvious that these media produced limited news content before 2013 (less than 250 posts per 
week). Second, we can observe that the number of posts increased to approximately 500 to 750 
per week between 2014 and 2016. Notably, this amount soared to more than 1,500 per week after 
2016, suggesting that Chinese state media were greatly using Facebook to circulate news for 
global audiences. One possible reason for this impressive increase is related to China’s global 
investments and national branding. Hence, China needs news media to promote its global images 






Figure 2-2. The Number of News Post (by Topics) 
 
 
Figure 2-2 also demonstrates that some news topics were more prevalent than others. For 
instance, culture and entertainment (26%), and society and family (14%) were massively 
produced by Chinese state media over time. At the same time, economy, international affairs, 
and military and terrorism were also popular news topics. Together, these five topics contributed 
to approximately 72% of all news stories offered by these seven news agencies. By contrast, 
Figure 2-2 shows that news about accidents and disasters, civil rights, and law and crimes only 













H1 expects that Chinese state media distribute more China-related news than other 
countries. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the official purpose of globalizing propaganda is to tell 
China’s stories. I find that 56% of news was related to China with the rest focused on the stories 
of other nations. Figure 2-3 further compares China’s news with others’ news. While Chinese 
state media increased both China-related news and others’ news on Facebook, it is clear that they 
constantly produced more China’s stories on Facebook. Thus, these state media try to achieve the 
official goal of spreading China’s voices and telling China’s stories by first spreading more 
China-related news on Facebook. Further, the result of t-test indicates that the mean of China’s 
stories and others’ stories is different from zero (t = 2.892, p = .003). Thus, H1 is supported. 
H2a expects that state media focus on China’s successes including economic growth, 
technological innovations, and international relations, while H2b assumes these media downplay 
China’s challenges including political corruption, civil rights, and environmental issues. To test 
these two hypotheses, I calculated and compared the proportion of each news topic for China and 
other countries (Figure 2-4)9. It is clear that China-related news is not always massively 
generated among these topics. More specifically, the vast majority of the economy (70%), 
international affairs (68%), and technology news (63%) focused on China’s stories, whereas 
most politics (66%), civil rights (88%), and military stories (66%) covered other countries. 
Surprisingly, more than 70% of environmental news was China’s stories. 
  
 





Figure 2-4. Comparing News Topics between China and Other Nations 
 
 
Furthermore, applying significance test reveals a statistically significant difference for 
China’s achievements: economy (t = 5.57, p < .001), international relations (t = 4.1, p < .001), 
and technology (t = 2.31, p < .05). Meanwhile, politics and civil rights challenges also achieve 
significant differences, t = 4.287, p < .001 and t = 7.075, p < .001, respectively, suggesting that 
Chinese state media are more likely to cover politics and civil rights in other nations on 
Facebook. Therefore, these results support H2a and H2b. In addition, I also find a significant 
difference between China and other nations for the other three topics. While Chinese state media 
generate more news content for China’s education, and culture and entertainment, they tend to 
distribute more posts for other countries’ military and terrorism. 
H3 expects that Chinese state media produce more soft news than hard news. To test this 




(48%) hard news and 138,727 soft news (52%). The result from a t-test reveals that this 
difference is not statistically significant (t = 1.006, p = .315). Thus, H3 is rejected.  
 
Figure 2-5. Comparing News Sentiment between China and Other Nations (with 95% 







Moreover, H4 predicts that the stories of China contain more positive sentiment, 
compared to stories of foreign nations. Figure 2-5 compares news sentiments of China and 
others. In general, sports, culture and entertainment, science, and international affairs had 
positive or neutral sentiments, whilst laws and crime, accident and disaster, and civil rights 
received negative ratings. Among these fourteen topics, China-related news achieved more 
positive ratings in twelve topics, including international affairs, politics, and economy. 
Moreover, nine topics obtained significant differences among these twelve topics. By contrast, 
the stories of other nations only obtained more positive sentiments in two topics (i.e., society and 
family, and laws and crime). However, only law and crime received a weak significant 
difference between the sentiment of China’s news (M = -1.178, SD = .613) and that of other 
nations’ news (M = -.972, SD = .682). Hence, H4 is supported. 
 
Audience Engagement: Liking but not Sharing 
The analysis of news production demonstrates that Chinese state media seek to tell the 
story of China using different agenda-building strategies, then to what extent do social media 
audiences engage with news provided by Chinese state media on Facebook? To examine 
audience engagement, I employ multivariate negative binomial regressions to predict audience 
engagement. Since the criteria variables likes and shares only have positive integers and are 
right-skewed (Likes: M = 2,107.76, Mdn = 218, SD = 7,106.34; Sharing: M = 126.98, Mdn = 8, 
SD = 1,708.61), negative binomial regression is a suitable tool to estimate count data with 
overdispersion (Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1995). All predictors are entered in negative 




Table 2-2. Negative Binomial Models Predicting Audience Engagement 




Intercept 4.29 (0.01) *** -1.91 (0.01) *** 
Likes   0.88 (0.00) ***  
Shares  0.78 (0.00) ***   
China-related news 0.37 (0.01) *** -0.13 (0.01) *** 
Soft news -0.21 (0.01) *** 0.18(0.01) *** 
News sentiment 0.02(0.00) *** -0.02(0.00) *** 
N  233,894 233,894 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Table 2-2 reports the results. Model1 predicts the number of likes, while Model 2 predicts 
the number of shares10. RQ1 asks whether China-related news receives more engagement than 
non-China-related news. Model 1 shows that China-related news is positively associated with the 
number of likes on Facebook, b = .37, p < .001. However, I find that China-related news is 
negatively associated with the number of sharing, b = -.13, p < .001. This means that while 
Facebook users are more likely to like China’s news, they are less likely to share posts that focus 
on China.   
H5 assumes that soft news content is more popular than hard news. Again, Table 2-2 
shows mixed results. While soft news topics are negatively related to the number of likes (b = 
 




-.21, p < .001), these stories receive more shares on Facebook (b = .18, p < .001). H5 is hence 
partially supported. 
Finally, H6 predicts that news with positive sentiment is more likely to be shared and 
liked by Facebook users. I find that news sentiment is positively associated with the number of 
likes on Facebook, b = .02, p < .001, but it is negatively related to the number of shares, b = -.02, 
p < .001. H6 is also partially supported.  
 
Discussion  
In this chapter, I investigate the practice of China’s globalizing propaganda by focusing 
on the supply and demand of news on Facebook. As China is increasingly intervening in the 
global information landscapes, it is urgent to understand how state media wield Facebook as a 
vehicle to tell China’s stories for global audiences and how users react to the practice of 
international propaganda. The results of Study 1 provide empirical support for the hypotheses 
regarding national imaging building. At the same time, I also find a somewhat contrasting picture 
about audience engagement. These findings suggest that while Chinese state media actively build 
agendas for boosting the non-political aspects of China in a favorable light, Facebook users do 
not always engage with China’s stories.  
The findings of Study 1 have several theoretical implications. First, I find that Chinese 
state media significantly increased the supply of news after 2015. This result is consistent with 
recent observations that China has devoted significant resources to improve its foreign 
propaganda, particularly on Western platforms (Huang & Wang, 2019; Nip & Sun, 2018; Tsai, 




China’s stories by focusing on three strategies: creating more China-related news, highlighting 
China’s advantages, and creating favorable sentiment for China.  
In addition, Study 1 suggests that state media outlets often focus on the coverage of 
China’s strengths and advantages including economic growth, technological innovations, and 
international relations. At the same time, they do not frequently cover China’s challenges like 
politics and civil society. This indicates that Chinese state media aim to portray China as a 
peaceful power in the field of technology, economics, and international affairs. As I have noted 
in Chapter 1, the official goal of the media going-out policy is to showcase China’s role as a 
builder of world peace. Thus, the findings of Study 1 confirm that these state media highlight 
non-political issues for China.  
To be sure, while these findings suggest that culture and entertainment stories are popular 
topics, certain hard news topics like the economy and international affairs are also frequently 
produced. These results indicate that Chinese state media are combining hard news with soft 
news to construct international agenda. On the one hand, some nonpolitical news is consistently 
distributed, and these stories get a large number of user’s attention. As such, soft news has the 
potential to help a country improve its national images and attract audiences. On the other hand, 
hard news can also play an important role in improving China’s image in the international arena, 
if these stories allow China to highlight its success in economics and international affairs. 
The findings also suggest that Chinese state media do build distinct agendas for China 
and other nations. Previous studies have found that the government is using mass media to 
conduct international agenda building (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). In Study 1, while the agenda of 




agenda of other nations focus on politics, military and terrorism, and civil rights. By doing so, 
state media can highlight China’s successful aspects, and make China’s challenges less salient. 
Meanwhile, these media frequently cover politics, military and terrorism, and civil rights for 
other countries, while downplaying these countries’ economy, international affairs, and culture.  
In addition to differential topic distinctions, I also find that China-related news often 
contains more positive sentiment than other nations’ news. This indicates that Chinese state 
media are notably chipper when telling stories of China by reporting on positive aspects, and 
gloomier on the negative aspects of other countries. For instance, I find that stories of China’s 
international affairs are often portrayed as positive content by these state media, whilst other 
nations’ international affairs are covered negatively. These temperamental and tonal differences 
can have substantive implications. Previous research has found that negative content can lead to 
people’s negative attitudes toward a country (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Wanta et al., 2004). By 
portraying China as a more pleasant power, these state news agencies have the potential to 
influence people’s attitudes toward the rise of China in a global context.  
Moreover, the findings of Study 1 provide nuanced evidence to understand audience 
engagement and news consumption in the context of globalizing propaganda. I find that 
Facebook users do not always engage with China-related news. It is clear that users are more 
likely to like a post containing China’s topics but are less willing to share China’s stories. As I 
have discussed in this chapter, individuals have come gatekeepers in the social media age and 
have the potential to decide the importance and popularity of news topics (Boczkowski & 
Mitchelstein, 2013). The mixed finding presented here thus suggests that the effectiveness of 




It should be noted that I do not consider the global expansion of Chinese state media as a 
new phenomenon. In fact, Chinese state media have begun to set overseas correspondents and 
news bureaus to “make China’s voice heard internationally” since the 1990s (Nyri, 2017, p. 20). 
The adoption of Western platforms like Facebook, however, offers the possibility to directly 
engage with the audience across the globe (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Huang & Wang, 2020). 
Traditional literature on political communication often regards digital media as liberation 
technologies, by which dissidents can engage in politics while authoritarian actors work to 
control information diffusion (G. Yang, 2009). However, Study 1 shows that digital media also 
empower the state actors, since authoritarian regimes like China are increasingly using global 
social media platforms to achieve their political purposes abroad.  
In addition to censorship, I argue that China has the potential to build international 
agenda and influence foreign audiences by globalizing propaganda. In the aftermath of the 2016 
US Presidential election, many are concerned about the use of Facebook’s advertising platform 
by Russian state actors to influence US election outcomes (Lukito et al., 2020; Woolley & 
Howard, 2018). Similarly, future studies might address the question of why Facebook, banned by 
the state from operating domestically in China, allows for its platform to be used by the same 
state to advance its political goals globally and openly. 
One limitation of Study 1 is that I do not explore how global audiences perceive Chinese 
state media on Facebook. Audience engagement does not necessarily lead to the change of 
perceptions and attitudes. Therefore, future research should test whether different sentiments of 
social media news affect public perception. Another limitation is that Study 1 does not 
investigate how Chinese state media compete with Western media on Facebook. It is argued that 




is interesting to analyze how Chinese state media cover certain issues (e.g., South China Sea) and 
compete with the incumbent news organization. It is also important to clarify that this media 
practice is not alone on Facebook: Chinese state media are also employing YouTube and Twitter 
to distribute news content and attract tens of millions of followers on these platforms. At the 
same time, Chinese local governments (e.g., Jiangsu) and commercial media (e.g., Yicai, and 
Hunan TV) are also emerging on these social media platforms. Therefore, future research should 
devote attention to these endeavors in order to understand the strategies used by China to 
improve its global influence. 
In sum, Study 1 reveals that Chinese state media are strategically using Western 
platforms to tell China’s stories and promote national branding. The findings presented in this 
chapter suggest that state media seek to build different agendas for China and other nations, and 
aims to frame China’s non-political issues. Moreover, social media users are less likely to share 
China-related news, and this may challenge the practice of international propaganda on 
Facebook. Yet, questions still remain as we do not know how Chinese state media cover other 
countries, and what factors can explain this practice. As I have stated in Chapter 1, in the field of 
globalizing propaganda, another important aspect of the practice is the coverage of foreign 
countries, since this determines how the host country portrays the guest countries. In addition to 
telling China’s story, these news agencies also attempt to spread China’s voice globally. 
Therefore, in the next chapter, I specifically examine the coverage of foreign countries in 





Chapter 3 (In)Visible Foreign Nations: Shaping International News (Study 2) 
 
Introduction 
The findings of Study 1 unveiled that Chinese state media seek to “tell stories of China” 
by crafting China as a favorable culture and society rather than a political entity. Nevertheless, 
the coverage of China is not the only way that is used by Chinese state media to globalize 
propaganda. In fact, these news organizations also produce and disseminate news about foreign 
nations on Western platforms. As I have noted in Chapter 1, a key component of globalizing 
propaganda is the coverage of foreign nations. This not only shows the connection between the 
host country (i.e., reporting country) and guest countries (i.e., reported countries), but also 
illuminates the way by which news media of the host country shape the image of foreign nations 
and international affairs (Segev, 2015). This practice could provide counter-flows of 
international news and potentially affect how global audiences perceive foreign nations. Then, 
how do Chinese state media tell stories of foreign nations?  
In Study 2, I further examine the visibility and invisibility of foreign nations in Chinese 
state media on Western platforms. The focus of this chapter, hence, has shifted from China’s 
stories to the structure and content of international news. In particular, if the analysis of telling 
China’s stories in Study 1 helps understand the coverage of the host country and audience 
engagement, then the exploration of international news in Study 2 allows me to look at the 
volume of reference to foreign nations in China’s globalizing propaganda, and at the same time, 




Scholars of international news and global communication have argued that not all 
countries are treated equally in the news (T. K. Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Jones, 
Van Aelst, & Vliegenthart, 2013; D. Walter, Sheafer, Nir, & Shenhav, 2016). More specifically, 
researchers have found that the picture of international events and foreign nations presented in 
news media is unavoidably biased and distorted (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Schramm, 1959). For 
example, international broadcasts highlight elite and powerful nations when covering 
international issues. The choice is usually related to multiple factors including economic ties 
between the host country and guest countries, and geographically and culturally proximity 
between two countries (Segev, 2015; H. D. Wu, 2000).  
However, previous literature on international news often emphasizes the coverage of 
foreign nations in the domestic market, whilst little attention has been paid to analyze how news 
outlets report international news for global audiences on social media platforms. In addition, 
prior studies on propaganda focus predominantly on how news media cover the host country and 
how audiences engage with the content. Yet, they ignore the important connection between the 
host country and guest countries. In addition to covering its own stories, the host country could 
also spread the news about foreign nations. Moreover, the coverage of foreign nations could lead 
to public awareness and shape how people think about other countries in the international arena 
(Fahmy et al., 2012; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Extending these lines of 
research, I expect that Chinese state media produce international news coverage in a way that 
serves its foreign policy and affects audiences’ perceptions of foreign nations.  
Therefore, the purpose of Study 2 is to systematically examine how Chinese state media 
shape international news on Western platforms, and what country-level factors can determine the 




response to dynamic international conditions of the host country. In other words, news media of 
the host country are motivated by national interests to report or not report guest countries. The 
analysis of the content and structure of international news coverage can inform us how the host 
country reports others and what factors can explain the coverage of guest countries.  
 
Research Hypotheses and Questions 
 
The Role of International News 
International news refers to the news coverage of foreign nations and international affairs 
(Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Rosengren, 1974). It often indicates the stories of “others” in the news 
and is considered an important means for shaping people’s understanding of foreign issues and 
the world (Nossek, 2004). International news had been explored in the 1950s and was related to 
the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (Kayser, 1953). the research 
conducted by Schramm (1959) found that the nations presented in the news were not 
proportionally consistent with the real world, because some were more visible than others. The 
rise of cable news further improves the role of international news. An important finding has been 
the theory of CNN effect, which comes from the observation that 24/7 broadcasting networks 
have become a decisive actor in advancing foreign policy interests of the state (Gilboa, 2005). 
By offering real-time coverage of a particular event, the global broadcasting networks have 
effectively impacted foreign public opinion (Iyengar & Simon, 1993) and foreign policy 
(Livingston, 1997). For example, studies have reported that respondents who often watched 




compared to those who often watched pan-Arab regional networks like Al Jazeera and MBC 
(Fahmy et al., 2012; Miladi, 2006).  
Based upon agenda-building theory, scholars of international news have investigated how 
news media cover foreign nations (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; D. Walter et al., 2016; H. D. Wu, 
2000). As I have discussed in Study 1, the theory of agenda-building examines the construction 
of issue salience in news media, with particular emphasis on factors and processes of the salience 
of topics and actors (Cobb & Elder, 1971; Lang & Lang, 1991). Scholars have employed this 
theory to examine how news media report foreign nations and international issues for domestic 
audiences (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Scholars of global communication suggest that the flow and 
structure of international news lack a balance, as mainstream Western media largely shape and 
dominate which countries should be covered and how to report foreign nations (T. K. Chang et 
al., 1987; Thussu, 2018). One of the important findings is that a few powerful and developed 
countries, particularly the US, dominated the international news coverage, whereas developing 
countries are often framed in terms of negative events (Golan, 2008; D. Walter et al., 2016; 
Wanta et al., 2004).  
In the context of international propaganda, the coverage of foreign nations is also 
important as it indicates how the host country portrays and frames guest countries for global 
audiences. Indeed, it allows news media of the host country to specifically provide favorable 
reporting for allied countries and meantime highlight the negative aspects of other countries  
(Herman & Chomsky, 2008; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Based upon this expectation, Chinese 
state media must follow the official line set by the Party-state and contribute to regime stability 
and legitimacy through propaganda (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Recent studies have 




2017; Roberts, Stewart, & Airoldi, 2016). Thus, I expect that there are substantial differences in 
news coverage across countries reported by Chinese state media on Facebook.  
 
The Determinants of International News Coverage 
A central question in international news research is to understand what makes some 
nations more newsworthy and prominent than others (Segev, 2015; H. D. Wu, 2000). The 
seminal work by Galtung and Ruge (1965) introduced 12 factors to explain the selection and 
newsworthiness of international and foreign issues. They argued that international news is 
mainly driven by factors including elite nations, cultural proximity, negative news, unexpected 
events) (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Additionally, Östgaard (1965) claimed that media ownership 
and governmental control of media also contribute to the flow of international news. Moreover, 
Rosengren (1974) proposed geographical proximity and the importance of events as predictors of 
international news flows. Further, Hester (1973) examined the determinants of international 
news from the perspective of international relations, suggesting that the hierarchy of nations and 
economic connection are key factors affecting the selection of international news.  
Obviously, conventional wisdom tends to explore the coverage of foreign nations from 
three perspectives: national traits (i.e., context-oriented factors like the size and power of foreign 
nations), relatedness (i.e., economic, political, and cultural proximity), and events (e.g., wars, 
conflicts). In Study 2, I focus on these three groups of factors to explore how and why Chinese 
state media cover international news. This will help me examine how China understands other 
nations and reports others in the global information landscape. 
First, I expect that traits of a nation can explain the structure of international news 




System theory, scholars have claimed that the coverage of international news is usually 
determined by the size and power of foreign nations (T. K. Chang et al., 1987; H. D. Wu, 2000). 
Core countries like the US received much more news coverage than other peripheral countries 
(Golan, 2008; Jones et al., 2013). For instance, empirical studies have demonstrated that 
population is an important predictor of foreign nation visibility in news media, as this variable is 
related to the “hierarchy of nations” (T. K. Chang & Lee, 1992; Jones et al., 2013). Extending 
this line of research, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H7: The level of national traits is positively associated with international news coverage 
Second, prior literature suggests that relatedness is a significant predictor of the 
prominence of foreign nations in the news, as this concept captures the connection between the 
host country and guest countries (H. D. Wu, 2000). A significant amount of research has 
reported the positive relation between economic ties and international news coverage (Segev, 
2015; D. Walter et al., 2016; H. D. Wu, 2000). For example, Ahern (1984) found that trade 
relations were strong predictors of covering foreign countries in the US. By examining news 
coverage in 38 countries, Wu (2000) reported that trade volume was a key factor predicting the 
amount of foreign news. Other scholars also found that trading interest and economic ties were 
important factors of foreign news coverage (Balmas, 2017; Dupree, 1971; Rosengren, 1974). The 
reason is that economic ties and trade flows indicate the importance of guest countries (Jones et 
al., 2013; D. Walter et al., 2016). Chinese state media are usually considered as the 
“mouthpiece” of the government (Stockmann, 2011), and their coverage often implies the 
perspective of the government. Thus, I expect that Chinese state media tend to focus on countries 
that have strong economic ties with China. As I have found in Study 1, Chinese state media 




foreign countries that have strong economic ties with China. Therefore, I propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H8: The level of economic connections with China is positively associated with 
international news coverage 
Third, while economic connections emphasize the relatedness of the host country and 
guest countries, another factor affecting the flow of international news is specific events that 
happened in guest countries. Research on news values has claimed that negative events like 
conflicts and wars are more likely to be reported by news outlets, particularly in developing 
countries (Golan, 2008; D. Walter et al., 2016; Wanta et al., 2004). Thus, it is possible that 
Chinese state media also focus on countries that have bad events. Thus, I propose the hypothesis: 
H9: The level of negative events is positively associated with international news coverage  
 
Measuring International News  
In this section, I review previous studies in international news and media bias to develop 
three aspects of measuring international news coverage: the amount of news coverage, the 
proportion of China-related news, and the sentiment of news. First, existing literature regards the 
visibility of foreign nations as a key outcome of international news coverage, since this indicator 
shows the prominence of foreign nations in the news (Jones et al., 2013). This is also 
conceptualized as visibility bias, referring to the relative amount of news coverage that an issue 
or actor receives, which is usually measured by comparing the length of reporting or the number 
of stories (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000). The more news stories a country obtained in the news, the 




 Second, scholars also explore specific connections between the host country and guest 
countries, as this indicator shows how closely two countries are in international news (Galtung & 
Ruge, 1965). If these state media often report certain countries with China, then these countries 
are important partners or allies. Finally, another important outcome is the valence of foreign 
nations (i.e., news sentiment or tones), as this indicator illustrates how a given country is 
reported in the news (D. Walter et al., 2016). Media coverage can emphasize either positive 
aspects or negative aspects when reporting a certain issue and actor (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). 
Countries receiving positive coverage in the news are more likely to receive favorable attitudes 
from audiences (Wanta et al., 2004). Researchers have used news tones and sentiment to capture 
the importance of foreign countries, as allies often receive more favorable coverage (H. D. Wu, 
2000). Previous studies have revealed that Chinese state media often report the positive aspects 
of China’s topics (Roberts et al., 2016) and cover negative aspects of foreign nations 
(Stockmann, 2011).  
 
Audience Engagement with International News 
 One limitation of previous studies on international news is the lack of audience analysis. 
While researchers have explored the structure and determinants of foreign nation coverage, it is 
not clear to what extent news audiences engage with international news, and importantly, 
whether country-level factors could explain the change of audience engagement. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 2, social media have facilitated more precise methods to measure and 
quantify the audience. The number of likes and ‘most read’, for instance, have been used to 




Theoretically, audience engagement is conceptualized as a social process by which 
people interact with others and participate in politics (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). 
It is also an important approach for users to express their perspectives (Lane et al., 2019)  and 
manage self-presentation (Kraft, et al., 2020). Moreover, scholars have analyzed the difference 
between newsworthiness and shareworthiness. While traditional criteria of newsworthiness 
indeed play a role in predicting the number of shares (Trilling et al., 2017), social media users 
also differ from journalists and editors in news selection and sharing (Bright, 2016). Thus, it is 
interesting to investigate how people engage with foreign nation coverage produced by Chinese 
state media on Western platforms. I propose the following question:  






Study 2 draws upon Facebook data to explore my hypotheses and research questions. As 
I have introduced in previous Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I first identified relevant Facebook pages 
operated by Chinese state media and then collected relevant data through Facebook’s API. In this 
study, the unit of analysis is countries. Since the focus of Study 2 is international news, I only 








Foreign countries. As I have introduced in Study 1, a news country dictionary was 
adopted to identify whether a post mentioned foreign countries. I used the name and capital of 
each country to determine whether a post contains the coverage of foreign countries. In total, 
189,579 posts involved international news and 185 nations were identified. Table B1 in the 
Appendix B provides information for these countries.  
The amount of news. To capture how many news stories these countries obtained, I 
calculated the number of posts for each country (M = 1,041, Mdn = 328 , SD = 2,366.7).  
China-related news. This variable captures to what extent each country is related to 
China in international news coverage. As I have noted, Study 1 identified China-related news by 
using a dictionary-based method. Compared to the amount of China-related news, I consider the 
proportion of China-related news each country received as one of the indicators of international 
news reporting. For each country, I calculated and aggregated the proportion of China-related 
news (M = .35, SD = .21).  
News sentiment. Based on sentiment analysis conducted in Study 1, I further calculated 
the average news sentiment for each country (M = .28, SD = .88).  
National traits. Based on previous studies (Segev, 2015; H. D. Wu, 2000), I identified 
two variables to measure the level of national traits for each country: GDP (gross domestic 
product) and population. These two variables capture the economic power and size of foreign 
nations. Yearly GDP and population data are collected from the World Bank. All country-level 
predictors are one year ahead of the time of news coverage. 
Relatedness. I used three measures to capture economic connections between China and 




trade relations between China and foreign nations, and data are gathered from World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS). The third variable indicates countries involved in China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). BRI is one of China’s key foreign policies and infrastructural investments, 
seeking to build various levels of cooperation between China and 65 countries in Asia, Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa. A dummy variable was created to indicate BRI nations.  
Negative events. To measure the level of negative events, I relied on the Global Peace 
Index (GPI) published by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This index comprises various 
conflict-related components like the number of external and internal wars, the death toll from 
conflicts, the potential for terrorist acts, and so on. It is scaled from 1 to 5; the higher the score, 
the more conflict the country has. An aggregated summary of these country-level variables can 
be found in Table B2 in the Appendix B.  
Audience engagement. I adopted the number of likes and shares to measure audience 
engagement. I first calculated the average number of likes and shares for each country and then 
tested the correlation of these two items (r = .80). Next, I combined these two into an index of 





In this section, I explore the structure of international news coverage by focusing on three 
measures of international news coverage. First, I calculated the number of news posts for each 
country and visualized the top twenty countries in Figure 3-1. It is clear that the United States is 




the US. In addition, Russia, Japan, UK, and France were also key countries receiving large 
amounts of coverage from Chinese state media. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
on international news showing that powerful countries are more likely to be covered (T. K. 
Chang et al., 1987; Segev, 2015). This is also reasonable since these countries are economic and 
political clout. By contrast, I find that countries like Micronesia, Suriname, Niue, and Kiribati 
only obtained limited news coverage. Consistent with previous research, these differences 
suggest that Chinese state media tend to focus on prominent foreign nations when reporting 
international news (Galtung & Ruge, 1965).  
 







Second, I explore China-related news. In terms of reporting amount, the US is still the 
most crucial country (12,713 China-related news), followed by Japan, Oman, Russia, Italy, and 
the UK. On the other hand, countries like Grenada, Honduras, Paraguay, and Guatemala only 
obtain limited China-related news. In Study 2, I focus on the proportion of China-related news, 
and Figure 3-2 illustrates the top countries. This time, the US was not the leading actor; instead, 
China’s neighboring countries (e.g., Japan and India), South American countries, and African 
countries were frequently related to China’s news by state media. The difference suggests that 
Chinese state media frequently connect developing countries with Chinese issues in the coverage 
of international news.  
 







To explore news sentiment, I calculated the average news sentiment for each country and 
then plotted a global news sentiment map (Figure 3-3). The red color indicates positive 
sentiments, while yellow shows negative tones in the news. Obviously, Central Asia, North 
Europe, and North America received favorable coverage from Chinese state media, whereas 
countries in the Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast Asia often got negative coverage. 
Surprisingly, though Africa is China’s key global partner, many African countries obtained 
negative sentiments from Chinese state media. One possible explanation is that many news 
stories of Africa are negative news like wars, military, and conflicts. 
 














Notably, some countries only have limited news coverage, so their news sentiment is not 
stable. For example, the news sentiment of Grenada is two but Grenada was only covered in nine 
news posts. Therefore, it is possible that a piece of news with a high sentiment score will 
significantly change this nation’s sentiment result. To address this problem, I further aggregated 
the news sentiment for the top 30 countries receiving the most coverage and illustrated the 
results in Figure 3-4. I find that Peru, Canada, Australia, Germany, and the UK are the most 
favorable countries in terms of news sentiment. Interestingly, though the US and Japan received 
a large amount of coverage from Chinese state media, their average news sentiments were not 
high (M = .14 and M = -.06, respectively). 
 
Hypothesis Testing  
While the descriptive analysis offers interesting patterns for the structure of international 
news, it is still unclear why some foreign nations are more visible and favorable than others. In 
this section, I further examine country-level factors that can be used to explain the structure of 
international news coverage. I use linear mixed-effects regression models in order to take into 
account the differences between years. More specifically, I first fit a fixed intercept null model 
(i.e., OLS regression) containing no predictors and a random intercept null model for each 
criteria variable (i.e., news amount, the proportion of China-related news, news sentiment, and 
audience engagement). Next, I conduct analyses of variance tests of the differences between 
likelihood-ratio test of these two models and find that random intercept-only models are better 
fits for all criterion variables: news amount (χ2 = 33.23, p < .001), China-related news (χ2 = 





Table 3-1 shows the results of mixed-effects models. Full maximum likelihood 
estimation is used, and all variables are standardized (z-score) for model estimations. H7 expects 
that national traits, measured as GDP and population, are important predictors of news amount. 
Models 1 finds that GDP is positively related to the amount of international news a country 
received, b = .46, p < .001. However, the population variable does not receive significant results. 




Table 3-1. Linear Mixed-Effects Models Predicting International News and Audience Engagement 
  Model 1 







Fixed effects     
Intercept 0.04 (0.11)    -0.24 (0.11)    -0.05 (0.08)    -0.17 (0.20)    
News amount          0.04 (0.04)    -0.04 (0.04)    0.09 * (0.04)    
China’s news 0.03 (0.03)            0.37 *** (0.03)    -0.02 (0.03)    
Sentiment  -0.03 (0.03)    0.35 *** (0.03)            0.08 * (0.03)     
Engagement  0.09 ** (0.03)     -0.04 (0.04)    0.12 ** (0.04)            
National traits     
Population 0.01 (0.02)    0.01 (0.03)    0.00 (0.03)    0.04 (0.02)    
GDP 0.46 *** (0.08)    -0.04 (0.09)    0.24 *  (0.10)   -0.08 (0.08)    
Relatedness     
Export 0.48 *** (0.11)    0.06 (0.13)    -0.26 (0.14)    0.05 (0.12)    
Import -0.07 * (0.03)      0.11 ** (0.04)    -0.07 (0.04)    0.00 (0.04)    




Event     
Negativity 0.15 *** (0.03)    -0.19 *** (0.03)    -0.18 *** (0.03)    -0.19 *** (0.03)    
Variance of random effects     
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 0.086 0.068 0.048 0.225 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.380 0.546 0.588 0.421 
N (Level 1 units) 809 809 809 809 
N (Level 2 units) 6 6 6 6 
AIC 1550.60 1846.03 1896.90 1645.67 
BIC 1606.95 1902.38 1953.25 1702.02 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full maximum likelihood estimation. 
BRI = Belt and Road Initiative. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. 





H8 assumes that economic connection, measured as export, import, and BRI, will 
increase the coverage of foreign nations. Table 3-1 suggests that export has a positive association 
with news amount in Model 1 (b = .49, p < .001), but does not achieve significant results in 
Model 2 and Model 3. Moreover, while import is negatively related to the amount of 
international news (b = -.07, p < .05), this variable is positively associated with the proportion of 
China’s news in Model 2 (b = .11, p < .01). Moreover, I find that BRI is also positively related to 
the proportion of China’s news in Model 2 (b = .53, p < .001). Hence, H8 is also supported.  
Furthermore, H9 expects that negative events positively influence international news 
coverage. I find that negative events are positively related to the amount of international news (b 
= .14, p < .01), but they are negatively associated with China-related news and news sentiment, b 
= -.18, p < .01, and b = -.21, p < .001, respectively. Thus, this provides partial support for H9. 
Finally, RQ2 explores whether three types of country-level factors are related to audience 
engagement. Model 4 shows that BRI is positively associated with audience engagement (b 
= .25, p < .001), whereas negative events are negatively related to the outcome (b = -.19, p 
< .001). Yet, neither population nor GDP achieves significant results in Model 4. Interestingly, I 
find that the amount of news a country receives and news sentiment are positive predictors of 
news sharing, but the proportion of China-related news does not significantly relate to the criteria 
variable. I also separated likes and shares and ran two models. The results show the same pattern: 
BRI and negative events are significant predictors.  
 
Discussion  
The goal of Study 2 is to further understand China’s globalizing propaganda by focusing 




coverage of foreign nations in domestic news markets (Segev, 2015; H. D. Wu, 2000), little 
attention has been paid to examine the structure of international news in the context of 
international propaganda. As I have noted, the theoretical framework proposed in this 
dissertation examines four stakeholders and three components behind China’s rise in global 
communication. One important aspect is the coverage of foreign nations, because this could help 
us understand how Chinese state media cover and frame other countries.  
Study 2 examines how Chinese state media produce systematically different news for 
foreign nations, and more importantly, what country-level factors can explain the structure of 
foreign nations coverage. This study highlights the relationship between the host country and 
guest countries, which is an important aspect of international propaganda. The results of Study 2 
align with previous research on international news flows (T. K. Chang et al., 1987; Jones et al., 
2013; H. D. Wu, 2000). I find that while generally developed and powerful countries (i.e., core 
countries) receive more news coverage, developing countries in Asia and Africa also obtain large 
amounts of coverage from Chinese state media, particularly in China-related news. I also reveal 
the differences in terms of China-related news and news sentiment. Moreover, the findings of 
Study 2 suggest that GDP, economic ties, and event features are important predictors of the 
structure of international news. 
This chapter expands our understanding of globalizing propaganda from the perspective 
of international news, and it makes the following theoretical contributions. First of all, I find that 
Chinese state media do not treat all countries equally on Western platforms. Consistent with 
previous literature, I uncover that core countries like the US, Russia, the UK, and Japan received 
large amounts of news coverage, whereas small and developing countries only obtained limited 




visibilities for foreign nations. I also find that these news outlets highlight the visibility of 
China’s commercial and political partners or opponents, since these countries are important 
players in the international arena. On the other hand, Chinese state media also cover China’s 
news with its neighbors like Japan and India, aiming to portray China’s role in international 
events and geopolitics.  
Second, I find that the coverage of peripheral countries in Asia and Europe is often 
related to China’s news. Rather than focusing on these countries’ domestic issues, Study 2 
illustrates that Chinese state media tend to report the connection between China and these 
peripheral countries in international news. Moreover, the findings indicate that China’s global 
partners like Africa countries do not necessarily receive more favorable coverage on Facebook. 
Rather, Western countries are more likely to get positive news coverage. One possible reason is 
that the coverage of Africa countries focuses on negative news like conflicts and crises, so the 
scores of news sentiment scores are often lower for these countries.  
More importantly, the results from this study also demonstrate that the structure of 
international news coverage is largely driven by three factors, namely, national traits, economic 
ties, and negative events. The economic power of a nation, measured as GDP, is a significant 
predictor of international news, indicating that Chinese state media tend to concentrate on large 
and powerful countries. Economic connections, which are captured as export, import, and BRI, 
are also important factors affecting the coverage of foreign nations. This suggests that these news 
media pay more attention to China’s trade partners. These findings are consistent with previous 
studies and further show that international propaganda also considers the importance of 




news, it is clear that Chinese state media are less likely to connect China with these events. This 
provides new evidence for the favorable tones of China’s related news.  
In addition, I find that some country-level factors can also be used to explain audience 
engagement. In particular, the findings in Table 3-1 suggest that BRI and negative events are 
significantly associated with engagement. The negative link between negativity and audience 
engagement is not surprising, as social media users are less likely to share negative news. The 
positive association between BRI and audience engagement shows that Facebook users are more 
willing to share news about BRI nations. One possible explanation is that the majority of 
followers of Chinese state media on Facebook are from developing countries in Asia and Africa, 
and thus they are more interested in BRI. Another possibility is that news about BRI contains 
more positive sentiment thus social media users are more likely to share it. Regardless of the 
explanations, the results clearly indicate that Facebook users pay more attention to specific 
events and national projects rather than other types of context factors like export or GDP.  
While Study 1 shows that Chinese state media tend to enhance China’s national image by 
focusing on positive events, as well as culture and society, Study 2 suggests that these state 
media also actively report foreign countries in certain ways. When combined with the findings 
from Study 1, it may be the case that the coverage of the host country is not the only way to 
conduct international propaganda. In addition to telling its own stories, it is clear that China also 
leverages Western platforms like Facebook to spread the stories of other nations. International 
news coverage can help Chinese state media to attract audience attention and meantime produce 
stories for foreign nations from China’s perspective. Indeed, the findings of Study 2 suggest that 
international news is an important aspect of China’s globalizing propaganda, which is heavily 




The results presented in this chapter matter greatly for thinking about how Chinese state 
media globalize propaganda on social media giants. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the global 
information environment is largely dominated by media organizations in Europe and North 
America (Winseck & Pike, 2009), and thus international news and foreign nations are 
predominated covered and framed by Western mainstream media like CNN and BBC (Gilboa, 
2005; Livingston, 1997). Given the fact that most people lack direct experience or knowledge 
about foreign nations, international news plays important roles in forming and shaping people’s 
attitudes toward and perceptions of other countries and international affairs (Nossek, 2004). 
International news is also widely used to serve national interest and foreign policy (Huang & 
Wang, 2020; Lee & Yang, 1996), so the coverage of foreign nations could indicate how the host 
country perceives other countries. 
China’s rise in global communication indicates the possibility that news outlets in a non-
Western nation might challenge the dominance of Western media and produce alternative stories 
for global audiences on Western platforms. With the rapid growth of China in global 
communication, foreign countries and international events are frequently covered and framed by 
Chinese state media. The content and structure of international news determine what stories 
Facebook users can receive from these state media. More importantly, the selection of 
international news coverage could also reshape people’s understanding of these guest countries 
(Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009).  
One limitation of Study 2 is that I only aggregate Facebook data to examine the structure 
of international news, rather than looking at specific events. This ignores the fact that the 
coverage of foreign nations may change due to some international affairs. It is possible, for 




media cover countries involved in BRI. Thus, further research could benefit by exploring how 
some international events and foreign policies change the structure of international news. 
Another limitation is the lack of analysis of specific countries’ roles in international news. For 
example, while the US is the most prominent nation in Chinese state media, it is still unclear how 
these news organizations cover US-China relations. Future research hence could examine the 
coverage of specific countries.  
To summarize, the findings of Study 2 suggest that it is important to understand the link 
between the host country and guest countries by looking at the content and form of international 
news coverage. International news is important, not only from the perspective of journalism 
studies, but also for the operation of international propaganda. By showing systematic 
differences across foreign nations, this chapter provides support for the framework of globalizing 
propaganda. In addition, Study 1 and Study 2 have demonstrated the importance of the US-based 
platforms in China’s globalizing propaganda. However, while Chinese state media actively wield 
giant platforms for propaganda purposes, it is not clear whether and how platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter could restrict China’s expansion. This is an interesting and important 
question because, as Study 1 and Study 2 have shown, China’s globalizing propaganda relies 
mostly on these platforms. More importantly, this question connects the host country with the 
fourth actor in my framework, namely, social media platforms. In the next chapter, I further 
analyze the regulation of China’s globalizing propaganda by emphasizing Twitter’s introduction 
of labeling state-affiliated media accounts.  
  




Chapter 4 Not Share It Anymore: Regulating Globalizing Propaganda (Study 3)11 
 
Introduction 
In Study 1 and Study 2, I have examined the practice of globalizing propaganda from two 
aspects. The findings of Study 1 suggest that Chinese state media  focus predominantly on non-
political topics when covering China, and Facebook audiences actively engage with this practice. 
In Study 2, I further reveal that Chinese state media shape international news for economic 
factors. They highlight news coverage of countries that have strong economic ties with China, 
and meantime do not connect China with countries having fragile conditions.  
The overarching goal of Study 3 is to examine whether and how Western platforms can 
regulate globalizing propaganda. If state-sponsored propaganda, as confirmed in Study 1 and 
Study 2, seek to purposefully craft national images and shape international news, then how could 
large platforms govern and restrict the distribution of propaganda content? More specifically, 
Study 3 employs a quasi-experimental design to test the effect of labeling Chinese state media on 
audience engagement in Twitter. This study utilizes a real-world intervention to examine the 
regulation of globalizing propaganda. On August 6, 2020, Twitter announced that it would add 
labels to “accounts that are controlled by certain official representatives of governments, state-
affiliated media entities” in order to “provide additional context” (Twitter, n.d.). The label 
appears on the profile pages of flagged accounts and on the tweets posted and shared by these
 
11 An earlier version of this chapter received the Top Student Paper Award from Political Communication Division 




accounts (see Figure 4-1). This practice provides a quasi-experimental opportunity to test the 
effect of flagging propaganda sources and to identify to what extent social media platforms can 
reduce the spread of international propaganda. 
 








As noted in Study 1, sharing information on social media is a social process in which 
people interact with others and participate in politics (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012) and a key 
component of online expression (Lane et al., 2019) and self-presentation (Kraft et al., 2020). In 
fact, audience engagement is central to the problem of information warfare around the globe 
(Bimber & Gil de Zúñiga, 2020), since what makes the current disinformation and propaganda 
particularly dangerous is that this type of information spreads quickly and widely on social 
media platforms (Woolley & Howard, 2018). In Study 3, I examine the debunking role that 
flagging could play in preventing people’s sharing of information from propaganda sources on 
social media. In doing so, this chapter contributes to the scholarship in three ways. First, I situate 
Study 3 in the emerging literature on flagging and the long-standing propaganda research, 
thereby expanding the emphasis of existing research from the content structure of international 
propaganda to the regulation of globalizing propaganda. Second, I provide substantive evidence 
concerning how social media platforms could restrict audience engagement in the natural setting. 
Third, the quasi-experimental design and interrupted time series analysis used in this chapter 
offer new directions for studying the regulation of international propaganda over time. 
 
Research Hypotheses and Questions 
 
Flagging as a Means of Platform Regulation 
The widespread growth of disinformation and propaganda on social media has raised 
growing concerns in recent years. Many worry that such information warfare and disorder can 
manipulate public opinion and disrupt democratic processes (Bimber & Gil de Zúñiga, 2020; M. 
L. Miller & Vaccari, 2020). In response, various solutions have been proposed by journalists, 




tech firms, and policymakers. While fact-checking organizations have mushroomed to verify 
politicians’ statements and news coverage (Amazeen, 2020), social media platforms have also 
taken actions to regulate content and users. A common approach is to flag potentially false, 
deceiving, or manipulative messages in the hope that these labels and warnings would be able to 
deter users from believing and sharing such content (Bode & Vraga, 2015; Garrett & Poulsen, 
2019; Mena, 2019; Weeks, 2015). For instance, Facebook has implemented the “Related 
Articles” feature in order to offer additional information to dubious posts. Twitter and YouTube 
have also added labels to content that might be disputed or misleading.  
However, empirical studies have presented inconsistent findings regarding the effect of 
flagging and fact-checking (Nieminen & Rapeli, 2019; N. Walter, Cohen, Holbert, & Morag, 
2020). For example, Amazeen et al. (2018) reported that attaching a truth scale to a message 
could correct false beliefs. On the other hand, other studies suggest that flagging might have 
limited or backfire effects (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Garrett and Poulsen (2019) found that fact-
checkers and peer-generated warning flags were not always successful in reducing belief in and 
sharing intention of untruthful messages.  
I argue that the discrepancies may be partly due to research designs and gaps. First, most 
existing studies rely on online experiments so participants are exposed to mock news with 
flagged messages. As such, the results usually lack external validity, making it difficult to 
generate conclusive findings. Second, previous studies mainly examine the effect of flagging on 
perceptions and attitudes, but changes in perceptions and attitudes are not always manifested in 
behaviors. Recent studies exploring the flagging effect on sharing behaviors still rely on self-
reported data (Chung & Kim, 2020; Mena, 2019). Finally, prior studies have focused primarily 
on the flagging of content rather than sources. Yet, the well-established persuasion literature has 




revealed that information sources play a crucial role in information processing and decision-
making (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Sundar, 2008). It is unclear whether attaching labels to 
social media accounts could affect users, since these labels signal that the information sources 
are questionable in terms of motive, impartiality, and credibility (Nassetta & Gross, 2020). 
Based on existing theories and evidence, I propose two competing expectations for the 
regulation of international propaganda. First, flagging can be effective in deterring people from 
engagement, because such a measure debunks the propaganda feature of Chinese state media. 
Alternatively, people could resist flagging since labeling state-affiliated media might conflict 
with their existing beliefs and knowledge. 
 
Source Flagging and the Decline of Audience Engagement  
There are three reasons to expect that source flagging could reduce audience engagement. 
First, flagging can be considered as one type of heuristic cues that help people process 
information and make judgments. Ample research has shown that people rely largely on heuristic 
cues for information processing (Chaiken, 1980; Sundar, 2008). Cues affect people’s evaluation 
of the attributes of a message (e.g., credibility) and the traits of a communicator (e.g., liking) 
(Chia & Cenite, 2012). Importantly, they are effective tools of persuasion, particularly for low-
involvement individuals (Chaiken, 1980) and in the online environment (Sundar, 2008). Thus, 
source flagging could be effective in reducing audience engagement because they reveal the 
affiliations of media accounts and challenge the credibility or neutrality of these sources. Recent 
research shows that people are less likely to share news provided by fake sources (Bauer & von 
Hohenberg, 2020) and to endorse rumors when fact-checking is presented (J. Shin, Jian, Driscoll, 
& Bar, 2017). 




Second, source flagging could also be effective due to the third-person effects. That is, 
people tend to perceive media messages to have a stronger effect on others than on themselves. 
Recent research has found that increased third-person perception would diminish people’s 
intentions to share fake news (Chung & Kim, 2020). This mechanism could apply to foreign 
propaganda as well, since the goal of propaganda is to persuade people and direct their behavior 
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014; Lasswell, 1938). In other words, users might not engage with 
flagged accounts, as they think that other users are more susceptible to propaganda sources than 
themselves.  
Third, people share news to express themselves and manage self-presentation (Kraft et 
al., 2020; Lane et al., 2019). Therefore, users would naturally avoid sharing information from 
flagged sources since this could damage their online reputation. This may be particularly salient 
given that propaganda from authoritarian countries strongly connotes manipulation and 
deception (Elswah & Howard, 2020; Nassetta & Gross, 2020). Taken together, I propose the 
following hypothesis :  
H10: The presence of source flagging will decrease audience engagement on social 
media. 
 
Source Flagging and the Increase of Audience Engagement  
Alternatively, source flagging could increase audience engagement. One explanation is 
motivated resistance (Nyhan, Porter, Reifler, & Wood, 2020). According to this explanation, 
people often have preexisting beliefs, ideologies, and knowledge. Thus, exposure to flagging 
messages might have undesired effects if corrections are counter-attitudinal, as people tend to 
avoid uncongenial fact-checkers (Hameleers & van der Meer, 2020). For example, Nyhan and 




Reifler (2010) found that fact-checking failed to change attitudes among the most committed 
participants but increased misperceptions instead.  
Second, the continued influence effect and familiarity effect could mitigate flagging 
efforts (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Thorson, 2016). Previous 
research suggests that fact- flagging could make people more likely to rely on false content for 
inferential reasoning, as these messages are more familiar and accessible (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Consequently, exposure to flagging can lead to corrections backfiring and strengthen 
individuals’ existing misperceptions.  
In the context of the current study, those who frequently share information from Chinese 
state media might already know the affiliations of these sources or have favorable attitudes 
toward China. As such, they might not be deterred by the flagging anyhow. It is also likely that 
they are motivated to share content from these flagged sources deliberately, in order to declare 
and defend their beliefs and ideologies. Thus, I propose:  
H11: The presence of source flagging will increase audience engagement on social 
media. 
 
The Effect of Source Flagging over Time 
Existing studies rely largely on one-time stimuli to measure the effect of flagging (Chung 
& Kim, 2020; Garrett & Poulsen, 2019). Nevertheless, in reality people are repeatedly exposed 
to flagging labels on social media. While flagging might have an immediate effect, changes in 
people’s behaviors could also happen gradually with repeated exposure, which cannot be 
captured by single-session experiments. Furthermore, the long-term effect of flagging on user 
behavior remains unknown. Flagging could produce lasting effects that permanently discourage 




audience engagement. Alternatively, it could generate short-term effects that would diminish 
over time. These are important questions since they explore how effective flagging measures 
could be, yet no study so far has provided empirical answers. I thus ask: 
RQ3: Does source flagging have an immediate effect or delayed effect on audience 
engagement? 
RQ4: Does source flagging have a long-term effect on audience engagement?  
 
The Role of Content Features 
As I have discussed in Study 1, previous research holds that news selection and audience 
engagement are also a function of content features like sentiments and topics (Trilling et al., 
2017). For example, previous research finds that controversial news (Boczkowski & 
Mitchelstein, 2012) and positive content (Kraft et al., 2020) are more likely to be shared by 
people. I also find that non-political topics are more liked to be shared by Facebook audiences. In 
Study 3, I consider two content factors: China-related news and political news. 
First, Twitter’s flagging might have differential effects between China- and non-China-
related news. Recent research has found that China-related content received more likes and 
reposts on Twitter and Facebook (Huang & Wang, 2020; Liang, 2019). Study 1 also confirms 
this finding. With the presence of source flagging, I expect users to be more aware that China-
related messages are tailored for purposes of conveying certain ideologies and persuading 
audiences. Thus, users are less likely to share China-related news if source flagging could limit 
audience engagement, because such labels debunk the operations of propaganda. On the other 
hand, prior research finds that people could hold on to existing beliefs when facing flagging 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The introduction of propaganda labels could further motivate users, 




particularly those who have already known the affiliations of labeled sources and found China 
favorable, to share China-related news in order to promote the image and voice of China. Hence, 
I hypothesize:  
H12: The effects of source flagging on audience engagement will be stronger for China-
related news than non-China-related news. 
Similar effects could be observed in political news as well. While Study 1 finds that 
political content is not the most prominent topic, politics is still the main arena where state 
propaganda endeavors operate and compete (Creemers, 2017; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014; 
Lasswell, 1938). It is likely that users are less willing to share political news produced by flagged 
sources, as flagging corrects their perceptions of information sources (Nassetta & Gross, 2020). I 
could also expect people who are familiar with these accounts to share political news more 
frequently, as they intend to defend their perspectives or restate their pre-existing beliefs and 
attitudes. I thus hypothesize:   
H13: The effects of source flagging on audience engagement will be stronger for 




Data   
To test the flagging effect, I first compiled a list of Twitter accounts that are operated by 
Chinese state media  organizations and then selected those are: 1) verified by Twitter, and 2) 
actively producing English news. This yielded 30 flagged accounts12: 25 are operated by state-
 
12  This is not an exclusive list of Chinese state media  on Twitter. Media accounts that publish news in other 
languages or do not actively produce content are not included in this study: @CRIjpn, @cgtnrussian, 




owned media and five are owned by market-based media (@caixin, @ShanghaiEye, 
@SixthTone, @thepapercn, and @yicaichina)13. Table 4-1 provides descriptive statistics for 
these media accounts. Similar to the media agencies used in Study 1 and Study 2, Chinese state 
media began to use Twitter for globalizing propaganda since 2009, and many flagged accounts 
were created during 2009 and 2012. It is also worth noting that earlier media accounts were 
usually international broadcasting like CCTV (@CCTV) or national newspapers like People’s 
Daily (@PDChina) and China Daily (@ChinaDaily), recently created accounts are more diverse. 
For instance, @Chinacultureorg is maintained by the Ministry of Culture, aiming to spread 
China’s history and culture, @ChinaScience is owned by the CCP for the purpose of 
disseminating news about science and technology, and @XinhuaTravel focuses on information 
about culture and travel.  
  
 
@cgtnenespanol, @cgtnarabic, @PuebloEnLnea, @Xhespanol, @XHJapanese, @XHIndonesia, @CRIespanol, 
@Xhespanol, @VoiceofPD, @cctvenespanol, @ChinaDailyEU, @ChinaDailyUSA, @rus_renminwang, 
@PeopleArabic, @DiarioPovo. 
13    Chinese state media  system has experienced market liberalization since the1990s. While market-based media 
do not receive subsidies from governments, they need to follow official regulations and censorship. 




Table 4-1. Descriptive Statistics of Flagged Media Accounts 
Media accounts W1 W2 W3 
Account 
created Affiliations 
@BeijingReview 224 260 259 Jun-09 CIPG 
@caixin 327 441 326 Jan-10 Commercial media 
@CCTV 210 202 215 Jul-09 State Council 
@cgtnafrica 813 807 796 Jun-12 State Council 
@cgtnamerica 919 904 874 Jun-12 State Council 
@CGTNEurope 439 375 314 Dec-16 State Council 
@CGTNOfficial 2,724 2,708 2,578 Jan-13 State Council 
@China__Focus 99 143 107 Oct-17 CIPG 
@Chinacultureorg 102 88 67 Nov-15 Ministry of Culture 
@ChinaDaily 1,700 1,690 1,633 Nov-09 State Council 
@ChinaPlusNews 236 191 244 Apr-09 State Council 
@ChinaScience 132 134 126 Aug-19 The CCP 
@Echinanews 681 675 667 Jul-11 The CCP 
@GlobalTimesBiz 420 359 294 Feb-16 People’s Daily 
@globaltimesnews 2,604 2,337 2,342 Jun-09 People’s Daily 
@Guangming_Daily 186 195 192 Jun-12 The CCP 
@ipandacom 154 140 150 Feb-13 CCTV 
@PDChina 751 725 732 May-11 The CCP 
@PDChinaBusiness 131 126 130 Aug-19 The CCP 
@PDChinaHK 64 45 32 Jun-20 The CCP 




@PDChinaLife 144 139 130 Aug-19 The CCP 
@PDChinaSports 117 93 111 Aug-19 The CCP 
@ShanghaiEye 384 381 383 Oct-15 Commercial media 
@SixthTone 165 155 162 Feb-16 Commercial media 
@thepapercn 308 372 338 Aug-19 Commercial media 
@thouse_opinions 232 309 246 Jul-19 Commercial media 
@XHNews 1,758 1,666 1,722 Feb-12 State Council 
@XHscitech 100 75 85 Jun-16 State Council 
@XinhuaTravel 58 57 60 Feb-19 State Council 
@yicaichina 533 589 715 Mar-16 Commercial media 
Total  16,715   16,381 16,030   – – 
Note. Columns W 1 – 3 show the total number of tweets created by each account in each period. 
CIPG = China International Publishing Group, CCTV = China Central Television, CCP = Chinese 
Communist Party.  
  




Next, I relied on Twitter’s API to collect data from these accounts. I gathered data in a 
consecutive 60-day period: 20 days before Twitter introduced flagging and the next 40 days. I 
decided to do so because time series data are often influenced by historical and social contexts, 
thus collecting data over a long time period could introduce time-varying confounders (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2014). In contrast, using a short period might not have enough observations 
for model estimation. Based on the consideration, I considered 20 days prior to the event as the 
pre-intervention period (W1 July 17 – August 5, 2020) and 20 days after the event as the post-
intervention period (W2 August 6 – August 25). I also included additional 20 days to estimate 
the long-term effect (W3 August 26 – September 14). This offered adequate observations and 
meantime limited possible impacts of time-varying confounders.  
Moreover, I actively monitored news during the period and found no significant events 
regarding China and Chinese media, which largely excluded the possibility that the fluctuations 
in content sharing might be due to breaking news or major issues relating to China. Overall, the 
dataset consisted of a total of 49,126 tweets: 16,715 in W1, 16,381 in W2, and 16,030 in W3 (see 
Table 4-1). I also examined whether the numbers of tweets are consistent across these three 
periods. I adopted a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test. Results of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Tests show that there are no significant differences in terms of the number of tweets between W1 




Audience engagement. To capture sharing behavior, I focused on the number of likes and 
retweets of each tweet. These two metrics are often used to measure the popularity of social 




media posts (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010). On Twitter, both likes and retweets indicate 
audience engagement since users can see tweets liked or retweeted by friends on their timelines. 
I combined these two into an index of daily audience engagement (r = .71, M = 77.82, Mdn = 
8.14, SD = 281.72). Given that the measure was highly skewed, I conducted a logarithmic 
transformation of the index (M = 2.51, SD = 1.66). 
Time variables. To estimate the flagging effect, I created three time-related variables (Y. 
Shin, 2017; Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, & Ross-Degnan, 2002). First, T represents a consecutive 
variable indicating time in days from the beginning of the observation (1 = July 17, 2 = July 18, 
3 = July 19…). The second variable I is a binary variable indicating the presence of flagging (0 = 
pre-intervention, 1 = post-intervention). It estimates whether flagging immediately influences the 
level of audience engagement. Finally, another time variable T2 is zero for pre-intervention 
observations and begins consecutively counting post-intervention observations (1 = August 6, 2 = 
August 7...). This variable estimates whether flagging gradually affects the trend of audience 
engagement.  
Content features. I performed dictionary-based methods to construct content variables. 
This approach uses the frequency of keywords to identify concepts and classes in texts (Young & 
Soroka, 2012). For China-related tweets, I compiled a list of keywords relating to China (e.g., 
China, Chinese), Chinese provinces and cities (e.g., Shanghai, Beijing), Chinese politicians (e.g., 
Xi Jinping), Chinese firms (e.g., Alibaba, Tencent), and Chinese celebrities. I then applied this 
dictionary to classify tweets related to China (0 = non-China, 1 = China). I further aggregated 
the data to calculate daily proportions of China-related news (M = .71, SD = .24). Following 
previous research (Kraft et al., 2020), I created a dictionary to identify political content and then 
calculated daily proportions of political news (M = .08, SD = .11).  




Control variables. I controlled for three content variables: news sentiment, COVID-19 
news, and the number of tweets. It has been found that people are less inspired to share news 
containing negative sentiment (Kraft et al., 2020) or pandemic news (Sharma, Yadav, Yadav, & 
Ferdinand, 2017). For news sentiment, I employed Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary developed by 
Young and Soroka (2012). This dictionary contains 3,430 positive sentiment words and 5,718 
negative sentiment words, allowing researchers to analyze the sentiment of textual data. I used R 
package “quanteda” to get a sentiment score for each tweet and then calculated daily news 
sentiment (M = .25, SD = .68). Next, I created a dictionary relating to COVID-19 (e.g., COVID-
19, coronavirus) and applied it to calculate the daily proportions of pandemic news (M = .19, SD 
= .16). I also counted the number of tweets posted per account every day (M = 29.88, SD = 
36.27). Table C1 in the Appendix C provides detailed summaries about these variables.  
Account-level variable. I include one account-level factor in the analysis: the number of 
followers of each account (M = 1,268,312, Mdn = 236,000). This variable measures the 
popularity of media accounts and is often positively related to audience engagement. I conducted 
a logarithmic transformation of this variable (M = 12.37, SD = 2.09).  
 
Analysis  
I use time series analysis to test hypotheses and explore research questions. The unit of 
analysis is daily-aggregated observations14. Compared with cross-sectional designs, time series 
techniques enable researchers to examine temporal dynamics and social processes over time 
(Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2014). In Study 3, a simple comparison of the before-and-after mean 
 
14   The use of weeks and months as time intervals is common in time series analysis, but I will have limited 
observations if I choose weekly aggregated data. Thus, I use daily interval in this study. 




values would be insufficient, since time series data may have trends over time. Thus, I adopt 
interrupted time series (ITS) designs to examine the flagging effect.  
In a typical ITS design, data are collected at multiple instances before and after the 
introduction of an intervention (D. T. Campbell & Ross, 1968). The intervention, or interruption, 
could be an event or public policy. In the current case, the intervention is Twitter’s practice of 
labeling state-affiliated media starting on August 6. The pre-intervention observations are used 
as the baseline to estimate counterfactual observations for the post-intervention (D. T. Campbell 
& Ross, 1968). Therefore, ITS can test whether the outcome observed in the post-intervention 
period is significantly different from that observed before the intervention, which allows us to 
infer that the observed change could be due to the intervention (Ramsay, Matowe, Grilli, 
Grimshaw, & Thomas, 2003). Thus, it is more informative than traditional before-after designs. 
Another advantage is that ITS accounts for potential biases in time series data, including 
autocorrelation, seasonality, secular trends, and random fluctuations (Wagner et al., 2002). ITS is 
hence considered the strongest quasi-experimental design, allowing researchers to test causal 
inferences when randomized trials are impractical (Ramsay et al., 2003).  
There are two intervention effects in ITS: the change in the level and that in the trend (Y. 
Shin, 2017; Wagner et al., 2002). To test the level change, I rely on the dichotomous variable I. 
This allows us to compare the values of the outcome variable at which the estimated level of the 
pre-intervention series and that of the post-intervention series cross the intervention. This 
variable also helps estimate whether the intervention has an immediate effect (Ramsay et al., 
2003; Wagner et al., 2002). A significantly negative result would suggest a sudden drop in the 
outcome after the intervention. To explore the trend change, I rely on the variable T2 to compare 
the estimated slopes of the pre- and post-intervention periods (Y. Shin, 2017). T2 also tests 




whether the intervention has delayed effect. A significantly negative result would mean a gradual 




Time Series Diagnostics 
The first step in time series analysis is to understand the structure of data (Y. Shin, 2017). 
Time series data often involve three components: seasonality, trend, and white noise (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2014). Since I am mainly interested in the change of audience engagement, I 
first estimate and deseasonalize the outcome variable. Seasonality refers to regular fluctuations 
that consistently occur over time, it should be estimated and removed from the data (Y. Shin, 
2017). To do so, I examine the PACF (partial autocorrelation function) of audience engagement 
for each media account. The results suggest that this variable does not have seasonality, meaning 
that audience engagement does not consistently repeat at the same frequency over time (Figure 
C1 in the Appendix C).  
 I also estimate the autocorrelation of the outcome variable, because time series variables 
often correlate with themselves across time (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2014). To test the first-
order autocorrelation, I conduct Ljung-Box test and Durbin-Watson test (Table C2 in the 
Appendix C). I also employ ACF (autocorrelation function) to identify high-order 
autocorrelation (Figure C2 in the Appendix C). The results show that, while some media 
accounts have first-order autocorrelation, most of them do not show high-order autocorrelation. 
This means that audience engagement does not correlate with itself over time. 
 





I use mixed-effects models to take into account the differences between accounts. I start 
with model comparisons to determine whether there are variations in audience engagement 
across these accounts. Similar to the process used in Study 2, I fit a fixed intercept null model 
(i.e., OLS regression) containing no predictors and a random intercept null model. Analyses of 
variance tests of the differences between likelihood-ratio test of these two models show that a 
random intercept-only model is a better fit for the data, χ2 = 2139.4, p < .001. The random 
intercept-only model suggests that the majority of the variance in audience engagement is 
attributed to account-level differences, ICC (intraclass correlation coefficient) = .88.  
H10 predicts that flagging will reduce engagement, whereas H11 expects that flagging 
will increase news sharing. Table 4-2 shows the results of mixed-effects models. Full maximum 
likelihood estimation is used. A likelihood-ratio test comparing the random intercept-only model 
with Model 1 reveals a significant difference, χ2 = 47.76 , p < .0115. Model 1 identifies a 
significantly negative effect of flagging on the level of audience engagement, b = -.17, p < .01. 
Meanwhile, I do not find significant increases in the level of and trend of audience engagement. 
Thus, H10 is supported whereas H11 is rejected. The predictors explain approximately 22% of 
the variance in engagement, whilst the remaining variance exists at the account-level (ICC 
= .78).   
 
15  I also run a mixed-effects model only using three time-related variables. The result of likelihood-ratio test 
suggests that Model 1 is a better fit for the data, χ2 = 17.64, p < .01. The time-variable-only model also reveals a 




Table 4-2. Linear Mixed-Effects Models Predicting Audience Engagement 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effects      
Intercept  -3.95 ** (1.16)     -4.01 ** (1.17)    -3.96 ** (1.16)     -4.02 ** (1.16)    
Time (T) 0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    
Level change (I) -0.17 ** (0.07)     -0.03 (0.16)    -0.25 ** (0.08)     -0.18 (0.18)    
Trend change (T2) 0.00 (0.01)    -0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)    0.01 (0.02)    
Sentiment  0.04 (0.04)    0.04 (0.04)    0.04 (0.04)    0.04 (0.04)    
Daily news -0.00 * (0.00)     -0.00 * (0.00)      -0.00 * (0.00)      -0.00 * (0.00)      
China’s news 0.07 (0.13)    0.15 (0.14)    0.07 (0.13)    0.14 (0.14)    
Political news -0.27 (0.22)    -0.27 (0.22)    -0.14 (0.29)    -0.10 (0.29)    
COVID-19 news -0.42 ** (0.14)    -0.40 ** (0.14)     -0.43 ** (0.14)     -0.41 ** (0.14)     
Followers  0.54 *** (0.09)    0.54 *** (0.09)    0.54 *** (0.09)    0.54 *** (0.09)    
Level × China news         -0.19 (0.20)            -0.09 (0.20)    
Trend × China news         0.01 (0.02)            -0.01 (0.02)    
Level × Political news         
 
0.76 (0.50)    0.72 (0.52)    




Trend × Political news         
 
-0.09 * (0.04)      -0.10 * (0.04)      
Variance of random effects     
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 1.132 1.134 1.134 1.333 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.311 0.310 0.309 0.308 
N (Level 1 units) 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 
N (Level 2 units) 30 30 30 30 
AIC 2001.88 2004.55 1999.27 2001.51 
BIC 2061.89 2074.56 2069.28 2081.52 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full maximum likelihood estimation. AIC = Akaike 
Information Criterion. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. Likelihood-ratio tests comparing Model 1 with Model 2/Model 4 
do not obtain significant differences, whereas the difference between Model 1 and Model 3 is significant, χ2 = 6.61, p < .05. 




H12 expects that the effect of source flagging on audience engagement will be stronger 
for China-related news instead of non-China-related news, and H13 proposes that the effect will 
be stronger for political news than non-political content. To test these two hypotheses, I run 
additional models including interaction terms. Models 2 shows that there are no interaction 
effects between China-related news and flagging. Thus, H12 is rejected. Moreover, Model 3 
reveals a negative interaction effect between political news and trend change, b = -.09, p < .05. 
This means that the sharing of political news gradually declined after the intervention. H13 is 
hence supported. 
Moreover, RQ3 explores whether source flagging has an immediate effect or delayed 
effect on audience engagement. Table 4-2 has revealed significant results for the level (variable 
I), meaning that flagging immediately decreases engagement. Further, I do not find significant 
difference in the trend (variable T2), suggesting that news sharing does not gradually decrease 
after the intervention. At the same time, I find that the sharing of political news gradually 
diminishes after the intervention, so source flagging has a delayed effect on reducing the 
diffusion of political content. This offers mixed findings for RQ3, indicating that source flagging 
effect is overall immediate, but when it comes to political news the effect might be delayed. 
RQ4 addresses whether flagging has a long-term effect on audience engagement. I 
combine W2 and W3 data as post-intervention observations and run additional models. The 
results suggest that flagging significantly reduces the level of audience engagement, b = -.18, p 
< .01. The interaction between political news and trend change is also significant, b = -.03, p 
< .05. To better understand the effects of source flagging over time, I visualize the change of 
engagement in Figure 4-2. Evidently, the reduction of news sharing is not uniform across these 
accounts. Specifically, I find that 24 media outlets experienced decreases in engagement in W2, 




ranging from 4.6 to 61.56 percent (also see Figure 4-3). For instance, @CGTNOfficial (W1 M = 
35.89, Mdn = 32.47; W2 M = 27.42, Mdn = 26.43), @PDChina (W1 M = 155.57, Mdn = 122.61; 
W2 M = 101.52, Mdn = 98.65), and @XinhuaTravel (W1 M = 1,582.38, Mdn = 1,534; W2 M = 





Figure 4-2. The Change of Audience Engagement over Time 
 
Note. The Y-axis is the value of daily news sharing for each account. The scales on the Y-axis are different. The green curve line 
is the smooth line (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) and the grey areas indicate 95% confidence levels. The red dotted 
line shows the intervention (August 6), whereas the blue dotted line indicates the end of W2 (August 25).   




Figure 4-3. The Change of Audience Engagement 
 
Notes. The bar chart shows the proportion change of news sharing in W2 compared 
with W1, calculated by subtracting the difference of daily values between W1 and W2 
and divided by W1 values. Red bars show reductions in audience engagement, 
whereas blue bars indicate increases. 
 
  




Interestingly, I find that six accounts received more sharing after the intervention 
(@caixin, @cgtnamerica, @China__Focus, @thepapercn, @SixthTone, and @yicaichina). 
While @cgtnamerica and @China_Focus are state-owned media, other four are operated by 
commercial media. For @cgtnamerica, @China_Focus, and @SixthTone, the increase is 
primarily driven by peaks in W2. I further remove these extreme values and find that their 
audience engagement also declined. For other three accounts, the increase is partially due to the 
fact that they received limited sharing (less than ten per day), so some popular tweets posted in 
W2 may boost news sharing. 
 
Robustness Tests 
I conduct additional tests to address the robustness of the conclusions when considering 
different specifications and alternative explanations. I begin with the consideration of time 
periods. I estimate the flagging effect using three other periods: seven days before and after the 
intervention, ten days, and fifteen days. I find the same results: source flagging significantly 
reduces the level of audience engagement (Table C3 in the Appendix C).  
 Second, I consider the effect for influential media outlets, as some accounts do not 
receive substantial audience engagement. To do so, I focus on accounts that receive at least 
twenty audience engagement per day in either W1 or W2. This yielded thirteen media accounts16. 
Consistent with my expectation, source flagging significantly reduces the level of engagement in 
short term, b = -.29, p < .05, and long term, b = -.29, p < .05 (Table C4 in the Appendix C).  
 
16  These accounts include: @XinhuaTrave, @PDChinaLif, @ipandacom, @PDChinaSports, @ChinaScience, 
@PDChina, @ChinaDaily, @XHNews, @globaltimesnews, @CGTNOfficial, @PDChinaBusiness, @CCTV, 
@cgtnamerica. 




 Third, I separate the number of likes and retweets. The results suggest that the presence 
of flagging has a significant effect on the level of liking and that of retweeting, b = -.19, p < .01 
and b = -.14, p < .05, respectively. Source flagging also has a long-term impact on decreasing 
both liking and retweeting (Table C5 in the Appendix C).   
 Fourth, I address plausible counterfactual conditions by testing the flagging effect on 
non-equivalent outcomes. That is, I explore variables that are not expected to respond to the 
intervention. I consider four non-equivalent variables: news sentiment, the number of tweets, 
China-related news, and political news. I expect that flagging will not affect these variables, as 
Chinese state media  need to follow official regulations and should not significantly change their 
coverage in response to the intervention. The results suggest that source flagging does not 
significantly change these variables (Table C6 in the Appendix C).  
Fifth, I consider another counterfactual scenario by examining media accounts that are 
not labeled but post topics similar to flagged accounts. I select Hong Kong’s South China 
Morning Post (SCMP) as the example, as it also focuses on the coverage of China and is not 
flagged by Twitter. The expectation is that SCMP’s audience engagement should not 
significantly change after August 6. I estimate the effect using an OLS model. The results reveal 
no significant differences in the level of engagement, b = .22, p = .45, and trend, b = .02, p = .50.   
Finally, I estimate the flagging effect for Chinese state media  that publish content in 
Chinese. In addition to English-language accounts, People’s Daily and China News Service also 
operate Twitter accounts publishing tweets in Chinese. These two are also labeled by Twitter. 
However, I expect that flagging Chinese-language accounts will not affect audience engagement 
of these accounts, as those who speak Chinese should already know that these agencies are state-
affiliated media. I run OLS models and find no significant differences in the level, b = .00, p 




= .64, and trend, b = -.01, p = .46, for People’s Daily. The model for China News Service also 




While Study 1 and Study 2 have revealed the practice of China’s globalizing propaganda, 
it is equally important to understand how social media platforms like Twitter could regulate and 
limit the spread of information by labeling propaganda sources. As Chinese state media depend 
heavily on Western platforms for the production of propaganda, the analysis of the regulation of 
such operations tells us to what extent Western platforms can restrict and govern globalizing 
propaganda. Facing the challenge of foreign propaganda, social media platforms have taken 
multiple measures to warn users and facilitate access to credible content. Using a quasi-
experimental design, Study 3 provides insights into how the flagging of propaganda sources 
affects information sharing and regulates the spread of propaganda on social media. I find that 
labeling accounts as state-affiliated media could immediately lower the level of audience 
engagement and further lead to a long-term reduction, particularly for political content.  
Study 3 offers five implications for the study of globalizing propaganda. First, it offers 
insights for understanding China’s rising role in global communication. While Western 
mainstream media still dominate the global information landscape, Study 1 and Study 2 find that 
China is becoming increasingly competitive by wielding Western platforms for providing 
alternative news. Although this may be the case, the findings of Study 3 show that social media 
platforms can still regulate audience engagement with Chinese state media, as flagged accounts 
suffered the loss of audience engagement. This means that the effectiveness of China’s 




globalizing propaganda still depends on platforms, which could restrict China’s efforts in 
reshaping the order of global communication. Yet, I also find that flagging could not discourage 
all news sharing, arguably because these accounts have attracted loyal audiences. For instance, 
CGTN still maintained 70 percent of sharing after the intervention. Thus, Chinese state media 
have substantial leverages to influence global communication.  
Second, I test two behavioral effects with two types of changes (levels vs. trends). Using 
real-world intervention and behavioral data, I find strong evidence supporting the claim that 
Twitter’s use of propaganda labels is effective as it discourages users from sharing information 
posted by Chinese state media. I argue that there are two possible explanations for corrective 
effect: source verifications and online presence. First, it is possible that many users did not know 
these accounts were state-affiliated before the intervention. As discussed, source cues play a 
crucial role in information processing and decision-making (Chaiken, 1980; Sundar, 2008). 
Twitter’s flagging thus helps authenticate state-affiliated accounts and triggers heuristic-based 
judgments (Chia & Cenite, 2012). In other words, the state-affiliated media labels could 
forewarn Twitter users of the propaganda nature of the sources, which debunks these accounts 
and further diminishes audience engagement (Nassetta & Gross, 2020). Second, some users 
might already know that these accounts are Chinese state media , but the introduction of source 
flagging deters them from engaging with these accounts. This is possible because sharing tweets 
created by flagged accounts may damage one’s online reputation, as previous studies find that 
social media users express themselves and manage online presence through information sharing 
(Kraft et al., 2020; Lane et al., 2019). These findings highlight the importance of platform 
regulation for regulating international propaganda. 




Third, Study 3 reveals that flagging propaganda sources might be more effective in 
dissuading people from sharing political content. This finding suggests that flagging has the 
potential to restrict the diffusion of political news created by propaganda sources. Furthermore, I 
find no evidence that the flagging effect differs between China-related news and non-China-
related news. As China’s foreign propaganda emphasizes “telling China’s story” and “spreading 
China’s voice”, it aims to compete with Western media in shaping not only the image of China, 
but also the public discourse of international affairs, as I have found in Study 2. The results of 
this chapter point out that Twitter’s flagging evenly dampens these two strategies. 
Fourth, the ITS analysis provides new directions for studying globalizing propaganda, as 
previous literature rarely investigates how social media companies can govern and regulate the 
spread of international propaganda on their platforms. I argue that flagging could affect 
information sharing in two ways: immediate change after the intervention (i.e., the change of 
levels) and gradual change across time (i.e., the change of trends). The findings of Study 3 reveal 
immediate effect on overall user engagement, as well as delayed effect on the sharing of political 
information. This further propounds that flagging could have different types of effects, and thus 
we need to consider flagging as a social dynamic rather than static processes. Moreover, I find 
that source flagging could have a long-term impact on audience engagement. This means that the 
observed effect of flagging is not a result of novelty. Instead, flagging has the potential to 
consistently decline the spread of propaganda content on social media.   
Notably, I also find that flagging does not uniformly deter engagement across these 
media accounts. It corroborates previous findings that the effect of flagging is socially and 
politically contingent (Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2018). While most accounts lost audience 
engagement after being flagged by Twitter, I do find that some accounts received more likes and 




retweets after the intervention. Furthermore, the declining pattern of audience engagement is also 
not the same across these accounts. One explanation is that these media accounts adopt different 
strategies for spreading propaganda. For example, CGTN portrays itself as an international 
media organization in its profile and does not mention its connections with China. Thus, many 
users might not know that CGTN is state-affiliated before the intervention. China Daily, by 
contrast, clearly identifies its connections with China in usernames and accounts, and hence 
people can easily recognize its affiliations without flagging. Another possibility is that source 
flagging would only deter certain groups of people (e.g., those who do not hold favorable 
attitudes toward China) from news sharing, but could not affect those who have favorable 
attitudes toward or are interested in China. 
Fifth, Study 3 also has practical implications for social media platforms, fact-checkers, 
and policymakers. I find that source flagging generates corrective effect immediately after the 
intervention, which provides evidence-based support for the use of flagging labels on social 
media. This is encouraging in light of the growing concerns about the effectiveness of corrective 
measures counteracting the operation of foreign propaganda in particular and information 
warfare in general. Nevertheless, I also observe that Twitter’s flagging does not have the same 
impact across flagged accounts. It thus suggests that flagging should not be considered as a 
panacea for platform governance. In order to improve the corrective measures, social media 
platforms need to develop multiple tools for offering credible content and consider tailor 
designing their corrective measures. 
Study 3 benefits from a quasi-experimental design which allows us to estimate causal 
inference in the real-world setting. Despite this strength, I note that it has several limitations. 
First, while the conclusions have high levels of ecological validity, the psychological 




mechanisms underlying people’s reactions to source flagging is still unclear. Previous studies 
have found that the presence of labels could influence how people evaluate the information, and 
the evaluation further leads to behavioral changes (Chung & Kim, 2020; Mena, 2019). Thus, it is 
possible that the introduction of flagging labels reduces people’s perceptions of source 
credibility, and the declined perception further discourages engagement with flagged accounts. 
Therefore, further research could examine how people assess flagged sources. 
Second, it is beyond the scope of Study 3 to identify who disengaged with these accounts 
after the intervention. This is partially due to Twitter’s restricted API policies, but I believe it 
holds important explanations to the flagging effect. Future research could test these explanations 
using network data. Third, due to the quasi-experimental nature of the study design, I cannot 
exclude the possibility that other exogenous factors might be at play, such as the changed 
structures and patterns of audience engagement on Twitter. Fourth, I focused on one platform 
and media accounts from one country. In fact, Twitter labels other countries’ state-affiliated 
media (e.g., Russia), and Facebook and YouTube also introduce similar measures. Future 
research hence could benefit by examining the effect of source flagging across platforms and 
countries.  
Considered collectively, the findings of Study 3 contribute to the growing body of 
scholarship on the effect of flagging and international propaganda on social media. The evidence 
presented here suggests that the introduction of flagging is effective in immediately reducing the 
sharing of propaganda content, and such corrective effect does not disappear in the long-term 
period. Study 3 thus suggests that the impact of international propaganda still depends on the 
regulation of the US-based platforms, and this dependency could further restrict China’s 
globalizing propaganda.   




Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
Revisiting Globalizing Propaganda 
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of how state power has 
been displayed, exercised, and restricted through communication by focusing on China’s 
globalizing propaganda on Western social media platforms. In the social media age, the 
formation and management of communication are certainly the key means of constructing power 
(Castells, 2013). Today, we are facing a completely different situation in which Chinese state 
media extensively disturb established global communication order in many ways, and they do 
this in part by leveraging Western platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In essential, Chinese 
state media are challenging the global communication order and reversing the international 
information flows that run from the West to other regions. Therefore, we need to think 
differently in important ways about how to study state power and communication in the global 
and comparative context. 
This project begins with the question “to what extent and in what ways are Chinese state 
media leveraging Western platforms that are blocked in China for propaganda operations?” 
Although China has become a key economic and political power in the world, it presents a 
paradox when it comes to communication and media. Its censorship systems, propaganda 
apparatus, and the Great Firewall indicate that the Party-state adopts a subtractive way for 
managing and controlling information flows. Previous studies in communication and political 
science have shown that removing unfavorable content, manipulating public opinion,




and restricting information access are common ways employed by state actors (Creemers, 2017; 
Han, 2018; King et al., 2013; Roberts, 2018). In contrast, in this dissertation, I argue that China’s 
rise on Western platforms has resulted in a significant transformation in the power structure of 
global communication. Rather than exploring whether and how social media can democratize 
authoritarian regimes, we need to study how a rising power wields and presents power via global 
communication. This dissertation reveals that China has employed an additive approach to 
reshape global communication and improve state power by leveraging Western platforms. This 
approach suggests that the operation of propaganda is not restricted to the domestic sphere; the 
Party-state instead conducts propaganda outside its territory to exercise communication power in 
the world.  
Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the transformation of global communication 
and the rise of international propaganda on social media. First, while the current global 
communication order is primarily ruled by Western nations, rising powers like China are 
increasingly challenging and shifting the structure and components of the order (Diamond et al., 
2016; Sparks, 2019; Thussu, 2018; Youmans & York, 2012). This could significantly change 
how power is distributed and who holds the power online. Second, one of the most influential 
strategies used is to globalize propaganda apparatus in order to reshape the international 
information flows and affect global audiences (Elswah & Howard, 2020; Lukito, 2020; Wright et 
al., 2020). Initially, propaganda was considered an important means for persuasion and 
manipulation during wars (Lasswell, 1938; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948). More recently, the rapid 
growth of foreign propaganda and mis-/disinformation campaigns on social media have raised 
public concerns (Golovchenko et al., 2020; Woolley & Howard, 2018). It is against this 




background that this dissertation seeks to explore how China is globalizing its propaganda, who 
are involved in the process, and how Western platforms regulate this practice.  
Building upon these scholarships, I propose and test a theoretical framework that 
systematically examines the practice and regulation of globalizing propaganda. In many respects, 
the findings from three empirical studies clearly illustrate the ways in which Chinese state media 
adopt Western platforms for promoting the presence of a non-Western and non-democratic 
nation and shaping international information flows, though the effectiveness still depends on the 
governance of platform stakeholders. For example, Study 1 and Study 2 provide convergent 
evidence that Chinese state media generate a curated selection of news stories for China and 
other countries, and economic ties are important factors affecting the structure of international 
news coverage. Study 3 further shows that Western platforms have the ability to confine the 
spread of China’s globalizing propaganda through source flagging. 
In this dissertation, I argue that globalizing propaganda has to be conceived as a whole 
system that involves multiple stakeholders and components that cannot be considered separately. 
Altogether, these stakeholders and components explain how globalizing propaganda has been 
operated and limited on a given platform, how various actors are connected and interacted, and 
how globalizing propaganda constitutes a moment of major shifts in global communication. 
There is no doubt that the rise of China in global communication will not only dramatically 
transform the structure and content of the existing global information landscapes, but also change 
how scholars theorize and analyze global communication and state power in the social media 
age. This is why, in this dissertation, I have devoted particular attention to the role that Chinese 
state media play in shaping the counter-flows of international news and its dependence on 
Western platforms.  





Counter-flows and Dependence 
As I have stated earlier in Chapter 1, a detailed understanding of globalizing propaganda 
requires a framework that involves actors and components behind the rise of China in global 
communication. My framework proposes that there have four stakeholders and two components. 
A basic assumption of the framework is that the host country intends to display and exercise its 
power at the international level through the use of Western platforms. The findings from this 
dissertation suggest that Chinese state media signify a counter-flows of international information. 
The production of counter-flows and the display of state power are facilitated through two 
mechanisms: the cultural and social presence of the host country and the focus of international 
economic connections. 
The framework helps identify theoretical contexts of global communication and 
propaganda, and further expands previous studies into the context of international propaganda on 
Western platforms. As I have noted in Study 1, the practice of globalizing propaganda is 
conceptualized as the supply and demand of international news on social media platforms. The 
supply-side indicates the production of the counter-flows, whereas the demand-side is related to 
the consumption of and engagement with the counter-flows. While previous studies claimed that 
politics and other types of hard news are central to the operation of propaganda at home (Ellu, 
1973; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014), I find that Chinese state media tend to report China as a 
culture and society rather than a polity. The emphasis on non-political topics suggests that 
China’s globalizing propaganda is significantly different from its domestic propaganda which 
focuses predominantly on political and ideological content (Brady, 2009; Creemers, 2017). To 
“tell China’s story”, Chinese state media strategically highlight China’s cultural and social 




aspects for global audiences. The attractiveness of culture and society suggests the softening of 
propaganda for global audiences. Moreover, as Study 1 has revealed, this practice does attract 
Facebook users to engage with propaganda content, particularly China-related news. This 
indicates that the cultural and social presence of China has substantially encouraged the 
consumption and distribution of the counter-flows.  
In addition, the framework also helps us understand the reporting of foreign nations and 
factors explaining the structure of international news coverage. This extends propaganda 
research that initially focuses on the host country into the consideration of other countries and 
international news. My dissertation underscores that international news coverage in globalizing 
propaganda is a strategic response to international economic conditions. In particular, I find that 
Chinese state media cover foreign nations in systematically different ways, and more 
importantly, economic connections are important factors that predict the structure of 
international news. The finding that foreign news coverage in Chinese state media is mainly 
driven by China’s interest in international economic engagement suggests that globalizing 
propaganda also facilitates China’s connections with other countries. As I have discussed in 
Chapter 1, the global information environment is largely dominated by Western mainstream 
media (Winseck & Pike, 2009), and the dominance could shape and construct how global 
audiences understand foreign nations and international affairs. The pragmatic approach in the 
coverage of foreign nations allows Chinese state media to offer counter-flows and alternative 
perspectives that fit with China’s national interest. 
However, my dissertation has recognized the dependence behind China’s globalizing 
propaganda. Although Chinese state media have strategically produced news content and 
progressively highlight China’s economic connections with other countries, an important 




assumption is that this practice has to rely upon Western platforms like Facebook and Twitter. It 
is this dependence that could confine and reduce the dissemination of the counter-flows. In 
Chapter 1, I define the regulation of globalizing propaganda as a system of rules, norms, and 
policies that manage and govern users and content of an online platform. As I have revealed in 
Study 3, this concept is tested by examining the effect of state-affiliated media labels in Twitter. 
My findings suggest that source flagging significantly reduced news sharing among flagged 
Chinese media accounts. This hence suggests that the effectiveness of China’s globalizing 
propaganda still depends on platform governance, and this could remarkably restrict China’s 
efforts in reshaping global communication and exercising state power.  
Interestingly, I also find that both China-related news and non-China-related news are 
impacted by the use of state-affiliated media labels. This suggests that flagging propaganda 
sources could evenly dampen the strategies of telling China’s story and the coverage of foreign 
nations. In other words, China’s counter-flows of international information might not be able to 
achieve the goal of presenting China as a culture and society and meantime highlighting its 
international economic connections. This raises a dilemma for China’s globalizing propaganda. 
On the one hand, the use of Western platforms helps state media to gain millions of followers 
and disseminate propaganda content. On the other hand, the dependence also shows that Western 
platforms can regulate China’s globalizing propaganda. 
Methodologically, this dissertation examines the significance of multilevel actors and 
components of globalizing propaganda. My analysis involves both micro-level communication 
(Study 1 and Study 3) and macro-level contexts and variables (Study 2). As I have discussed in 
Chapter 1, the use of multilevel modeling helps researchers take into account complex 
communication phenomena. Specifically, the unit of analysis in Study 1 is social media posts, 




the unit of analysis is countries in Study 2, and it changes to daily communication in Study 3. 
The multilevel approach recognizes that globalizing propaganda is complex interactions between 
a variety of actors at multiple levels. At the micro-level, Chinese state media disseminate the 
counter-flows in order to shape global information landscapes and attract audience engagement. 
At the same time, Western platforms use source flagging to regulate globalizing propaganda at 
the account level. At the macro-level, Chinese state media are driven by country-level factors to 
produce international news. The recognition of the importance of multifaceted perspectives is 
what makes this dissertation exceptionally valuable for global communication and comparative 
political communication.  
To summarize, the findings from three studies suggest that globalizing propaganda 
should be regarded as complex interactions between different actors, rather than a centralized 
communication model. At the same time, two components are involved in the operation of 
globalizing propaganda and can facilitate or restrict the production and spread of the counter-
flows. Therefore, the framework proposed in this dissertation comprehensively analyzes how 
Western platforms have been leveraged by authoritarian regimes as a means of displaying and 
strengthening state power, as well as how these platforms conduct governance in order to limit 
the spread of globalizing propaganda.  
 
The Sophistication of Globalizing Propaganda 
 This dissertation project has demonstrated that Chinese state media are globalizing 
propaganda practices in order to provide counter-flows of international information and affect 
global audiences on Western platforms. While China’s attempts have reached scale in terms of 
audience size and user engagement, it is still unclear whether and to what extent China’s 




globalizing propaganda is sophisticated or not. I consider sophistication as the process and result 
of becoming more complex or subtle given certain conditions. As such, the sophistication of 
propaganda shows that state media have the ability and intention to adapt and modify their 
propaganda strategies if the environment and/or platforms alter. This is important because the 
results of Study 3 have suggested that the dependence can restrict the dissemination of 
globalizing propaganda.  
In Table 5-1, I offer a structure of sophisticated globalizing propaganda. I identify three 
research focuses, namely, effectiveness, innovation, and adaptation. It is worth noting that this is 
not an exclusive topics about sophisticated propaganda; instead, I argue that these three 
dimensions represent the most prominent topics regarding the operation and consequence of 
sophisticated propaganda. First, effectiveness indicates the outcome of sophisticated globalizing 
propaganda. That is, how and to what extent globalizing propaganda can influence foreign 
audiences and alter their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. This dimension can be 
operationalized into multiple indicators, such as the number of news sharing and people’s 
evaluation of China. In this dissertation, I have systematically examined the effectiveness of 
China’s globalizing propaganda in three studies, focusing on audience engagement. Collectively, 
the findings from three studies suggest that Chinese state media have attracted considerable 
amounts of audience engagement, particularly for China-related information. Therefore, China 
has achieved sophistication in terms of effectiveness on Facebook and Twitter. Nevertheless, 
audiences engagement is one indicator of effectiveness, other indicators like public opinion may 
tell a different story about the sophistication of China’s globalizing propaganda. Future research 
could look at whether and how Chinese state media change foreign audiences’ attitudes and 
perceptions.   




Table 5-1. The Sophistication of Globalizing Propaganda 
Dimensions Research Questions Empirical studies  Possible Indicators  
Effectiveness • Does globalizing 
propaganda influence 
and manipulate public 
opinion? 





• Study 1 
• Study 2 
• Study 3 
• Audience engagement (e.g., likes) 
• Public opinion (e.g., country 
favorability rating) 
• National images (e.g., soft power 
rank) 
Innovation • Does globalizing 
propaganda employ 
novel strategies to 
spread information and 
interact with 
audiences? 
• Study 1 
• Study 2 
• The use of popular culture 
• The collaboration with Internet 
influencers 
• The level of direct connections with 
social media users 




Adaptation • Does globalizing 
propaganda evolve and 
modify for new uses or 
purposes? 
• Study 3 • The change of content due to new 
situations (e.g., Twitter’s flagging) 
• The iteration of propaganda strategies 
 
  




The second dimension, innovation, refers to the user of novel and new strategies for 
globalizing propaganda. As I discussed in Chapter 1, traditional propaganda operations focused 
on political and ideological content, while China’s recent attempts have employed popular 
culture and digital media. In Study 1 and Study 2, I have revealed that Chinese state media 
produce a variety of topics for China and other countries. To tell stories of China, these media 
organizations highlight the cultural and social aspects of China, meaning that globalizing 
propaganda move the attention away from political content. To report foreign countries, Chinese 
state media consider the importance of international economic connections. These findings 
suggest that China’s globalizing propaganda does adopt novel strategies for producing and 
spreading information. Moreover, the dimension of innovation has other indicators, such as 
collaborating with Internet celebrities and influencers to promote China-related elements or 
interacting with Facebook and Twitter users. These practices could be included in future 
research. 
Finally, adaptation indicates the capacity of evolving and modifying globalizing 
propaganda for new uses or purposes. This is perhaps the most challenging aspect of 
sophisticated propaganda, because adaptation suggests that state media have the potential to 
change their strategies by which globalizing propaganda becomes better suited to the global 
information environment. Study 3 has demonstrated that Wester platforms can effectively 
regulate the spread of globalizing propaganda, and Chinese state media do not significantly alter 
their content. This result suggests that these news outlets still follow the routine for offering 
content on Western platforms after being labeled as state-affiliated media. Therefore, Chinese 
state media may not be able to immediately modify and evolve their practices when the media 




environment has changed. This could further limit the impact of China’s globalizing propaganda 
on Western platforms.  
 
Future Directions  
While this dissertation benefits from the use of large-scale social media data and 
computational methods, I also recognize several limitations of my analysis that could be 
addressed in future research. First, I explore the demand-side of globalizing propaganda by 
looking at audience engagement on Facebook and Twitter. Although engagement is an important 
measure of the spread and success of online news (Zamith, 2018), whether and how the counter-
flows could influence individuals’ attitudes and perceptions are still unclear. It is possible that 
the cultural and social presence of China could increase people’s favorability of China and 
further lead to the change of public opinion. It is also possible that the focus of international 
economic connections will set the agenda to affect how foreign publics evaluate China’s 
globalization. Alternatively, one could argue that selective exposure exists in globalizing 
propaganda, so those who do not hold favorable attitudes toward China will not read and/or share 
news provided by Chinese state media, particularly news about China. Therefore, globalizing 
propaganda could generate polarization among social media users. Future research could 
investigate psychological mechanisms and media exposure behind the dissemination of 
globalizing propaganda. 
Second, although the use of social media data provides a high level of external validity, it 
inevitably introduces the difficulty of fully controlling research design, avoiding selection bias, 
and understanding the data generating process. Social media data also cannot answer questions 
regarding the institutional and organizational structure of Chinese state media. Furthermore, 




there have debates about data collection and analysis using social media platforms, and scholars 
question the change of API policies (Freelon, 2018). Therefore, data used in this project might 
not tell the whole story and could hide some important aspects of globalizing propaganda. For 
example, it is not clear how social media posts are created by journalists and editors working for 
globalizing propaganda. It is also unclear how Chinese state media modify their organizational 
structure to promote globalizing propaganda. Thus, the findings of this dissertation could be 
supplemented by looking at the institutional and organizational levels of globalizing propaganda.  
Third, the rise of Chinese state media on Western platforms is not the only approach that 
China adopts to construct its power. In fact, Chinese online influencers (i.e., Wanghong) have 
also occupied Western platforms and become influential actors presenting the cultural and social 
aspects of China. For instance, Li Ziqi, a Chinese female video blogger, has obtained more than 
15 million subscribers on YouTube. Moreover, China’s investors also actively engage with 
Hollywood film industry to produce and distribute entertainment content (Kokas, 2018). These 
approaches do not explicitly display state power and thus receive little attention. However, they 
illustrate that globalizing propaganda has involved non-political actors to show state power in 
subtle ways. Therefore, future research could explore the practice and regulation of these non-
official activities and their implications on global communication.  
Fourth, while this dissertation focuses on global communication and international 
information, it should be pointed out that China is also substantially globalizing its own 
platforms and infrastructures. As I have found in Study 3, the effectiveness of China’s 
globalizing propaganda still depends on Western platforms. Yet, the rise of Chinese platforms 
has challenged the dominance of the US-based tech companies (de Kloet, Poell, Zeng, & Chow, 
2019; Keane & Yu, 2019). TikTok, for instance, has become the most popular platform around 




the globe and it is owned by China’s tech giant ByteDance. Journalists have found that TikTok 
censored videos that challenge China’s policies (The Guardian, 2019). The global expansion of 
Chinese platforms further complicates our understanding of globalizing communication because 
China’s practice may receive limited regulation and restriction on Chinese platforms. 
In addition to digital platforms, China has also devoted massive resources to impact 
global network infrastructures (Hong, 2017; Kaska, Beckvard, & Minarik, 2019). The Huawei 
ban and the competition of the fifth generation of wireless infrastructure (5G) between China and 
the US have illustrated the fact that Chinese telecom companies have become leading actors in 
communication infrastructure (S. Campbell, Zhao, Frith, & Liang, 2021). This has significant 
consequences on global communication. Therefore, the emergence of Chinese platforms and tech 
firms might further empower China to globalize its propaganda apparatus on its own platforms 
enabled by its own telecommunication infrastructures. This not only avoids regulation conducted 
by Western platforms but also fundamentally modifies how global communication functions. 
Future research could hence benefit by exploring how Chinese platforms and network 
infrastructures facilitate globalizing propaganda. 
 
Conclusion 
The rise of China in global communication has challenged our understanding of global 
and comparative political communication, propaganda, and social media platforms. On the one 
hand, state-sponsored propaganda has increasingly expanded its scope and reach through 
Western platforms. Scholars have found that the growth of international propaganda not only 
create information disorder (Crilley, Gillespie, Vidgen, & Willis, 2020; Elswah & Howard, 
2020), but also increasingly shape the international news and information landscape (Huang & 




Wang, 2020; Nip & Sun, 2018). On the other hand, the operation of international propaganda 
relies heavily on Western platforms which are owned by a few American companies. This means 
that, though state media can attract global audiences on Western platforms (Golovchenko et al., 
2020; Lukito et al., 2020), their practices are governed and controlled by these platforms 
(Nassetta & Gross, 2020). Regardless of the consequences, it is clear that global communication 
is experiencing a substantial transformation that might change how we understand and study 
communication and state power in the social media age. 
To be sure, the proliferation of social media has expanded the way by which state media 
deliver propaganda (Woolley & Howard, 2018). The complex interactions have also shifted 
propaganda operations (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Golovchenko et al., 2020). It is against this 
background I argue that we need to look at the practice and regulation of globalizing propaganda 
if we want to understand the future of global and comparative political communication. We must 
consider globalizing propaganda as a new means of displaying and exercising state power around 
the world. This new approach is shaping and constructing how social media users understand the 
host country, foreign countries, and international affairs. At the same time, we should not 
overestimate the effectiveness of globalizing propaganda, as its practice still depends on Western 
platforms. However, it is important to note that globalizing propaganda is just one tool for 
achieving the political goal of authoritarian regimes and other approaches have been 
implemented over the past several years.  
To conclude, I find that Chinese state media actively leverage Western social media 
platforms to provide news stories for global audiences, with the purpose of framing national 
images and enhancing power. I also reveal that tech companies seek to regulate and restrict the 
spread of globalizing propaganda on their platforms. Based upon my findings, I argue that the 




practice-regulation framework provides a systematic and comprehensive way for analyzing and 























Appendix A: Study 1 
 
Table A1. Examples of News Topics and Posts 





A policeman keeps the stranded people in order at the landslide site in Akto, northwest China's Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region. A landslide triggered by rainstorm happened before dawn on Monday, 
blocking about 3 kilometers of the Sino-Pakistan highway. Hundreds of vehicles and more than 1,000 
people were stranded in the mountain area of the Pamirs. 
URL 
Civil rights 
Riot police detain a demonstrator during a protest and urban intervention held by members of the "Chilean 
Network Against Violence against Women" organization, outside La Moneda Palace in Santiago, capital of 
Chile, on March 11, 2016. (Xinhua/Jorge Villegas) 
URL 
Culture/entertainment 
The World Heritage Committee of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), announced on Sunday the inscription to the World Heritage List of the Padre Tembleque 
Aqueduct of the Hydraulic System, which was built in the XVI century on the initiative of the Franciscan 
Fray Tembleque and is located in the Central Plateau  
URL 
Economy 




In a rare move, the ministry released guidelines on early childhood education on Monday, in an effort to 
curb the growing practice of young children being educated in a way that pushes them beyond what 
children at their age should learn. 
URL 
Environment 
The population of China's endangered animals, including giant pandas and Siberian tigers, is on the rise 
thanks to billions of yuan in investment. The latest wildlife census shows the number of wild Siberian tigers 
has risen from 12 to 16 in 2000 to 18 to 22, while just seven crested ibis were found in 1981, compared to 
the more than 1,700 that now live in the wild and in captivity. 
URL 
Health 
A staff member of an exhibitor introduces a touch screen system for medical imaging consultation at the 
22nd China International Medical Equipment & Affiliated Facilities Exhibition and Scientific Conference 
(CHINA-HOSPEQ 2013) in China's capital Beijing. The three-day CHINA-HOSPEQ 2013 kicked off 







Japan and Australia Wednesday held their 5th round of ""two-plus-two"" talks involving foreign and 
defense chiefs from both sides and vowed to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation, especially 
in the area of submarine technology transfer." 
URL 
Law/crime 








China in 2017 aims to deepen the nation’s supervisory reform, strengthening a push to punish those who 
violate the Party’s rules. 
URL 
Science/technology Dancing robots are displayed during the expo in Qingdao, east China's Shandong, July 7, 2016. URL 
Society/family 
A farmer helps villager Peng Qiugen harvest rice on the roof of Peng's house which had been converted 
into a rice field at Qilin Village of Shaoxing City, east China's Zhejiang Province, Nov. 18, 2013. Peng 
several years ago transformed the roof of his house into a farmland, in which rice, watermelons and 
vegetables have been harvested in different seasons. 
URL 
Sports 
Netherland's forward Robin van Persie controls the ball during a training session at the Estadio Nacional in 









Table A2. News Topics Codebook 
Topic Instructions  
General 
information 
This codebook is based on upon UK codebook, New York Times Index 
Data Codebook, and Bright’s research (2016). The purpose of the study is to 
understand news content produced by news media on Facebook.  
Unit of 
Analysis 
Facebook posts in the dataset 
Coding 
Instructions 
You will be coding news contents collected from Facebook pages. You will 
be coding directly into a form provided for you in Excel. The procedure 
followed two main phases: designing and refining our coding procedure and 




1 - Selecting which posts must be coded: All posts in the dataset must be 
coded, unless the message column does not contain any text. 
2 - Determining type of post (specified below). Next, you assess the type of 
article through several variables (0=no, 1=yes, or NA) 
Accident and 
disaster 
a) Accident news: post that is almost 
exclusively about a sudden calamitous event 
bringing great damage, loss, or destruction, such as 
fire, plane accident 
b) Disaster news: post that is almost 
exclusively about unforeseen and unplanned event 
or circumstance, such as earthquake, floods, 
droughts, and other natural disasters.  
Economics 
and business 
a) Economic news: domestic macroeconomic 
issues, inflation, prices, and interest rates, 
unemployment, banks, national budget and debt, 
taxation, tax policy, and tax reform etc. 
b) Business news: commercial and companies’ 
activities, customers, industry plan and policy, 
investment, manufacturing issues, domestic and 




a) Politics news: political elections and vote, 
politicians’ activities and speeches, political 
institutions, political affordance, political party etc. 
b) Government news: public policy, 
policymaking, government efficiency, bureaucratic 




a) Civil rights: human rights protests, civil 
rights enforcement, taking private property, impact 
on private property rights, voting rights and issues, 
freedom of speech, anti-government activities etc. 
b) Minority: ethnic minority and racial group 






c) Immigration: right to asylum, political 
asylum, refugees, immigration and nationality 






a) Military: military activities, wars, army 
services, soldiers etc. 
b) Defense: defense forces, defense policy and 
budget etc. 





a) Countries: developing countries issues, 
international finance and economic development, 
foreign diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Minister, Ambassador issues, neighboring 
countries, Israel and Palestine etc. 
b) International Organizations, the United 




a) Law: laws and regulations, law enforcement 
agencies, the judicial system, improving justice etc. 
b) Crime: criminals, fraud, prisons, 
embezzlement, organized crime activities, 
racketeering control, organized crime, illegal drug 
production etc. 
 
Health a) Health care reform, health system, insurance 
etc. 
b) Diseases, medical devices, hospitals and 
doctors, patients etc. 
Science and 
technology 
a) Scientific research: natural science, social 
science 
b) Technology: robots, satellite, spacecraft, 
technological innovation, big data etc.  
Sports a) Sport activities  
b) Sport stars and teams 
Education a) Education system and reform. 
b) Schools, teachers and students, tuition fee. 
Environment 
and nature 
a) Environmental issues: greenhouse, climate 
change, pollution, environmentalists,  














a) Arts: art performance, art products, artists, 
art shows. 
b) Culture: cultural heritage, cultural activities, 
historical issues, museums. 
c) Entertainment: travel, holidays, festivals, 






APPENDIX B: Study 2 
Table B1. Descriptive Statistics of Countries Covered by Chinese State Media 
Country  Posts Likes Retweet Sentiment 
Afghanistan 1465 649.3355 27.27561 -0.20586 
Albania 29 921.3523 23.67803 1.253788 
Algeria 257 311.8798 27.50243 -0.00672 
Angola 206 528.804 38.92071 0.319615 
Antigua 9 690.8 20.53333 1.533333 
Argentina 1060 968.0753 41.5975 0.530361 
Armenia 83 1149.754 32.90251 0.304466 
Australia 2735 2117.738 105.9061 0.540664 
Austria 373 1872.714 84.40314 -0.10768 
Azerbaijan 62 1275.007 75.56836 0.672531 
Bahamas 40 3163.923 169.0196 0.683977 
Bahrain 58 824.6738 27.28751 0.066251 
Bangladesh 513 1608.848 80.60468 0.142606 
Barbados 12 3966.771 169.7917 3.604167 
Belarus 225 1339.828 53.36282 1.695712 
Belgium 1411 789.1657 31.97237 0.159363 
Belize 6 6180.333 201.5 0.666667 
Benin 136 239.334 40.35141 0.419387 
Bhutan 37 2095.369 83.5746 2.139683 
Bolivia 190 877.8602 39.49943 0.085138 
Bosnia 81 2316.804 87.91365 -0.34036 
Botswana 197 2030.567 130.8574 0.041483 
Brazil 2701 1031.454 44.74044 0.334038 
Bulgaria 147 989.1033 40.1455 0.649268 
Burundi 557 130.1825 20.68567 -0.0789 
Cabo 7 32.41667 4.25 -0.91667 
Cambodia 451 1480.891 64.2248 0.877594 
Cameroon 458 319.3881 53.63244 -0.24969 
Canada 1928 1772.322 78.46147 0.462708 
Central African 
Republic 355 98.66269 8.553373 -1.01916 
Chad 287 229.1492 23.82649 -0.45149 
Chile 882 970.3604 47.35372 0.248685 





Comoros 22 1005.861 64.01111 0.888889 
Congo 791 307.5883 21.67953 -0.93528 
Cook Islands 4 183.3333 2.166667 4.333333 
Costa Rica 218 1105.545 78.87193 0.341882 
Côte d'Ivoire 238 234.4959 37.72167 0.084475 
Croatia 147 2546.491 106.3443 0.47391 
Cuba 1447 699.42 29.5623 0.366363 
Cyprus 111 1456.407 38.81348 -0.27507 
Czech Republic 391 2643.574 98.82168 0.768697 
Denmark 328 1632.009 87.71303 0.208194 
Djibouti 148 1104.549 55.87354 0.95444 
Dominica 64 2090.055 95.69281 -0.24658 
Ecuador 773 1080.113 60.24928 -0.11891 
Egypt 3707 446.0634 22.07318 -0.49439 
El Salvador 45 901.9481 49.92952 -0.47016 
Equatorial Guinea 78 451.5753 34.35228 -0.08744 
Eritrea 72 356.8366 36.86132 -0.94505 
Estonia 132 1246.213 28.44606 -0.22907 
Ethiopia 1232 425.4792 54.27167 0.499362 
Fiji 87 1378.958 41.69091 0.967793 
Finland 418 1422.824 50.05633 0.952892 
France 5332 1364.747 58.95358 0.148066 
Gabon 194 259.4358 19.26696 0.756216 
Gambia 267 387.5164 103.1146 -0.65813 
Georgia 170 2437.411 144.6965 0.094637 
Germany 3417 1367.721 63.94398 0.512724 
Ghana 638 280.4579 31.87336 0.269403 
Greece 1006 1194.218 46.74118 0.137151 
Grenada 9 1067.625 44.5 1.583333 
Guatemala 83 739.2085 26.79783 -0.47793 
Guinea 499 554.4889 32.46666 -0.9149 
Guinea Bissau 50 443.2069 16.90347 -0.19931 
Guyana 19 334.9333 11.19722 1.166667 
Haiti 147 1109.67 40.61132 -0.77731 
Honduras 58 316.2898 18.14586 -0.43491 
Hong Kong, China 3824 1550.993 94.57853 0.351259 
Hungary 413 2303.384 78.10475 0.42514 
Iceland 99 5352.25 263.3228 1.358671 
India 4453 1952.253 97.12989 0.197443 
Indonesia 1716 1928.172 96.64742 -0.20817 
Iran 1652 913.4366 41.06355 -0.01153 





Ireland 253 1517.206 45.2614 0.950747 
Israel 1627 781.2857 38.4219 -0.29723 
Italy 4716 2080.485 97.75046 1.03147 
Jamaica 92 1302.526 45.80233 0.881735 
Japan 6702 1748.055 79.15806 -0.15253 
Jordan 323 1114.889 49.76948 0.902464 
Kazakhstan 585 1658.984 45.03009 0.735379 
Kenya 4299 445.3057 31.97575 -0.2829 
Kiribati 4 462.8333 8.5 -1.33333 
Korea, North 1216 819.5095 37.47112 -0.13645 
Korea, South 2928 1226.753 41.95216 -0.04793 
Kosovo 10 1031.542 27.25 -1 
Kuwait 83 1312.463 95.52368 -0.37926 
Kyrgyzstan 246 1617.144 47.34051 1.291083 
Laos 463 1530.362 48.76912 0.808496 
Latvia 805 2714.172 165.3545 0.405169 
Lebanon 241 580.4407 50.14236 -0.69168 
Lesotho 50 177.0027 28.71915 0.382479 
Liberia 531 582.7065 29.08428 -0.17978 
Libya 1006 306.5196 20.40116 -1.13844 
Liechtenstein 4 315 10.5 -1.5 
Lithuania 179 1438.6 46.04524 0.186822 
Luxembourg 137 1628.917 65.09544 0.428446 
Macedonia 82 1685.915 60.62008 -0.0501 
Madagascar 243 1340.354 49.4212 0.013966 
Malawi 215 245.8624 42.83432 -0.17902 
Malaysia 2048 1422.036 110.4605 0.133036 
Maldives 3182 3734.407 243.5901 0.159522 
Mali 3244 475.5397 32.84359 -0.6937 
Malta 90 2235.923 70.12277 -0.41292 
Mauritania 91 606.9902 110.2133 0.059322 
Mauritius 117 523.6789 32.35453 1.163761 
Mexico 1755 841.9125 45.20335 0.275033 
Micronesia 6 1060.611 34.88889 1.277778 
Moldova 11 637.5417 20.72917 -0.02083 
Mongolia 1495 2044.562 97.54291 0.903905 
Montenegro 33 1499.816 22.72256 0.685128 
Morocco 426 1102.746 85.03016 0.161585 
Mozambique 263 599.002 35.33815 -0.1203 
Myanmar 1294 1407.136 53.12803 0.34424 
Namibia 238 650.9498 49.26006 0.567653 





Nepal 1512 1769.463 75.94375 0.387215 
Netherlands 942 1887.538 200.4079 0.500906 
New Zealand 604 1678.487 67.14457 0.804801 
Nicaragua 71 731.8403 31.10831 -0.08604 
Niger 2741 287.2699 54.55287 -0.51793 
Nigeria 2632 287.6051 55.9544 -0.59005 
Niue 6 5143.5 194 2.666667 
Norway 320 2549.691 130.5122 0.463217 
Oman 4867 2039.471 157.148 -0.18748 
Pakistan 1924 1342.782 57.97278 -0.0989 
Palestinian 902 711.7882 39.23006 -0.42242 
Panama 224 725.0599 30.70061 0.183724 
Papua New Guinea 48 3991.816 299.053 -0.27009 
Paraguay 49 1035.242 33.26 -0.1441 
Peru 2575 1147.195 44.68819 0.840297 
Philippines 2102 1289.305 80.00973 -0.43493 
Poland 422 1409.129 47.4256 0.797725 
Portugal 448 1569.164 97.03614 0.79475 
Qatar 252 1431.36 45.57705 0.166684 
Romania 188 1020.949 48.61573 0.836477 
Russia 7144 1542.914 99.40223 0.19134 
Rwanda 840 212.4702 24.31938 -0.03281 
Samoa 46 4269.587 265.203 0.691458 
São Tomé and 
Principe 46 424.3172 9.05914 0.846237 
Saudi Arabia 608 1118.36 97.40223 -0.03376 
Senegal 471 234.9852 21.6588 0.111464 
Serbia 471 2014.517 68.24979 1.117342 
Seychelles 50 828.4081 55.97076 0.389881 
Sierra Leone 355 749.695 32.85663 -0.58995 
Singapore 1411 1327.168 50.52108 0.25674 
Slovakia 89 2140.513 73.47557 1.07037 
Slovenia 128 1837.539 64.20808 0.926538 
Solomon Islands 9 4382.313 211.75 -1.375 
Somalia 1844 319.416 36.35695 -0.97181 
South Africa 3216 869.7884 47.58184 0.180046 
South Sudan 1497 317.756 22.1135 -0.42822 
Spain 1494 1444.5 58.24102 0.156502 
Sri Lanka 326 948.6224 29.73441 -0.20703 
St Lucia 1 129 0 6 
Sudan 1949 367.3626 23.77835 -0.42695 





Swaziland 34 127.8225 14.7829 0.252381 
Sweden 529 1644.692 137.6139 1.639531 
Switzerland 1312 1505.167 80.99362 0.612394 
Syria 3139 940.8611 53.30693 -0.72487 
Taiwan 2237 1815.654 83.57147 0.257117 
Tajikistan 123 1501.097 54.63747 1.491464 
Tanzania 924 884.2472 67.6089 0.383489 
Thailand 2109 1663.925 90.27789 0.165582 
Togo 151 447.1183 35.30774 0.252528 
Tonga 158 426.0626 20.65297 0.217328 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 48 522.836 7.53964 0.675676 
Tunisia 401 589.4527 24.92415 -0.37274 
Turkey 2198 1142.399 61.61193 -0.41614 
Turkmenistan 102 1663.196 111.9973 1.279175 
Uganda 1367 224.1248 30.24001 -0.33138 
Ukraine 1225 1295.916 202.7442 -0.44095 
United Arab 
Emirates 229 2499.123 170.426 0.696459 
United Kingdom 6705 1636.05 76.66505 0.401226 
United States 26900 1542.886 79.03005 0.202833 
Uruguay 154 931.4881 54.71499 0.750925 
Uzbekistan 343 1121.929 28.56631 1.579388 
Vanuatu 24 3360.05 163.7917 1 
Venezuela 670 389.9102 14.48351 -0.26531 
Vietnam 1232 1423.906 53.26613 0.015314 
Yemen 864 1129.644 59.32776 -0.18305 
Zambia 439 866.8162 49.71833 0.277298 







Table B2. Descriptive Statistics of Country-level Variables 
Country GDP 
Populatio
n Export Import BRI 
Negativit
y 
Afghanistan 1.95E+10 32785984 368055.8 8810.25 2 3.3245 
Albania 1.23E+10 2885250 409899.4 170155.3 
1.33333
3 1.9285 
Algeria NA 38945427 6813386 1378077 
0.83333
3 2.363 





Antigua 1.28E+09 92516 270264.6 98.486 
0.83333
3 NA 
Argentina 5.51E+11 42431588 8134688 5830944 1 2.054667 
Armenia 1.08E+10 2905409 119178.2 133283.3 2 2.2695 




4 1 1.386167 
Austria 4.15E+11 8537863 2239785 5060227 1 1.308833 
Azerbaijan 6.27E+10 9471317 710215.9 262252.3 2 2.457833 
Bahamas 1.12E+10 370704.4 723305.3 38623.53 
0.83333
3 NA 
Bahrain 3.15E+10 1337807 1059307 223098.6 2 2.2915 
Bangladesh 1.67E+11 1.54E+08 
1091057
5 663080.1 2 2.147333 
Barbados 4.71E+09 284911.3 76268.17 15677.76 
0.66666
7 NA 
Belarus 6.43E+10 9478221 907771.1 671230.9 2 2.222833 
Belgium 5.02E+11 11186546 
1651114
7 8980476 1 1.4475 
Belize 1.69E+09 357149.5 87179.05 4529.3 
0.33333
3 NA 
Benin 1.2E+10 10293739 2784125 173483.3 
0.83333
3 2.0898 
Bhutan 1.9E+09 714793.3 12408.56 113.9467 2 1.7355 
Bolivia 3.15E+10 10705622 553840.7 372489.8 
0.83333
3 2.079 
Bosnia 1.74E+10 3489062 109205.8 35739.77 
1.66666
7 1.918 
Botswana 1.52E+10 2081127 259516.4 138126.8 1 1.692667 




5 1 2.130333 
Bulgaria 5.42E+10 7220151 1089691 824035 
1.66666
7 1.6376 







Cabo 1.63E+09 527944.5 45985.82 52.945 
0.33333
3 NA 
Cambodia 1.61E+10 15151740 3233206 457211.7 2 2.179667 
Cameroon 3.2E+10 22693866 1569380 625864.5 
0.83333
3 2.1982 




2 1 1.350167 
Central African 
Republic 2.01E+09 4466338 12934.4 34129.39 1 3.097667 
Chad 1.21E+10 13450394 195717.8 150581.8 1 2.596667 




5 1 1.69 
Colombia 3.41E+11 46816230 6878359 3810074 1 2.709667 
Comoros 1.04E+09 777468.7 44921.16 14.77 0.5 NA 
Congo 3.31E+10 72655971 1062708 2826448 1 3.033667 
Cook Islands NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Costa Rica 5.17E+10 4794530 1152725 3147579 
0.83333
3 1.7572 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.54E+10 22393315 1109857 170591.8 1 2.3755 
Croatia 5.47E+10 4227918 1143894 110534.4 
1.66666
7 1.6668 
Cuba 7.97E+10 11290547 1387306 485775.4 1 2.062167 
Cyprus 2.34E+10 1147867 879591.7 59990.47 1 1.9535 
Czech Republic 2.03E+11 10532559 7487780 2748097 
1.66666
7 1.3786 
Denmark 3.31E+11 5638674 6133574 3580692 1 1.197 
Djibouti 2.13E+09 898646 1432571 721.666 
0.83333
3 2.1166 
Dominica 5.24E+08 71111.2 29902.21 692.27 
0.83333
3 2.126 
Ecuador 9.39E+10 15846739 2699772 922741 1 2.116833 
Egypt 2.95E+11 89445067 9454195 1220209 2 2.352833 
El Salvador 2.27E+10 6296078 622612 25283.51 
0.83333
3 2.1994 
Equatorial Guinea 1.81E+10 1122725 296222.1 1861652 
0.83333
3 1.9452 
Eritrea NA NA 96651.43 145616.8 
0.83333
3 2.397 
Estonia 2.43E+10 1318979 1089562 202166 2 1.708333 
Ethiopia 5.29E+10 96797649 2310225 367805.9 1 2.407167 
Fiji 4.4E+09 866934.2 271247.2 29033.06 1 NA 
Finland 2.59E+11 5446260 5238047 3878684 1 1.386833 









Gabon 1.63E+10 1881222 466615.3 1132789 
0.83333
3 2.0026 
Gambia 1.38E+09 2025553 312380.8 69301.32 
0.83333
3 2.0938 
Georgia 1.61E+10 3729196 797681.1 46100.59 2 2.419167 




7 1 1.519167 
Ghana 5E+10 26924571 4326130 1044797 1 1.809333 
Greece 2.34E+11 10934065 3802255 354749.8 1 2.014833 
Grenada 8.88E+08 108529.3 13058.2 13.2275 
0.66666
7 NA 
Guatemala 5.79E+10 15305470 1706755 119002.2 
0.83333
3 2.3034 
Guinea 8.16E+09 11047803 969078.2 134664.7 1 2.301167 
Guinea Bissau 1.07E+09 1671384 16417.92 15917.3 1 2.349333 
Guyana 4.14E+09 761481.7 166132.9 29927.3 1 2.1175 
Haiti 1.43E+10 10547225 377342.6 11332.01 
0.83333
3 2.1366 
Honduras 1.99E+10 8955702 823301.4 142188.1 
0.83333
3 2.3174 
Hong Kong, China 2.85E+11 7209667 3.26E+08 
1527712
0 1 NA 
Hungary 1.31E+11 9867393 5562909 2927586 
1.66666
7 1.5142 
Iceland 1.69E+10 326189 120252.8 76762.39 1 1.116 




1 2 2.617667 




8 2 1.805 




6 2 2.525833 
Iraq 2.04E+11 33727868 6471909 
1419721
9 2 3.334667 
Ireland 2.59E+11 4653078 2524025 4167817 1 1.4285 
Israel 2.90E+11 8146267 7650598 3042904 2 2.814167 




3 1 1.761167 
Jamaica 1.42E+10 2874647 613506.6 23809.05 
0.83333
3 2.1464 
Japan 5.28E+12 1.27E+08 1.44E+08 1.64E+08 1 1.332333 
Jordan 3.52E+10 8668752 3108262 247597.7 2 1.958 




6 2 2.0255 





Kiribati 1.75E+08 111727 33640.35 6747.885 
0.33333
3 NA 
Korea, North NA 24992130 3271823 2646403 1 2.994833 
Korea, South 1.39E+12 50590799 
9284766
0 1.73E+08 1 1.808833 
Kosovo 6.91E+09 1799160 NA NA 
0.66666
7 2.062 
Kuwait 1.47E+11 3671727 2993422 8785223 
1.66666
7 1.6634 
Kyrgyzstan 6.85E+09 5785550 5026203 72453.7 2 2.337 
Laos 1.24E+10 6593361 1198021 1218376 2 1.8365 
Latvia 2.9E+10 2006254 1213584 109186.8 2 1.677833 
Lebanon 4.67E+10 6026968 2105318 25373.04 2 2.728667 
Lesotho 2.4E+09 2044194 82168.44 12511.56 
0.83333
3 1.9136 
Liberia 3.08E+09 4360503 2088590 180630.3 
0.83333
3 1.963 
Libya 4.62E+10 6354344 1862256 2083657 1 2.793333 
Liechtenstein 6.43E+09 37271.67 NA NA 0.5 1.715333 
Lithuania 4.45E+10 2930194 NA NA 
1.66666
7 NA 
Luxembourg 6.06E+10 556448.6 1858273 287535.9 
0.83333
3 NA 
Macedonia NA NA NA NA 
1.66666
7 2.032 
Madagascar 1.19E+10 23605250 749249.2 147670.2 
0.83333
3 2.0476 
Malawi 5.88E+09 16295081 218835.7 35157.73 
0.83333
3 1.7754 




1 2 1.590333 
Maldives 3.52E+09 426461.3 144727.5 255.9417 2 NA 
Mali 1.34E+10 16713730 299458 153514.7 1 2.449833 
Malta 1.09E+10 436192.4 2379681 608517 
0.83333
3 NA 
Mauritania 11.01983 25.516 1166191 NA 
0.83333
3 2.3372 
Mauritius 1.21E+10 1260309 722675.8 14564.75 
0.83333
3 1.5446 




1 1 2.457333 
Micronesia NA NA NA NA 0.5 NA 







Mongolia 1.17E+10 2911960 2101747 3945767 2 1.808833 
Montenegro 4.31E+09 621616 126337.2 29603.63 
1.66666
7 1.9532 
Morocco 1.04E+11 34187967 3068359 536665.1 
0.83333
3 2.047 
Mozambique 1.58E+10 26316296 1471100 687998.1 
0.83333
3 1.9702 
Myanmar 6.34E+10 52043921 7506692 5163875 2 2.294833 





6 12475 1808.03 91.23 
0.16666
7 NA 
Nepal 1.99E+10 27022049 1557114 31351.61 2 2.041167 
Netherlands 8.43E+11 16847952 
6009038
9 9186252 1 1.532167 
New Zealand 1.84E+11 4505467 4358656 7045724 1 1.244 
Nicaragua 1.19E+10 6142985 569649.3 60732.33 
0.83333
3 1.9544 
Niger 9.89E+09 18907478 167045.1 66582.76 1 2.199667 
Nigeria 4.68E+11 1.74E+08 
1155884
6 1534637 1 2.738333 
Niue NA NA NA NA 0.5 NA 
Norway 4.64E+11 5101940 2955163 3666922 1 1.479833 
Oman 7.29E+10 3881295 1840012 
1729609
3 2 1.9315 
Pakistan 2.44E+11 1.93E+08 
1260914
0 2599487 2 3.136 
Palestinian NA NA NA NA 2 2.883 





Papua New Guinea 2.17E+10 7949129 692889.5 1249704 
0.83333
3 2.1078 
Paraguay 6.46E+10 11168148 1968676 1608946 
0.83333
3 2.0318 
Peru 2.02E+11 41056325 7370395 
1007277
9 1 2.1355 




5 2 2.484167 





Portugal 2.2E+11 10435715 2973928 1463960 1 1.4315 
Qatar 1.79E+11 2374634 1693346 6233205 2 1.559 











7 2 3.058 
Rwanda 7.97E+09 10962679 106112.9 71101.96 1 2.2225 
Samoa 7.75E+08 192014.8 62782.7 402.596 
0.83333
3 NA 
São Tomé and 
Principe 3.31E+08 201329.5 6180.615 25.465 
0.33333
3 NA 




9 2 2.206833 
Senegal 1.87E+10 14186226 1565299 82271.05 
0.83333
3 2.0582 
Serbia 4.38E+10 7129498 423222.1 138173.4 
1.66666
7 1.9938 
Seychelles 1.27E+09 90858 44275.91 226.24 1 NA 
Sierra Leone 4.1E+09 6942950 218053.2 677774.1 1 1.819667 




5 2 1.417333 
Slovakia 9.45E+10 5418844 2798362 3027388 
1.66666
7 1.5486 
Slovenia 4.65E+10 2061533 1950511 323331.8 
1.66666
7 1.3942 
Solomon Islands 1.33E+09 595242.3 63340.94 428683.9 
0.66666
7 NA 
Somalia NA 13260318 203702.6 15131.54 1 3.3445 




8 1 2.339167 
South Sudan 1.42E+10 10400406 75435.24 2216738 1 2.914833 
Spain 1.33E+12 46590929 
2026064
1 6297444 1 1.6335 
Sri Lanka 7.51E+10 20726612 3635050 212940 2 2.3405 
St Lucia NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sudan NA NA NA NA 1 3.242333 
Suriname 4.97E+09 549226 187459.2 34096.37 0.5 NA 
Swaziland NA NA NA NA 
0.83333
3 NA 
Sweden 5.53E+11 9664558 6726307 6732060 1 1.379167 
Switzerland 6.86E+11 8140498 3375597 
3800827
5 1 1.3895 
Syria NA NA NA NA 2 3.083667 
Taiwan NA NA NA NA 1 1.694667 
Tajikistan 7.75E+09 8167092 1933787 66797.62 2 2.2755 











3 2 2.416167 
Togo 4.29E+09 7139927 2483538 137848.2 
0.83333
3 1.9666 




Tobago 2.56E+10 1361750 377169.8 114808.3 
0.83333
3 2.0878 
Tunisia 4.5E+10 11014822 1256120 184622.4 1 1.971833 
Turkey 8.92E+11 76601414 
1725765
5 3425953 2 2.510667 
Turkmenistan 3.8E+10 5465652 988998.1 8094751 
1.66666
7 2.1846 
Uganda 2.96E+10 36419407 528398.1 64969.92 1 2.187667 















0 1 1.814333 
United States 1.72E+13 3.17E+08 3.73E+08 1.42E+08 1 2.172833 
Uruguay 5.33E+10 3395654 2155042 2129792 1 NA 
Uzbekistan 7.16E+10 30543600 2111729 1384879 2 NA 
Vanuatu 7.95E+08 267495.8 173685.4 6544.678 
0.66666
7 NA 
Venezuela 3.88E+11 29667922 5897098 
1050850
0 1 2.455833 




3 2 1.861 
Yemen 3.75E+10 25486243 1753637 2299679 2 2.795667 
Zambia 2.44E+10 15176240 635330.4 2590182 1 1.758333 






APPENDIX C: Study 3 
Table C1. Descriptive Statistics of Flagged Media Accounts 







BeijingReview 0 224 6.846781 1.554639 0.068061 0.826954 0.138538 0.213093 
BeijingReview 1 260 3.239363 1.060372 0.185985 0.7394 0.080815 0.179096 
BeijingReview 2 259 4.859128 1.832427 0.471062 0.810539 0.089933 0.21886 
caixin 0 327 2.698449 2.251008 -0.34851 0.871923 0.083652 0.146492 
caixin 1 441 3.588573 3.016499 -0.10007 0.908596 0.104743 0.107737 
caixin 2 326 2.55877 1.57108 -0.16772 0.895239 0.124428 0.139887 
CCTV 0 210 37.06798 5.297552 0.341061 0.758939 0.130355 0.252844 
CCTV 1 202 35.80996 4.599317 0.387685 0.826122 0.158156 0.214193 
CCTV 2 215 24.28403 4.246618 0.352339 0.878662 0.127277 0.167747 
cgtnafrica 0 813 5.093798 2.762057 -0.16812 0.111859 0.075762 0.3465 
cgtnafrica 1 807 3.911079 2.293 -0.16679 0.107813 0.121428 0.295553 
cgtnafrica 2 796 3.225963 1.630691 -0.2118 0.087772 0.10404 0.257342 
cgtnamerica 0 919 26.03601 11.65107 -0.29194 0.205961 0.192095 0.344599 
cgtnamerica 1 904 21.1938 67.48771 -0.38004 0.211689 0.231149 0.258046 
cgtnamerica 2 874 20.0433 7.389077 -0.26549 0.222552 0.177054 0.244426 
CGTNEurope 0 439 15.04015 8.42838 -0.07518 0.277918 0.104408 0.334201 
CGTNEurope 1 375 12.28146 7.508514 -0.16081 0.211184 0.075424 0.237347 
CGTNEurope 2 314 9.692535 5.435482 -0.02806 0.285776 0.073024 0.329633 
CGTNOfficial 0 2724 53.0091 18.78003 -0.12308 0.403233 0.120241 0.318894 
CGTNOfficial 1 2708 41.2551 13.57854 -0.13566 0.418594 0.130182 0.238399 




China__Focus 0 99 2.686323 3.500034 0.057193 0.691423 0.114694 0.108226 
China__Focus 1 143 2.658357 3.878902 0.166329 0.656228 0.066437 0.086828 
China__Focus 2 107 2.462407 3.156614 0.552249 0.710344 0.080079 0.200159 
Chinacultureorg 0 102 6.993736 2.441667 0.664966 0.910658 0 0.115136 
Chinacultureorg 1 88 7.149581 2.427381 0.59817 0.886442 0.006173 0.143276 
Chinacultureorg 2 67 6.116587 2.968968 0.675159 0.761508 0 0.117302 
ChinaDaily 0 1700 77.59454 22.1201 0.369677 0.750713 0.092867 0.231538 
ChinaDaily 1 1690 71.7049 19.76563 0.451716 0.789157 0.097651 0.17371 
ChinaDaily 2 1633 60.48586 15.2238 0.394455 0.756395 0.097634 0.200287 
ChinaPlusNews 0 236 7.144668 2.806494 -0.254 0.629165 0.221289 0.238608 
ChinaPlusNews 1 191 6.195662 2.00485 0.051702 0.645403 0.274409 0.217838 
ChinaPlusNews 2 244 5.906135 2.234508 0.055091 0.622535 0.193194 0.18741 
ChinaScience 0 132 379.4177 34.32344 0.483241 0.931571 0.028066 0.151577 
ChinaScience 1 134 154.9612 18.92897 0.443751 0.870256 0.015079 0.194596 
ChinaScience 2 126 376.6629 30.21151 0.735119 0.904167 0.039881 0.182143 
Echinanews 0 681 17.73843 5.124756 -0.00788 0.758166 0.083381 0.31252 
Echinanews 1 675 12.78091 3.461414 0.139861 0.760097 0.117471 0.289642 
Echinanews 2 667 11.33025 3.576085 0.165175 0.732271 0.118491 0.299714 
GlobalTimesBiz 0 420 1.418751 0.923181 0.074846 0.905038 0.091386 0.218465 
GlobalTimesBiz 1 359 1.435945 0.62098 -0.01195 0.902853 0.166566 0.190864 
GlobalTimesBiz 2 294 1.416844 0.674567 0.206548 0.926965 0.103008 0.160326 
globaltimesnews 0 2604 68.13635 17.48317 -0.16221 0.821098 0.074153 0.27603 
globaltimesnews 1 2337 55.11821 13.91803 -0.13357 0.799608 0.099514 0.228262 
globaltimesnews 2 2342 91.49726 20.55112 -0.05307 0.77292 0.071433 0.21118 
Guangming_Daily 0 186 3.787512 0.77312 0.474683 0.923858 0.039382 0.130263 
Guangming_Daily 1 195 3.679684 0.591782 0.559432 0.963009 0.021389 0.033182 
Guangming_Daily 2 192 3.438049 0.773319 0.489776 0.925867 0.011264 0.039961 
ipandacom 0 154 391.4707 84.13981 1.979471 0.931205 0 0 
ipandacom 1 140 368.6261 73.73113 2.203214 0.994737 0 0 
ipandacom 2 150 389.038 81.28636 1.985065 0.972778 0 0 





PDChina 1 725 164.4272 38.62163 0.226868 0.789172 0.096846 0.172158 
PDChina 2 732 200.5797 43.25117 0.322992 0.803743 0.107006 0.18938 
PDChinaBusiness 0 131 38.95799 4.757125 0.325992 0.972673 0.040675 0.125595 
PDChinaBusiness 1 126 36.54358 4.2182 0.433369 0.960119 0.047168 0.087843 
PDChinaBusiness 2 130 36.89944 4.702507 0.540458 0.969643 0.051281 0.052724 
PDChinaHK 0 64 0.440997 0.155357 -0.08891 0.357738 0.058408 0.132961 
PDChinaHK 1 45 0.421429 0.011905 0.182823 0.213861 0.042942 0 
PDChinaHK 2 32 0.570513 0.064103 0 0.070513 0.019231 0.025641 
PDChinaLife 0 144 500.6634 34.74762 0.955772 0.859307 0 0 
PDChinaLife 1 139 183.5273 22.32388 0.810317 0.837229 0 0.027417 
PDChinaLife 2 130 529.3309 44.1338 0.984776 0.830844 0 0 
PDChinaSports 0 117 404.856 27.20306 0.54623 0.675113 0.039456 0.249036 
PDChinaSports 1 93 210.725 13.04405 0.869603 0.68246 0 0.119921 
PDChinaSports 2 111 489.1427 26.36808 0.76661 0.654932 0.007937 0.130045 
ShanghaiEye 0 384 0.941992 1.225532 0.551303 0.730842 0.043848 0.2869 
ShanghaiEye 1 381 0.898791 0.475148 0.371609 0.726645 0.040903 0.331732 
ShanghaiEye 2 383 2.258739 0.982419 0.475136 0.76913 0.050459 0.294421 
SixthTone 0 165 11.55085 5.58002 -0.44681 0.891389 0.032222 0.165972 
SixthTone 1 155 12.84417 6.100976 -0.15109 0.859441 0.049702 0.13502 
SixthTone 2 162 5.496865 3.038274 0.041468 0.740635 0.032143 0.073889 
thepapercn 0 308 1.640078 1.001055 0.004999 0.862441 0.003096 0.110112 
thepapercn 1 372 1.858355 0.962471 0.182616 0.82528 0.012468 0.098598 
thepapercn 2 338 2.235845 0.774358 0.259529 0.854905 0.012249 0.088553 
thouse_opinions 0 232 18.47435 8.589144 -0.51731 0.721235 0.349651 0.263015 
thouse_opinions 1 309 10.18882 4.507881 -0.25397 0.582606 0.38106 0.213214 
thouse_opinions 2 246 14.81051 4.80366 -0.18064 0.647794 0.358834 0.228644 
XHNews 0 1758 68.8341 22.2585 -0.03383 0.547202 0.082967 0.447511 
XHNews 1 1666 65.77557 19.63768 0.067858 0.531222 0.109147 0.395856 
XHNews 2 1722 50.09734 15.58195 0.254124 0.572344 0.105676 0.372048 





XHscitech 1 75 9.064787 3.07594 0.559023 0.932456 0.010526 0.402256 
XHscitech 2 85 9.716548 4.169286 0.439167 0.859524 0.008333 0.170198 
XinhuaTravel 0 58 2963.618 201.1404 0.688596 0.824561 0 0.048246 
XinhuaTravel 1 57 1289.467 90.51852 0.537037 0.953704 0.018519 0.02963 
XinhuaTravel 2 60 2154.821 154.7042 1.129167 0.95 0 0 
yicaichina 0 533 1.558635 1.041927 0.139753 0.779639 0.028697 0.177041 
yicaichina 1 589 2.053764 1.326432 0.076276 0.874749 0.037352 0.109673 












Table C2. Autocorrelation Tests across Flagged Media Accounts 
Media accounts Ljung-Box test Durbin-Watson test 
@BeijingReview X2 = 11.71, p < .01 D-W statistic = 1.07,  p < .01  
@caixin X2 = 3.56, p = .06 D-W statistic = 1.49,  p = .07 
@CCTV X2 = .87, p = .35 D-W statistic = 2.07,  p = .99 
@cgtnafrica X2 = 3.35, p = .07 D-W statistic = 1.85,  p = .44 
@cgtnamerica X2 = .02, p = .90 D-W statistic = 2.04,  p = .51 
@CGTNEurope X2 = 8.81, p < .01  D-W statistic = .28,  p < .01 
@CGTNOfficial X2 = 5.85, p < .05 D-W statistic = 1.76,  p = .26 
@China__Focus X2 = .07, p = .80 D-W statistic = 1.84,  p = .33 
@Chinacultureorg X2 = .37, p = .54 D-W statistic = 1.82,  p = .42 
@ChinaDaily X2 = .85, p = .36 D-W statistic = .07,  p = .36 
@ChinaPlusNews X2 = 1.50, p = .22 D-W statistic = 1.83,  p = .40 
@ChinaScience X2 = 1.30, p = .26 D-W statistic = 1.64,  p = .19 
@Echinanews X2 = 25.54, p < .01 D-W statistic = 1.22,  p < .01 
@GlobalTimesBiz X2 = .28, p = .59 D-W statistic = 1.72,  p = .24 
@globaltimesnews X2 = 7.51, p < .01 D-W statistic = 1.45,  p < .05 
@Guangming_Daily X2 = 1.72, p = .19 D-W statistic = 1.69,  p = .20 
@ipandacom X2 = .43, p = .51 D-W statistic = 1.80,  p = .35 
@PDChina X2 = 1.85, p =.17 D-W statistic = 1.72,  p = .19 
@PDChinaBusiness X2 = .40, p = .48 D-W statistic = 1.83,  p = .48 
@PDChinaHK X2 = .99, p = .32 D-W statistic = 1.67,  p = .22 
@PDChinaLife X2 = 1.39, p = .24 D-W statistic = 1.63,  p = .20 
@PDChinaSports X2 = 3.13, p =.08 D-W statistic = 1.46,  p = .08 
@ShanghaiEye X2 = .10, p = .76 D-W statistic = 1.97,  p = .67 
@SixthTone X2 = .03, p = .87 D-W statistic = 1.05,  p = .72 
@thepapercn X2 = .32, p = .57 D-W statistic = 1.89,  p = .55 
@thouse_opinions X2 = .96, p = .33 D-W statistic = 1.85,  p = .48 
@XHNews X2 = 8.96, p < .01 D-W statistic = 1.46,  p < .05 
@XHscitech X2 = .72, p = .40 D-W statistic = 1.78,  p = .29 
@XinhuaTravel X2 = 4.91, p < .05 D-W statistic = 1.52,  p < .05  
@yicaichina X2 = .30, p = .58 D-W statistic = 1.83,  p = .37 











Table C3. Linear Mixed-effects Models Predicting Audience Engagement 
  Seven days Ten days Fifteen days  
Short term Long term  Short term Long term Short term Long term  
Fixed effects        
Intercept  -4.11 ** (1.28)     -4.11 ** (1.24)     -4.13 ** (1.19)     -4.01 ** (1.16)     -4.00 **  (1.18)    -3.86 ** (1.18)     
Time (T) -0.01 (0.02)    0.01 (0.02)    0.01 (0.01)    0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)    
Level change (I) -0.25 * (0.13)      -0.22 * (0.10)      -0.20 † (0.10)     -0.22 ** (0.08)     -0.17 * (0.08)      -0.20 ** (0.07)     
Trend change (T2) 0.02 (0.03)    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.02 (0.01)    -0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)    
Sentiment  0.06 (0.08)    0.05 (0.06)    0.07 (0.06)    0.02 (0.04)    0.07 (0.05)    0.05 (0.03)    
Daily news -0.01 † (0.00)      -0.00 † (0.00)      -0.00 † (0.00)      -0.00 * (0.00)      -0.00 * (0.00)     -0.00 * (0.00)      
China’s news 0.10 (0.25)    0.08 (0.20)    0.01 (0.22)    -0.08 (0.16)    0.04 (0.16)    -0.14 (0.13)    
Political news 0.15 (0.43)    0.06 (0.31)     -0.08(0.33)    -0.22 (0.26)    -0.10 (0.25)    -0.18 (0.22)    
COVID-19 news -0.74 ** (0.28)     -0.40 † (0.21)      -0.44 † (0.23)      -0.28 (0.17)    -0.48 ** (0.17)     -0.32 * (0.14)      
Followers  0.57 *** (0.10)    0.55 *** (0.10)    0.55 *** (0.10)    0.54 *** (0.09)     0.55 *** (0.09)    0.54 *** (0.09)    
Variance of random 
effects 
      
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 1.208 1.163 1.139 1.088 1.163 1.634 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.387 0.345 0.391 0.343 0.316 0.338 
N (Level 1 units) 386 580 556 831 830 1,245 
N (Level 2 units) 30 30 30 30 30 30 
AIC 864.22 1178.54 1199.90 1627.68 1562.39 2356.71 
BIC 911.69 1230.90 1251.75 1684.35 1619.05 2418.23 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full maximum likelihood estimation. AIC = Akaike Information 
Criterion. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. Short-term models use the same number of dates for pre- and post-intervention 
observations. Long-term models involve additional dates.  





Table C4. Linear Mixed-effects Models Predicting Audience Engagement 
  Short term Long term  
Fixed effects    
Intercept  3.11 (3.14)   4.03 (3.23)   
Time (T) 0.01 (0.01)   0.00 (0.01)   
Level change (I) -0.29 * (0.13)    -0.29 * (0.12)    
Trend change (T2) -0.02 (0.01)   0.00 (0.01)   
Sentiment  0.08 (0.07)   0.12 † (0.07)    
Daily news -0.01 * (0.00)   -0.00 * (0.00)    
China’s news -0.09 (0.32)   -0.44 (0.28)   
Political news -0.09 (0.62)   -0.20 (0.51)   
COVID-19 news -1.17 ** (0.41)   -0.93 ** (0.36)   
Followers  0.10 (0.22)   0.05 0.23)   
Variance of random effects   
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 0.789 0.851 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.548 0.567 
N (Level 1 units) 467 703 
N (Level 2 units) 13 13 
AIC 1119.70 1677.20 
BIC 1169.46 1731.86 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full 
maximum likelihood estimation. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. BIC = 
Bayesian Information Criterion.  






Table C5. Linear Mixed-effects Models Predicting Likes and Retweets 
 Likes  Retweets  
  Short term Long term  Short term Long term  
Fixed effects      
Intercept  -4.20 ** (1.23)     -4.23 ** (1.25)     -2.57 * (0.96)      -2.58 * (0.95)      
Time (T) 0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)   
Level change (I) -0.19 ** (0.07)     -0.20 *** (0.06)    -0.14 *  (0.06)     -0.13 * (0.05)      
Trend change (T2) -0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.01)    0.01 (0.00)    
Sentiment 0.06 (0.04)    0.05 † (0.03)     0.02 (0.03)    0.02(0.03)    
Daily news -0.00 ** (0.00)     -0.00 *** (0.00)   0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)   
China’s news 0.05 (0.13)    -0.01 (0.11)    0.08 (0.12)    0.02 (0.09)    
Political news -0.22 (0.23)    -0.21 (0.19)    -0.27 (0.21)    -0.17 (0.17)    
COVID-19 news -0.42 ** (0.14)     -0.32 ** (0.12)     -0.27 * (0.13)      -0.16 (0.11)    
Followers  0.59 *** (0.10)    0.60 *** (0.10)    0.37 *** (0.08)     0.38 *** (0.08)    
Variance of random effects     
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 1.274 1.317 0.762 0.753 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.320 0.343 0.266 0.262 
N (Level 1 units) 1,097 1,644 1,097 1,644 
N (Level 2 units) 30 30 30 30 
AIC 2038.03 3090.38 1822.00 2637.55 
BIC 2098.03 3155.24 1882.00 2702.41 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full maximum likelihood estimation. 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion.  







Table C6. Linear Mixed-effects Models Predicting Non-equivalent Outcomes 
  Sentiment  Daily news China’s news Political news 
Fixed effects      
Intercept  -0.47 (0.44)    -0.11 (0.93)   0.49 * (0.24)      0.01 (0.09) 
Time (T) 0.00 (0.00)    0.01 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 * (0.00)    
Level change (I) -0.01 (0.06)    -0.06 (0.06)    0.00 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.01) 
Trend change (T2) 0.00 (0.01)    -0.01 (0.01)    -0.00 † (0.00)      0.00 (0.00)    
Daily news 0.00 (0.00)           0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    
Sentiment         -0.05 † (0.03)    0.04 *** (0.01)   -0.01 * (0.00)   
China’s news 0.52 *** (0.10)    -0.11 (0.12)           0.03 † (0.02) 
Political news -0.45 *  (0.19)     0.24 (0.20)   0.12 * (0.05)            
COVID-19 news -0.06 (0.12)    -0.02 (0.13)   -0.14 *** (0.03)    0.02(0.02) 
Followers  0.03 (0.04)    0.23 ** (0.07)   0.02 (0.02)    0.00 (0.01)    
Variance of random effects     
Level 2: τ0
2= Var(U0j) 0.153 0.726 0.048 0.006 
Level 1: δ2 = Var(Rij) 0.226 0.250 0.017 0.006 
N (Level 1 units) 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 
N (Level 2 units) 30 30 30 30 
AIC 1599.72 1752.06 -1196.16 -2409.27 
BIC 1654.72 1807.06 -1141.16 -2354.26 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Full maximum likelihood estimation. 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. Daily news is log-transformed 
values of the number of tweets posted per day by each account. 








Adena, M., Enikolopov, R., Petrova, M., Santarosa, V., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2015). Radio and the 
rise of the Nazis in prewar Germany. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1885–
1940. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv030 
Aggarwal, C. C., & Zhai, C. (Eds.). (2012). Mining text data. London, UK: Springer Science + 
Business Media. 
Ahern, T. J. (1984). Determinants of foreign coverage in US newspapers. In R. L. Stevenson & 
D. L. Shaw (Eds.), Foreign news and the new world information order (pp. 217–236). 
Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. 
Althaus, S. L., Cizmar, A. M., & Gimpel, J. G. (2009). Media supply, audience demand, and the 
geography of news consumption in the United States. Political Communication, 26(3), 249–
277. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600903053361 
Amazeen, M. A. (2020). Journalistic interventions: The structural factors affecting the global 
emergence of fact-checking. Journalism, 21(1), 95–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917730217 
Amsden, A. H. (2001). The rise of “the rest”: Challenges to the west from late-industrializing 
economies. London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
AP. (2016). China state broadcaster rebrands in international push. Retrieved from Associated 
Press website: https://apnews.com/article/c8504edb9ae3432f8ec42c2e617fc6a8 
Aronczyk, M. (2013). Branding the nation: The global business of national identity. London, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
Bailard, C. S. (2012). A field experiment on the Internet’s effect in an African election: Savvier 






Bailard, C. S. (2016). China in Africa: An analysis of the effect of Chinese media expansion on 
African public opinion. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(4), 446–471. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161216646733 
Balmas, M. (2017). Bad news: The changing coverage of national leaders in foreign media of 
Western democracies. Mass Communication & Society, 20(5), 663–685. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2017.1323104 
Banks, G. C., Woznyj, H. M., Wesslen, R. S., & Ross, R. L. (2018). A review of best practice 
recommendations for text analysis in R (and a user-friendly app). Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 33(4), 445–459. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-017-9528-3 
Barberá, P. (2015). Birds of the same feather tweet together: Bayesian ideal point estimation 
using Twitter data. Political Analysis, 23(1), 76–91. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpu011 
Bastos, M., & Farkas, J. (2019). “Donald Trump is my president!”: The Internet Research 
Agency propaganda machine. Social Media + Society, 5(3), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119865466 
Bauer, P. C., & von Hohenberg, C. B. (2020). Believing and sharing information by fake 
sources: An experiment. Political Communication, 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/mrxvc 
Baum, M. (2003). Soft news goes to war: Public opinion and American foreign policy in the new 
media age. New York, NY: Princeton University Press. 
Bennett, W. L. (2003). The burglar alarm that just keeps ringing: A response to Zaller. Political 






Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the 
personalization of contentious politics. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5), 739–
768. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661 
Berger, J. (2014). Word of mouth and interpersonal communication: A review and directions for 
future research. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 24(4), 586–607. 
https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2014.05.002 
Berger, J., & Milkman, K. L. (2012). What makes online content viral? Journal of Marketing 
Research, 49(2), 192–205. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.10.0353 
Bimber, B. (2003). Information and American democracy: Technology in the evolution of 
political power. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bimber, B., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2020). The unedited public sphere. New Media & Society, 
22(4), 700–715. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819893980 
Bjola, C., & Holmes, M. (2015). Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice. London, UK: 
Routledge. 
Boczkowski, P. J., & Mitchelstein, E. (2012). How users take advantage of different forms of 
interactivity on online news sites: Clicking, e-mailing, and commenting. Human 
Communication Research, 38(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2011.01418.x 
Boczkowski, P. J., & Mitchelstein, E. (2013). The news gap: When the information preferences 
of the media and the public diverge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Boczkowski, P. J., & Peer, L. (2011). The choice gap: The divergent online news preferences of 
journalists and consumers. Journal of Communication, 61(5), 857–876. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01582.x 





misinformation through related stories functionality in social media. Journal of 
Communication, 65(4), 619–638. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12166 
Bolsover, G., & Howard, P. (2019). Chinese computational propaganda: Automation, algorithms 
and the manipulation of information about Chinese politics on Twitter and Weibo. 
Information, Communication & Society, 22(14), 2063–2080. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1476576 
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Freeman, J. R., Hitt, M. P., & Pevehouse, J. C. W. (2014). Time series 
analysis for the social sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Brady, A. M. (2009). Marketing dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary 
China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Brady, A. M. (2015). China’s foreign propaganda machine. Journal of Democracy, 26(4), 51–59. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0056 
Bright, J. (2016). The social news gap: How news reading and news sharing diverge. Journal of 
Communication, 66(3), 343–365. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12232 
Bright, J., & Nicholls, T. (2014). The life and death of political news: Measuring the impact of 
the audience agenda using online data. Social Science Computer Review, 32(2), 170–181. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313506845 
Campbell, D. T., & Ross, H. L. (1968). Analysis time-series data in quasi-experimental analysis. 
Law & Society Review, 3(1), 33–54. 
Campbell, S., Zhao, F., Frith, J., & Liang, F. (2021). Imagining 5G: Public sense-making through 
advertising in China and the US. Mobile Media & Communication, 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2050157920985239 





liberty. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. 
International Journal of Communication, 1, 238–266. 
Castells, M. (2011). The rise of the network society. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Castells, M. (2013). Communication power. London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Ceccobelli, D., Quaranta, M., & Valeriani, A. (2020). Citizens’ engagement with popularization 
and with populist actors on Facebook: A study on 52 leaders in 18 Western democracies. 
European Journal of Communication, 35(5), 435–452. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323120909292 
Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics and power. London, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source 
versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 
752–766. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752 
Chang, T. K., & Lee, J. W. (1992). Factors affecting gatekeepers’ selection of foreign news: A 
national survey of newspaper editors. Journalism Quarterly, 69(3), 554–561. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/107769909206900303 
Chang, T. K., Shoemaker, P. J., & Brendlinger, N. (1987). Determinants of international news 
coverage in the US media. Communication Research, 14(4), 396–414. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/009365087014004002 
Chang, Tsan Kuo, & Lin, F. (2014). From propaganda to public diplomacy: Assessing China’s 






Chen, X., Kaye, D. B. V., & Zeng, J. (2021). #PositiveEnergy Douyin: Constructing “playful 
patriotism” in a Chinese short-video application. Chinese Journal of Communication, 14(1), 
97–177. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2020.1761848 
Chia, S. C., & Cenite, M. (2012). Biased news or biased public? An examination of audiences’ 
perceived news bias in an authoritarian press system. Journalism Studies, 13(1), 124–140. 
https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2011.601957 
Chung, M., & Kim, N. (2020). When I learn the news is false: How fact-checking information 
stems the spread of fake news via third-person perception. Human Communication 
Research, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqaa010 
Cobb, R. W., & Elder, C. D. (1971). The politics of agenda-building: An alternative perspective 
for modern democratic theory. The Journal of Politics, 33(4), 892–915. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2128415 
Col Jarred Prier, L. (2017). Commanding the trend: Social media as information warfare. 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, 11(4), 50–85. Retrieved from 
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf 
Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). The costs of connection: How data is colonizing human life 
and appropriating it for capitalism. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Creemers, R. (2017). Cyber China: Upgrading propaganda, public opinion work and social 
management for the twenty-first century. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(103), 85–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1206281 
Crilley, R., Gillespie, M., Vidgen, B., & Willis, A. (2020). Understanding RT’s audiences: 
Exposure not endorsement for Twitter followers of Russian state-sponsored media. 





D’Alessio, D., & Allen, M. (2000). Media bias in presidential elections: A meta‐analysis. 
Journal of Communication, 50(4), 133–156. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2000.tb02866.x 
de Kloet, J., Poell, T., Zeng, G., & Chow, Y. F. (2019). The plaformization of Chinese society: 
Infrastructure, governance, and practice. Chinese Journal of Communication, 12(3), 249–
256. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2019.1644008 
Diamond, L., Plattner, M. F., & Walker, C. (2016). Authoritarianism goes global: The challenge 
to democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
DiMaggio, P., Nag, M., & Blei, D. (2013). Exploiting affinities between topic modeling and the 
sociological perspective on culture: Application to newspaper coverage of US government 
arts funding. Poetics, 41(6), 570–606. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2013.08.004 
Dollar, D. (2007). Asian century or multi-polar century? Retrieved from 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7215/wps4174.pdf?sequence
=1 
Dupree, J. D. (1971). International communication: View from “A window on the world.” 
Gazette, 17, 224–235. 
Economist. (2019). China is using Facebook to build a huge audience around the world. 
Retrieved from Economist website: https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2019/04/20/china-is-using-facebook-to-build-a-huge-audience-around-the-world 
Ellu, J. (1973). Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
Elswah, M., & Howard, P. N. (2020). “Anything that causes chaos”: The organizational behavior 






Entman, R. M. (2008). Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The US case. The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 13(2), 87–102. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208314657 
Esarey, A., & Xiao, Q. (2011). Digital communication and political change in China. 
International Journal of Communication, 5, 298–319. 
Evans, J. A., & Aceves, P. (2016). Machine translation: mining text for social theory. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 42, 21–50. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-081715-074206 
Fahmy, S., Wanta, W., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Mediated public diplomacy: Satellite TV news in 
the Arab world and perception effects. International Communication Gazette, 74(8), 728–
749. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048512459144 
Farkas, J., Schou, J., & Neumayer, C. (2018). Cloaked Facebook pages: Exploring fake Islamist 
propaganda in social media. New Media & Society, 20(5), 1850–1867. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817707759 
Farrell, H. (2012). The consequences of the internet for politics. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 15, 35–52. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-030810-110815 
Freelon, D. (2018). Computational research in the post-API age. Political Communication, 35(4), 
665–668. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1477506 
Freelon, D., Bossetta, M., Wells, C., Lukito, J., Xia, Y., & Adams, K. (2020). Black trolls matter: 
Racial and ideological asymmetries in social media disinformation. Social Science 
Computer Review, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439320914853 
Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The structure of foreign news: The presentation of the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers. Journal of Peace Research, 





Gardner, W., Mulvey, E. P., & Shaw, E. C. (1995). Regression analyses of counts and rates: 
Poisson, overdispersed poisson, and negative binomial models. Psychological Bulletin, 
118(3), 392–404. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.118.3.392 
Garrett, R. K., & Poulsen, S. (2019). Flagging facebook falsehoods: Self-identified humor 
warnings outperform fact checker and peer warnings. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 24(5), 240–258. https://doi.org/10.1093/ccc/zmz012 
Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals’ 
social capital, civic engagement and political participation. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 17(3), 319–336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x 
Gilboa, E. (2005). The CNN effect: The search for a communication theory of international 
relations. Political Communication, 22(1), 27–44. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600590908429 
Golan, G. J. (2008). Where in the world is Africa?: Predicting coverage of Africa by US 
television networks. International Communication Gazette, 70(1), 41–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048507084577 
Golovchenko, Y., Buntain, C., Eady, G., Brown, M. A., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). Cross-platform 
state propaganda: Russian trolls on Twitter and YouTube during the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election. International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(3), 357–389. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220912682 
Gorfinkel, L., Joffe, S., Van Staden, C., & Wu, Y. S. (2014). CCTV’s global outreach: 
Examining the audiences of China’s ‘New Voice’on Africa. Media International Australia, 
151(1), 81–88. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878X1415100111 





content analysis methods for political texts. Political Analysis, 21(3), 267–297. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mps028 
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and 
politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hameleers, M., & van der Meer, T. G. L. A. (2020). Misinformation and polarization in a high-
choice media environment: How effective are political fact-checkers? Communication 
Research, 47(2), 227–250. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650218819671 
Han, R. (2018). Contesting cyberspace in China: Online expression and authoritarian resilience. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Hartig, F. (2016). How China understands public diplomacy: The importance of national image 
for national interests. International Studies Review, 18(4), 655–680. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw007 
Harwit, E. (2008). China’s telecommunications revolution. London, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hassid, J. (2012). Safety valve or pressure cooker? Blogs in Chinese political life. Journal of 
Communication, 62(2), 212–230. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2012.01634.x 
Hayes, A. F. (2006). A primer on multilevel modeling. Human Communication Research, 32(4), 
385–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2006.00281.x 
Headrick, D. R., & Griset, P. (2001). Submarine telegraph cables: Business and politics, 1838–
1939. Business History Review, 75(3), 543–578. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/3116386 





mass media. London, UK: The Bodley Head. 
Hester, A. (1973). Theoretical considerations in predicting volume and direction of international 
information flow. Gazette, 19(4), 239–247. 
Hills, J. (2002). The struggle for control of global communication: The formative century. 
Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Hills, J. (2007). Telecommunications and empire. Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Hindman, M. (2008). The myth of digital democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hong, Y. (2017). Networking China: The digital transformation of the Chinese economy. 
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion. London, 
UK: Yale University Press. 
Howard, P. N. (2006). New media campaigns and the managed citizen. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2013). Democracy’s fourth wave?: digital media and the 
Arab Spring. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Huang, Z. A., & Wang, R. (2020). ‘Panda engagement’ in China’s digital public diplomacy. 
Asian Journal of Communication, 30(2), 118–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2020.1725075 
Huang, Z. A., & Wang, R. U. I. (2019). Building a network to “Tell China stories well”: Chinese 
diplomatic communication strategies on Twitter. International Journal of Communication, 
13, 2984–3007. 
Ingram, M. (2015). Facebook has taken over from Google as a traffic source for news. Retrieved 





Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News coverage of the Gulf Crisis and public opinion: A study 
of agenda-setting, priming, and framing. Communication Research, 20(3), 365–383. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/009365093020003002 
Ji, C., & Liu, H. (2017). Authoritarian media bias in international context: A tale of commercial 
peace. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2956129 
Jiang, M., & Fu, K. W. (2018). Chinese social media and big data: Big data, big brother, big 
profit? Policy & Internet, 10(4), 372–392. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.187 
Jin, D. Y. (2013). The construction of platform imperialism in the Globalization era. TripleC, 
11(1), 145–172. https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v11i1.458 
Jones, T. M., Van Aelst, P., & Vliegenthart, R. (2013). Foreign nation visibility in U.S. news 
coverage: A longitudinal analysis (1950-2006). Communication Research, 40(3), 417–436. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650211415845 
Jowett, G. S., & O’Donnell, V. (2014). Propaganda & persuasion. London, UK: Sage. 
Kaska, K., Beckvard, H., & Minarik, T. (2019). Huawei, 5G and China as a security threat. 
Retrieved from https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOE-Huawei-2019-03-28-
FINAL.pdf 
Kayser, J. (1953). One week’s news: Comparative study of 17 major dailies for a seven-day 
period. Paris, French: UNESCO. 
Keane, M., & Yu, H. (2019). A digital empire in the making : China’s outbound digital 
platforms. International Journal of Communication, 13, 4624–4641. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 






King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How censorship in China allows government 
criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review, 107(2), 
326–343. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014 
King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017). How the Chinese government fabricates social media 
posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. American Political Science Review, 
111(3), 484–501. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000144 
Kiousis, S., Mitrook, M., Wu, X., & Seltzer, T. (2006). First-and second-level agenda-building 
and agenda-setting effects: Exploring the linkages among candidate news releases, media 
coverage, and public opinion during the 2002 Florida gubernatorial election. Journal of 
Public Relations Research, 18(3), 265–285. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s1532754xjprr1803_4 
Kokas, A. (2018). Predicting volatility between China and Hollywood: Using network 
management to understand Sino-US film collaboration. Global Media & Communication, 
14(3), 233–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/1742766518759797 
Kraft, P. W., Krupnikov, Y., Milita, K., Ryan, J. B., & Soroka, S. (2020). Social media and the 
changing information environment: Sentiment differences in read versus recirculated news 
content. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfaa015 
Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm offensive: How China’s soft power is transforming the world. 
London, UK: Yale University Press. 
Kwak, H., Lee, C., Park, H., & Moon, S. (2010). What is Twitter, a social network or a news 
media? In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, 591–600. 
https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1145/1772690.1772751 





relationship between political candidates and the media in the 2002 Michigan governor’s 
race. Journal of Political Marketing, 9(3), 186–206. 
Lane, D. S., Lee, S. S., Liang, F., Kim, D. H., Shen, L., Weeks, B. E., & Kwak, N. (2019). Social 
media expression and the political self. Journal of Communication, 69(1), 49–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy064 
Lang, G. E., & Lang, K. (1991). Watergate: An exploration of the agenda-building process. In D. 
Protess & M. E. McCombs (Eds.), Agenda setting. Readings on media, public opinion and 
policymaking (pp. 277–289). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Lasswell, H. D. (1938). Propaganda technique in the world war. New York, NY: Peter Smith. 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Merton, R. K. (1948). Mass communication, popular taste and organized 
social action. Media Studies: A Reader, 2nd Edn.(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999), (1948), 18–30. 
Lazer, D. M. J., Pentland, A., Watts, D. J., Aral, S., Athey, S., Contractor, N., … Wagner, C. 
(2020). Computational social science: Obstacles and opportunities. Science, 369(6507), 
1060–1062. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz8170 
Lee, C. C. (2012). China as a rising world power: Chinese press discourses. Chinese Journal of 
Communication, 5(1), 38–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2011.647742 
Lee, C. C., & Yang, J. (1996). Foreign news and national interest: Comparing US and Japanese 
coverage of a Chinese student movement. International Communication Gazette, 56(1), 1–
18. https://doi.org/10.1177/001654929605600101 
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). 
Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. 






Liang, F. (2019). The New Silk Road on Facebook: How China’s official media cover and frame 
a national initiative for global audiences. Communication & the Public, 4(4), 261–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047319894654 
Livingston, S. (1997). Clarifying the CNN effect: An examination of media effects according to 
type of military intervention. London, UK: Public Policy. 
Livingstone, S. (2019). Audiences in an age of datafication: Critical questions for media 
research. Television & New Media, 20(2), 170–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476418811118 
Lorentzen, P. (2014). China’s strategic censorship. American Journal of Political Science, 58(2), 
402–414. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12065 
Lucas, C., Nielsen, R. A., Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., Storer, A., & Tingley, D. (2015). 
Computer-assisted text analysis for comparative politics. Political Analysis, 23(2), 254–277. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpu019 
Lukito, J. (2020). Coordinating a multi-platform disinformation campaign: Internet Research 
Agency activity on three U.S. social media platforms, 2015 to 2017. Political 
Communication, 37(2), 238–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1661889 
Lukito, J., Suk, J., Zhang, Y., Doroshenko, L., Kim, S. J., Su, M. H., … Wells, C. (2020). The 
wolves in sheep’s clothing: How Russia’s Internet Research Agency tweets appeared in 
U.S. news as Vox populi. International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(2), 196–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161219895215 
MacKinnon, R. (2008). Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in 





Malone, G. D. (1985). Managing public diplomacy. Washington Quarterly, 8(3), 199–213. 
Margolin, D. B., Hannak, A., & Weber, I. (2018). Political fact-checking on Twitter: When do 
corrections have an effect? Political Communication, 35(2), 196–219. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1334018 
Mattoni, A., & Ceccobelli, D. (2018). Comparing hybrid media systems in the digital age: A 
theoretical framework for analysis. European Journal of Communication, 33(5), 540–557. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323118784831 
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. https://doi.org/10.1086/267990 
Mena, P. (2019). Cleaning up social media: The effect of warning labels on likelihood of sharing 
false news on Facebook. Policy & Internet, 12(2), 165–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.214 
Miladi, N. (2006). Satellite TV news and the Arab diaspora in Britain: Comparing Al-Jazeera, 
the BBC and CNN. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(6), 947–960. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830600761552 
Miller, B. (2018). The limits of commercialized censorship in China. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101417/1/miller_limits_of_commercialized_censorship_in_china.pdf 
Miller, M. L., & Vaccari, C. (2020). Digital threats to democracy: Comparative lessons and 
possible remedies. International Journal of Press/Politics, 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220922323 
Min, B., & Luqiu, L. R. (2020). Howpropaganda techniques leverage their advantages: A cross-
national study of the effects of Chinese international propaganda on the U.S. and South 






Molina, M., & Garip, F. (2019). Machine learning for sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 
45, 27–45. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073117-041106 
Morozov, E. (2011). Liberation technology: whither Internet control? Journal of Democracy, 
22(2), 62–74. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0022 
Napoli, P. M. (2011). Audience evolution: New technologies and the transformation of media 
audiences. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Nassetta, J., & Gross, K. (2020). State media warning labels can counteract the effects of foreign 
disinformation. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, 1, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-45 
Nechushtai, E. (2018). From liberal to polarized liberal? Contemporary US news in Hallin and 
Mancini’s typology of news systems. International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(2), 183–
201. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218771902 
Nelson, J. L. (2019). The next media regime: The pursuit of ‘audience engagement’ in 
journalism. Journalism, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884919862375 
Nieminen, S., & Rapeli, L. (2019). Fighting misperceptions and doubting journalists’ objectivity: 
A review of fact-checking literature. Political Studies Review, 17(3), 296–309. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918786852 
Nip, J. Y., & Sun, C. (2018). China’s news media tweeting, competing with US sources. 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 13(1), 98–122. 
https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.292 
Nisbet, M. C. (2008). Agenda building. In W. Donsbach & W. Donsbach (Eds.), The 





Nossek, H. (2004). Our news and their news: The role of national identity in the coverage of 
foreign news. Journalism, 5(3), 343–368. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884904044941 
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York, NY: Public 
Affairs. 
Nye, J. S. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699 
Nyhan, B., Porter, E., Reifler, J., & Wood, T. J. (2020). Taking fact-checks literally but not 
seriously? The effects of journalistic fact-checking on factual beliefs and candidate 
favorability. Political Behavior, 42(3), 939–960. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-
09528-x 
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010). When corrections fail: The persistence of political 
misperceptions. Political Behavior, 32(2), 303–330. 
Nyri, P. (2017). Reporting for China: How Chinese correspondents work with the world. Seattle, 
WA: University of Washington Press. 
O’Connor, B., Bamman, D., & Smith, N. A. (2011). Computational text analysis for social 
science: Model assumptions and complexity. Second Workshop on Comptuational Social 
Science and the Wisdom of Crowds, 1–8. Retrieved from 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.228.3731&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
Östgaard, E. (1965). Factors influencing the flow of news. Journal of Peace Research, 2(1), 39–
63. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200103 






Pamment, J. (2012). New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy 
and practice. London, UK: Routledge. 
Pan, Z., & McLeod, J. M. (1991). Multilevel analysis in mass communication research. 
Communication Research, 18(2), 140–173. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/009365091018002002 
Papacharissi, Z. (2015). Affective publics: Sentiment, technology, and politics. London, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Parks, L., & Starosielski, N. (2015). Signal traffic: Critical studies of media infrastructures. 
Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Pearce, K. E., & Kendzior, S. (2012). Networked authoritarianism and social media in 
Azerbaijan. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 283–298. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01633.x 
Plantin, J. C., & de Seta, G. (2019). WeChat as infrastructure: The techno-nationalist shaping of 
Chinese digital platforms. Chinese Journal of Communication, 12(3), 257–273. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2019.1572633 
Prior, M. (2007). Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political 
involvement and polarizes elections. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ramsay, C. R., Matowe, L., Grilli, R., Grimshaw, J. M., & Thomas, R. E. (2003). Interrupted 
time series designs in health technology assessment: Lessons from two systematic reviews 
of behavior change strategies. International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health 
Care, 19(4), 613–623. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266462303000576 
Rawnsley, G. (1997). Radio diplomacy and propaganda: The BBC and VOA in international 






Reinemann, C., Stanyer, J., Scherr, S., & Legnante, G. (2012). Hard and soft news: A review of 
concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism, 13(2), 221–239. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911427803 
Repnikova, M., & Fang, K. (2018). Authoritarian participatory persuasion 2.0: Netizens as 
thought work collaborators in China. Journal of Contemporary China, 27(113), 763–779. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1458063 
Roberts, M. E. (2018). Censored: Distraction and diversion inside China’s Great Firewall. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., & Airoldi, E. M. (2016). A model of text for experimentation in 
the social sciences. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 111(515), 988–1003. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2016.1141684 
Rosengren, K. E. (1974). International news: Methods, data and theory. Journal of Peace 
Research, 11(2), 145–156. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234337401100208 
Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution 
of three media effects models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9–20. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326_5.x 
Schiller, D. (2011). Geopolitical-economic conflict and network infrastructures. Chinese Journal 
of Communication, 4(1), 90–107. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2011.544085 
Schramm, W. (1959). One day in the world’s press: Fourteen great newspapers on a day of 
crisis. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 
Scott, D. (2015). China’s public diplomacy rhetoric, 1990–2012: Pragmatic image-crafting. 






Segev, E. (2015). Visible and invisible countries: News flow theory revised. Journalism, 16(3), 
412–428. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884914521579 
Shah, D. V., Cappella Ramesh, J. N., & Neuman, W. R. (2015). Big data, digital media, and 
computational social science: Possibilities and perils. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 659(1), 6–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215572084 
Shambaugh, D. (2007). China’s propaganda system: Institutions, processes and efficacy. In K. E. 
Brodsgaard (Ed.), Critical readings on the Chinese Communist Party (pp. 731–751). 
Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill. 
Sharma, M., Yadav, K., Yadav, N., & Ferdinand, K. C. (2017). Zika virus pandemic—analysis 
of Facebook as a social media health information platform. American Journal of Infection 
Control, 45(3). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2016.08.022 
Sheafer, T., & Gabay, I. (2009). Mediated public diplomacy: A strategic contest over 
international agenda building and frame building. Political Communication, 26(4), 447–
467. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600903297240 
Shin, J., Jian, L., Driscoll, K., & Bar, F. (2017). Political rumoring on Twitter during the 2012 
US presidential election: Rumor diffusion and correction. New Media & Society, 19(8), 
1214–1235. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816634054 
Shin, Y. (2017). Time series analysis in the social sciences: The fundamentals. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Shoemaker, P. J., & Vos, T. (2009). Gatekeeping theory. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Simpson, C. (2015). Science of coercion: Communication research and psychological warfare, 





Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. (1999). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and advanced 
multilevel modeling. Sage. 
Soroka, S., Daku, M., Hiaeshutter-Rice, D., Guggenheim, L., & Pasek, J. (2018). Negativity and 
positivity biases in economic news coverage: Traditional versus social media. 
Communication Research, 45(7), 1078–1098. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650217725870 
Sparks, C. (2019). An emerging cultural imperialist. In O. Boyd-Barrett & T. Mirrlees (Eds.), 
Media imperialism: Continuity and change (pp. 275–289). London, UK: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Starosielski, N. (2015). The undersea network. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Stewart, B. M., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2009). Use of force and civil–military relations in Russia: an 
automated content analysis. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(2), 319–343. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310902975455 
Stockmann, D. (2011). Race to the bottom: Media marketization and increasing negativity 
toward the United States in China. Political Communication, 28(3), 268–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2011.572447 
Stockmann, D., & Gallagher, M. E. (2011). Remote control: How the media sustain authoritarian 
rule in China. Comparative Political Studies, 44(4), 436–467. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010394773 
Stoycheff, E., & Nisbet, E. C. (2014). What’s the bandwidth for democracy? Deconstructing 
Internet penetration and citizen attitudes about governance. Political Communication, 31(4), 
628–646. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2013.852641 
Strauß, N., Huber, B., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2020). “Yes, I saw it–but didn’t read it…” A cross-





across platforms. Digital Journalism, 8(9), 1181–1205. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1832130 
Sundar, S. S. (2008). The MAIN model: A heuristic approach to understanding technology 
effects on credibility. In M. J. Metzger & A. J. Flanagin (Eds.), Digital media, youth, and 
credibility (pp. 73–100). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/dmal.9780262562324.073 
Svensson, M. (2014). Voice, power and connectivity in China’s microblogosphere: Digital 
divides on SinaWeibo. China Information, 28(2), 168–188. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X14540082 
The Guardian. (2019). Revealed: How TikTok censors videos that do not please Beijing. 
Retrieved from The Guardian website: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-
that-do-not-please-beijing 
Thorson, E. (2016). Belief echoes: The persistent effects of corrected misinformation. Political 
Communication, 33(3), 460–480. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187 
Thussu, D. K. (2018). A new global communication order for a multipolar world. 
Communication Research & Practice, 4(1), 52–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2018.1432988 
Thussu, D. K., De Burgh, H., & Shi, A. (2017). China’s media go global. London, UK: 
Routledge. 
Timmons, H., & Horwitz, J. (2016). China’s propaganda news outlets are absolutely crushing it 






Trilling, D., Tolochko, P., & Burscher, B. (2017). From newsworthiness to shareworthiness: 
How to predict news sharing based on article characteristics. Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 94(1), 38–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016654682 
Tsai, W. H. (2017). Enabling China’s voice to be heard by the world: Ideas and operations of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s external propaganda system. Problems of Post-Communism, 
64(3–4), 203–213. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1236667 
Tunstall, J. (1977). The media are American. London, UK: Constable. 
Twitter. (n.d.). About government and state-affiliated media account labels on Twitter. Retrieved 
from https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/state-affiliated-china 
Valenzuela, S. (2013). Unpacking the use of social media for protest behavior: The roles of 
information, opinion expression, and activism. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(7), 920–
942. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764213479375 
van Dijck, J., Poell, T., & de Waal, M. (2018). The platform society: Public values in a 
connective world. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Wagner, A. K., Soumerai, S. B., Zhang, F., & Ross-Degnan, D. (2002). Segmented regression 
analysis of interrupted time series studies in medication use research. Journal of Clinical 
Pharmacy and Therapeutics, 27(4), 299–309. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-
2710.2002.00430.x 
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world system. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Walter, D., Sheafer, T., Nir, L., & Shenhav, S. (2016). Not all countries are created equal: 
Foreign countries prevalence in U.S. news and entertainment media. Mass Communication 
& Society, 19(4), 522–541. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2016.1170853 





what works and for whom. Political Communication, 37(3), 350–375. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1668894 
Wang, J. (2011). Soft power in China: Public diplomacy through communication. London, UK: 
Springer. 
Wanta, W., Golan, G., & Lee, C. (2004). Agenda setting and international news: Media influence 
on public perceptions of foreign nations. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 
81(2), 364–377. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900408100209 
Wasserman, H., & Madrid-morales, D. (2018). How influential are Chinese media in Africa? An 
audience analysis in Kenya and South Africa. International Journal of Communication, 12, 
2212–2231. 
Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, partisanship, and misperceptions: How anger and anxiety 
moderate the effect of partisan bias on susceptibility to political misinformation. Journal of 
Communication, 65(4), 699–719. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164 
Welbers, K., Van Atteveldt, W., & Benoit, K. (2017). Text analysis in R. Communication 
Methods & Measures, 11(4), 245–265. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/1 
9312458.2017.1387238 
Winseck, D., & Pike, R. M. (2007). Communication and empire: Media, markets, and 
globalization, 1860–1930. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Winseck, D., & Pike, R. M. (2009). The global media and the empire of liberal internationalism, 
Circa 1910–301. Media History, 15(1), 31–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/13688800802176961 
Woolley, S. C., & Howard, P. N. (Eds.). (2018). Computational propaganda: Political parties, 






Wright, K., Scott, M., & Bunce, M. (2020). Soft power, hard news: How journalists at state-
funded transnational media legitimize their work. International Journal of Press/Politics, 
25(4), 607–631. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220922832 
Wu, H. D. (2000). Systemic determinants of international news coverage: A comparison of 38 
countries. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 110–130. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2000.tb02844.x 
Wu, Y. S. (2016). China’s media and public diplomacy approach in Africa: Illustrations from 
South Africa. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(1), 81–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2016.1139606 
Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation, 
performed: Self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information 
Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646–1664. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1621921 
Xu, X. (2021). To repress or to co‐opt? Authoritarian control in the age of digital surveillance. 
American Journal of Political Science, 65(2), 309–325. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12514 
Yang, G. (2009). The power of the Internet in China: Citizen activism online. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
Yang, T., & Peng, Y. (2020). The importance of trending topics in the gatekeeping of social 
media news engagement: A natural experiment on Weibo. Communication Research, 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650220933729 
Youmans, W. L., & Powers, S. (2012). Remote negotiations: International broadcasting as 





Youmans, W. L., & York, J. C. (2012). Social media and the activist toolkit: User agreements, 
corporate interests, and the information infrastructure of modern social movements. Journal 
of Communication, 62(2), 315–329. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01636.x 
Young, L., & Soroka, S. (2012). Affective news: The automated coding of sentiment in political 
texts. Political Communication, 29(2), 205–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.671234 
Zamith, R. (2018). Quantified audiences in news production: A synthesis and research agenda. 
Digital Journalism, 6(4), 418–435. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2018.1444999 
Zamith, R., Belair-Gagnon, V., & Lewis, S. C. (2020). Constructing audience quantification: 
Social influences and the development of norms about audience analytics and metrics. New 
Media and Society, 22(10), 1763–1784. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819881735 
Zhao, Y. (2010). China’s pursuits of indigenous innovations in information technology 
developments: Hopes, follies and uncertainties. Chinese Journal of Communication, 3(3), 
266–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2010.499628 
Zollmann, F. (2019). Bringing propaganda back into news media studies. Critical Sociology, 
45(3), 329–345. https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920517731134 
 
 
 
 
 
